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 Though commonly overlooked, communities of displaced persons often play a complex 
and significant role in the emergence and perpetuation of ethnic conflict. This paper looks at the 
intersection of these themes in the conflict between the former Soviet Republic of Georgia and 
the separatist region of Abkhazia. In particular it looks at the nature of protracted or “frozen” 
conflict with particular attention to the role of the displaced community in the conflict’s 
entrenchment. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question: why do certain conflicts go 
unresolved for so long, and what role do refugees play in this resolution resistance? The paper is 
based on field research conducted in Georgia, including interviews with 45 Georgian internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia. The results of the study suggest that various forces and 
motivations acting on the IDP community have the effect of entrenching it i the ambiguous state 
of neither returning to Abkhazia nor integrating into Georgian society that has become the status 
quo, and that this entrenchment plays a role in the factors that contribute o the frozen state of the 
conflict. In particular, the study suggests that power and identity play an unexpectedly large role 
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 The double-decker tour bus was heading from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, sk rting the 
southeast corner of the Black Sea towards some ocean-side resort in Turkey. Passing through the 
Georgian sea-side city of Batumi, two Georgian men on board were playing cards to pass the time 
of the multi-day journey. “This is foolish,” one of the men joked to the other. “Why are we going 
all this way to Turkey – why don’t we just go to Sukhumi?” Other riders sitting around the men 
laughed, betraying the joke’s context.   
 Sukhumi is the capital city of Abkhazia, a region on the northeast shores of the Black 
Sea. The region is internationally recognized as part of the Republic of Georgia, but gained de-
facto independence from the emerging state in a bloody war fought just after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Although the war was halted by a ceasefire in 1994, the conflict between Abkhazia and 
Georgia remains unresolved today, leaving the people of both nations in a state of legal limbo and 
uncertain status.  
 From that ceasefire in 1994 until recently the world saw comparatively l ttle violence 
coming from the region, as the urgency of negotiations and the conflict cooled and came to an 
apparent stand-still. However, in August of 2008, the headlines of international media outlets 
were saturated with news from Georgia. It what has come to be called by some a  “The August 
War” Russian and Georgian forces clashed in a brief but highly destructive war. The conflict was 
sparked over the other of Georgia’s separatist regions, South Ossetia, which although distinct 
shares much in common with Abkhazia in terms of history and relations with Georgia. However, 
the fighting that began in and around this region quickly spread to Western Georgia as an 
additional front opened along the Georgian-Abkhazian border. Russian forces, acting on behalf of 
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the separatist regions, whose claim for independence they support, advanced into Georgian 
territory, attacking its military and state infrastructure for roughly one week before withdrawing 
amid increasing pressure and criticism from the international community.  
 The outcomes of this recent round of fighting are not yet clear at the time that this 
document is being written, nor is it clear that the recent round of fighting is entirely over, as 
occasional skirmishes, kidnappings, and casualties from paramilitary activity continue to occur. 
As far as is known to the public, settlement negotiations regarding the substantive issues of 
sovereignty and status have yet to take place, and it is uncertain as to what the status of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia will be when or if they are completed. However, despite the uncertainty that 
currently surrounds these conflicts, one thing that is clear is the importance of these conflicts’ 
history as a source of understanding the recent round of violence in them. The initial periods of 
violence that began these conflicts, the ceasefires that in theory ended them, and the time that has 
passed since then with no resolution and no movement towards either peace or renewed war is all 
the more relevant due to recent events. The ceasefires that were signed in the early 1990’s and 
their failure to initiate a fruitful peace process ought to be the subj ct of serious thought and study 
for the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), and any other entity that seeks to serve as a third party in the settlement of 
these conflicts.  
 Understanding why these cease-fires did not lead to a meaningful resolution f the 
conflict, and understanding the so-called frozen period that followed, and the dynamics that held 
it in this stagnant state are crucial to constructing a successful and implementable peace 
agreement at the conclusion of the current round of fighting.   
 Conflicts such as the one between Georgia and Abkhazia are representative of the kind of 
conflict that has proliferated since the fall of the Soviet Union. Perhaps there were some for 
whom this fall marked the emergence of a new, more peaceful world order. Nearly two decades 
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later, the major military powers of the world are no longer at war, but the presence of violent 
conflict has not abated. Rather, armed conflicts within states and between smaller states have 
emerged throughout the world. There are many names given to the armed conflicts that persist 
today: international, intrastate, inter-communal, ethnic conflict, ethno-national conflict, border 
wars, separatist wars, and so on. While these conflicts take place under vastly different conditions 
and for various reasons, many of them are similar in that they are resistant to conventional 
conflict resolution methods.  A number of these resolution-resistant, or inractable, conflicts 
erupted in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. In several of the newly formed states such 
as Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan full-scale armed conflict erupted shortly after 
independence. Yet while these regions have not until recently experi nc d such high levels of 
violence as those in the early-1990s, all of these conflicts have yet to s e the implementation of a 
successful peace agreement. These have commonly been referred to as “frozen” conflicts, mostly 
due to this lack of progress or action. This type of conflict, and the painful stagnation that it tends 
to display, is the primary concern of this paper.  
  The conflicts referred to as frozen appear to have a different dynamic than the wider set 
of conflicts that are thought of as intractable. While both are characterized by continuation over a 
long period of time and a general resistance to resolution, intractable conflict ften has a cyclical 
dynamic: phases of relative violence followed by quieter periods, followed in turn by resurgent 
violence. The conflicts in Israel-Palestine and in Sri Lanka are examples of intractable conflict; 
something as simple as international news coverage demonstrates the cyclical pattern whereby 
these conflicts will occasionally flare-up, dominating headlines around the world, only to remain 
relatively quiet for a period of time. By contrast, frozen conflict tends to behave a bit differently. 
Rather than going through cycles of violence and relative calm, frozen conflict goes through an 
initial wave of intense violence which is then stopped by a ceasefire (often internationally 
enforced). This begins a long period of stagnation where violence remains low but parties see no 
4 
resolution to the issues of dispute and little movement in the peace process. Think, for example, 
of the conflict in Cyprus or the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh involving Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
When these conflicts each reached their respective breaking points, they commanded a great deal 
of international attention. However, since these conflicts descended from the height of intensity in 
the mid 1970’s and early 1990’s respectively, the international community has heard relatively 
little from them, although neither has been resolved.   
During this period of no war- no peace, parties may seem to return to normalcy, entering 
a post conflict phase before the conflict has actually ended. Sizable populations of displaced 
persons and internally displaced persons (IDPs) serve as reminder that the conflict is not over 
until it is resolved. As frozen conflict goes unsettled and stagnates, those displaced by the initial 
conflict remain unable to return despite low levels of violence. The Gre k Cypriots that were 
displaced in 1974 and have yet to return to their former homes in North Cyprus are an example of 
such a population.  
The conflict between the Republic of Georgia and Abkhazia, its breakaway region, is an 
example of frozen conflict. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Abkhazian and Georgian forces 
engaged in a brief, intense war over the sovereignty of the region. Intervention by the 
international community resulted in a ceasefire in 1994, which has more or less he d until the 
recent round of fighting between Georgia and Russia. Efforts by government officials to negotiate 
a settlement have been unsuccessful, and despite the relative absence of subs quent violence 
between the groups, the conflict remains unresolved. Between 200,000 and 300,000 ethnic 
Georgians were displaced from Abkhazia during the war of the early 1990’s, a population of 
uncertain status central to the frozen nature of the conflict. IDP policies, nterests, and actions 
have a significant impact on this population, the conflict, and on the peacebuilding groups that 
attempt to work with them. Furthermore, IDP policy and IDP communities ar  key factors in 
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conflict settlement and must be taken into account by third parties involved in the negotiations of 
these settlements. 
  What accounts for the longevity of frozen conflict? Why do frozen conflicts go 
unresolved for so long, and why do they not simply fade away? This paper will turn to he 
existing literature in several related fields, and the case of Georgia and Abkhazia in particular in 
an attempt to answer these questions. The pursuit of these questions will i clude the study of 
displaced populations, their role in such conflicts, their view of return, and an understanding of 
the obstacles that stand in the way of return, both real and perceived.    
Focusing on the relationship between frozen conflict and displacement the study suggest  
that there are two plausible alternative rival hypotheses that explain the role of displaced persons 
in frozen conflict, examining conflict in the IDP community on two levels. The first hypothesis 
looks at the conflict that occurs on the refugee-government level, and uses the framework of 
William Zartman’s ripeness concept (1989) and Pruitt’s modified readin ss model  (1997, 2007)1 
to explain the continuance of the conflict. In this hypothesis, frozen conflict exists at a sort of 
equilibrium - below ripeness and readiness in intensity and motivation and above peace (or non-
conflict). According to this hypothesis, opposing forces in the conflict are what keep the conflict 
in this sort of equilibrium or limbo. Forces such as peacekeepers, international id programs, and 
state building projects in the separatist regions push the intensity level down, keeping it below the 
level of what we might call ripeness. Meanwhile the presence of an IDP populati n that maintains 
a desire to return pushes the intensity up, keeping the conflict at a level that demands formal 
resolution and prevents the conflict from fading away. This also offers a conceptualization of 
frozen conflict that accommodates the criticisms of post-soviet scholars such as Dov Lynch and 
Charles King, who argue that the term “frozen” is misleading as it betrays what in reality is a 
                                                          
1
 Both ripeness and readiness theories attempt to describe the element of timing in conflict resolution. 
Generally speaking these concepts explain that a conflict is ripe for resolution when the cost of continued 
conflict is perceived to be greater than the cost of settlement. 
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dynamic conflict situation where both parties have changed and grown over time (Lynch, 2001, 
2004; King 2001). If frozen conflict is conceived of as being in a state of equilibrium, held in 
what appears to be a standstill by opposite and opposing forces, this allows for a great deal of 
movement on both sides without significant movement in the conflict and peace process.   
The second hypothesis looks at conflict on the internal level of IDPs, focusing on the 
opposing forces within this population to explain the frozen nature of the conflict. Th s 
hypothesis is informed by Kurt Lewin’s classic force-field analysis framework (1958), and posits 
that although the IDP population claims the desire to return as an official position, there are 
opposing and contradicting forces within IDPs: forces for return and recompense as well as forces 
against return and for stagnation. The conflict of these forces within IDPs, acted out in IDP 
communities, therefore prevents the return of the displaced population while also preventing their 
integration into the host community.  
 To explore these alternative hypotheses, this research looks at the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict and examines the population of IDPs displaced during it. The displaced population in 
Georgia is a major factor in this conflict, and that which this population can tell us about the issue 
of return can in turn tell us about the obstacles or resistance to settlement of the conflict. This 
case study will seek to address questions regarding IDP status, IDP views about return, perceived 
obstacles to return, and whether grassroots peacebuilding has the ability to overcome these 
obstacles. 
 This study specifically analyzes the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and more generally 
discusses the group of ongoing conflicts that are considered frozen. It doesso through a rather 
endogenous lens and looks mostly to the internal dynamics of these conflicts for greater 
understanding of their causes and entrenchment. However, there are a number of ways in which 
these conflicts, and in particular the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, can be interpreted and a 
number of outside factors that could be said to have a significant role. First, many have pointed to 
7 
precedents set since the eruption of these conflicts by both Chechnya and Kosovo. Early analysis 
of these conflicts looked to the outcome of the Chechen war as a precedent for the outcome of 
similar efforts by Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and Transnistria for 
independence. The precedent set by Chechnya was that of a separatist conflict without 
tremendous international involvement ending with the re-absorption of theseparatist entity into 
the state from which it seceded by force (Lynch, 2004). Naturally, in the case of Chechnya Russia 
had that which other former Soviet states do not have: the military capability to repatriate the 
separatist states by force. Yet the frozen state that has followed ceasefire in these conflicts has 
been interpreted simply as the central states like Georgia waiting to build their military to 
sufficient strength.  
 Kosovo has played an equally precedent setting role in the interpretations of the e 
conflicts. In particular, the separatist states involved in these conflicts have pointed to the legal 
interpretations and reasoning of western states for supporting Kosovo’s Independence, and hold 
this reasoning as the legal and political precedent for their own indepe nce. Furthermore, the 
Russian government has pointed to the wide recognition of Kosovo’s independence as a 
precedent for their official recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. 
 Further still, there are interpretations of the “Great Powers” persuasion that paint these 
conflicts as proxy wars in which hostilities between Russia and Soviet successor states, especially 
Georgia, are played out. This interpretation has been seen throughout media coverage of the most 
recent round of fighting in the separatist areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. One can also find 
this interpretation taken a step further, especially in current media analysis, suggesting that the 
hostilities between successor states and Russia as played out in these separatist conflicts, are in 
turn a proxy stage for Russia and the Western powers that have supported the n wly independent 
successor states to confront each other. These and other interpretations of hese conflicts and their 
respective stalemates all offer both insight and scope to the understanding of these conflicts and 
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their causes. While these insights all merit consideration, this analysis will attempt to focus 
endogenous on the causes, factors, and players that drive the dynamics at work in the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict on the micro level.          
 The proceeding paper contains five sections. The first will offer a r view of existing 
literature relevant to the question of what exactly frozen conflict is, and why it tends to display 
such stagnation. The second will provide a background into the case that this study will focus on, 
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The third section will provide an account of the methodology 
used in this study, while the final chapters will offer the results of his study and discussion and 
analysis of these results.    
 The theoretical literature presented will attempt to unpack the concept of frozen conflict 
by looking at the issues surrounding and related to it. Thus, the paper will consider the literature 
in several areas including: the dynamics of protracted/intractable conflict, conflict settlement and 
power sharing, and the timing of peace processes. The literature review will also look at the 
largely sociological and social-psychological theory examining refuge return, theories of social 
forces, and the literature that looks on frozen conflict as a phenomenon of the former Soviet 
sphere. By exploring the theories offered in these fields, the study arrives at two hypotheses 
highlighting possible factors accounting for the longevity of frozen conflict, which will be 
explored in this study. 
I explored these questions in the summer of 2007 on a two-month site visit to the 
Republic of Georgia, collecting data from individuals and organizations includi g IDPs, service 
providers and government officials in various regions of the country. Sources fo  data were 
primarily material collected from NGOs (such as pamphlets, reports, mis ion statements) as well 
as the data collected from interviews with NGO’s and with IDPs. Analysis of the data will 
identify sentiments, fears, and experiences that are common in the IDP community while also 
attempting to recognize certain themes that emerge inductively from in the IDP responses. Some 
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of these themes connect to those which past literature suggest are significant, such as themes of 
return and security. Analysis of the data should suggest that one of the hypotheses presented is 
accurate or that neither is correct. It should also be noted that as this study was conducted in 
2007, the research and data collection was completed well before the recent eruption of violence 
involving Georgia, the separatist regions, and Russia. While this may affect the significance and 
context of this study, it does not affect the findings or accuracy of this study, as the research 
presented herein was focused not on the specific outcomes of this conflict, but on the socio-
political phenomenon of conflict “freezing” of which the Georgian-Abkhazian confli t has been 
an example.  
 The discussion and analysis of these factors may shed a bit of light on the stagnant nature 
of frozen conflict and may even highlight some causes of this stagnation. Furthermore, by looking 
at the role of grassroots peacebuilding in frozen conflict, particularly in respect to their work with 
displaced populations, this project’s conclusions may carry implications about the capacity of 
multi-track peacebuilding to make a significant contribution in such situations and may even raise 
















What accounts for the longevity of frozen conflict, and what role do displaced 
populations play in this? In the attempt to find an answer to these questions in exi ting literature, 
this review will cover prominent theories in several areas. These include the literature on 
intractable and protracted conflict, power sharing, and peace agreements. However, before such 
topics can be explored it is necessary to first develop a definition and understa ing of what is 
meant by the term frozen conflict. The term is often used to describe conflicts whose peace 
process seemingly ends with the imposition of a ceasefire agreement, leaving the initial conflict 
unresolved for years or decades. Yet despite the not uncommon use of this term, there has been 
little development of a working definition or consensus on what it connotes of the conflicts it is 
used to describe.   
It could be said that two central characteristics of frozen conflict are longevity and lack of 
progress in negotiations or peace processes, two characteristics tha  are also central to the related 
designation of intractable conflicts. Both frozen and intractable confli t possesses a certain 
resistance to resolution, and it may even make sense to describe frozen conflict as a particular 
phenomenon within the world of intractability. As such, the literature on intractability will be 
helpful in defining frozen conflict.   
 
Defining Frozen Conflict 
In the most basic sense, we know that protracted conflict is marked by its longevity; yet a 
deeper understanding is necessary to describe the nature of frozen conflict as a type of intractable 
or protracted conflict. Protracted social conflict (PSC) is defined by Edward Azar (as cited in 
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Fisher, 1997, p. 79) as “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time wi h sporadic 
outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity." In developing his theory on 
protracted social conflict, Azar noted the connection of protracted social c nflict to such factors 
as identity, human needs, and underdevelopment. Contrary to realist approaches, Azar argues that 
PSCs in the post-WWII era are carried out primarily by identity based groups rather than by state 
actors. He notes that most conflicts in this era are based on “developmental needs expressed in 
terms of cultural values, human rights and security; as such, they are not easily suppressed, and 
continue to be pursued in the long term by all  means available” (Azar, 1990). These concepts are 
heavily influenced by John Burton’s needs theory and Johan Galtung’s structural approaches to 
violence.  
Galtung’s early work on peace and violence expanded on the common use and 
understanding of violence to incorporate forms of deprivation and denial. Underthis xpanded 
view, social injustice, particularly when institutionalized, is interpr ted as structural violence 
which can be understood as systematic inequality in power and access to resources (Galtung, 
1969). Theories of structural violence are interested in the linkages between political, economic 
and social structures, institutionalized inequality, and overt violence and conflict (Azar, 1990; 
2002), and provide a theoretical foundation for the connection between conflict a d development.  
Burton’s theory of human needs (1997) draws on Galtung’s theory of structural violence. 
Needs theory, Burton explains, emerged as a way of describing the deprivations and problems 
created by structural violence (1997). Needs theory distinguishes between “negotiable interests 
and non-negotiable needs,” indicating also that while the former can be bargained or bartered for, 
the later may require “altered perceptions by the parties concerned, and in some cases agreed 
structural change” (Burton, 1997, p.35). Such non-negotiable needs include those for recognition 
and identity. Burton posits that social conflict and violence are rooted in the desire or attempt to 
secure these non-negotiable needs for one’s self and one’s identity group.  
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Azar conceptualized protracted social conflict as being rooted in such phenomena and 
therefore claimed that traditional means of resolving conflict are insufficient in these contexts: 
“Outcomes (military victories, negotiated agreements, etc.) insofar as they do not satisfy basic 
needs, contain latent conflicts which cause further cycles of manifest violence, often involving a 
shift or spill-over in issues and actors” (Azar, 1990). Azar’s theory of protracted social conflict 
also identifies main characteristics of these conflicts, which may be helpful in conceptualizing 
where frozen conflict stands in theoretical relation to protracted social conflict. The main 
characteristics are:   
•  Protracted hostility and insecurity characterized by periods of armed violence 
and crisis with no clear cycle of genesis, maturity, reduction and termination 
•  Fluctuation in the intensity and frequency of interactions, oscillating between 
overt and covert patterns of conflict, while hostile attitudes continue 
•  Absence of a distinct termination point, where war has become the status quo 
and the threat of peace may mean crisis 
•  Conflict spillover in terms of both actors and issues, so that the conflict is no 
longer intrastate or one-dimensional but regional and multi-causal, with blurring 
of internal and external boundaries of the conflict  (Azar E. , 2002 p.16) 
 
With these characteristics in mind, perhaps we can begin to outline a conceptualization of 
frozen conflict. Building on these characteristics of PSC, frozen confli t might be characterized 
as protracted hostility and insecurity characterized by a single period or series of periods of armed 
violence, ending in a ceasefire enforced by a third party. The second characteristic also helps to 
define frozen conflict if we understand “overt and covert patterns of conflict” more as non-
traditional conflict patterns such as forced economic or political isolat on or operating through 
non-state militias rather than overt armed military aggression. Furthermore, frozen conflict 
typically demonstrates a distinct termination of armed conflict, in this way we might understand 
the third point as absence of a distinct termination of hostilities, where the effects of these 
hostilities (such as displacement) become the status quo. Finally, frozen conflict a  be thought of 
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as demonstrating the conflict spillover that Azar describes in the final point. The two groups of 
characteristics are compared in the table below. 
Characteristics of Protracted Social 
Conflict (PSC) (Azar, 2002) 
Proposed Characteristics of Frozen 
Conflict 
Periods of armed violence and crisis with no 
clear cycle of genesis, maturity, reduction and 
termination 
Single period or series of periods of armed 
violence, ending in a ceasefire enforced by a 
third party 
Fluctuation in the intensity and frequency of 
interactions, oscillating between overt and 
covert conflict patterns. 
Presence of non-traditional conflict patterns 
such as forced economic or political isolation 
or operating through non-state militias rather 
than overt armed military aggression. 
Absence of a distinct termination point, war 
becomes the status quo  
Distinct termination of armed conflict 
without the distinct termination of hostilities 
- where the effects of these hostilities (such 
as displacement or sanctions) become the 
status quo. 
Conflict spillover - the conflict is no longer 
intrastate or one-dimensional but regional and 
multi-causal, blurring of internal and external 
boundaries of the conflict 
Conflict spillover - the conflict is no longer 
intrastate or one-dimensional but regional 
and multi-causal, blurring of internal and 
external boundaries of the conflict 
Table 1: Characteristics of PSC versus Frozen Conflict 
 
The conceptualization of intractability offered by Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess can 
also shed light on the issue of frozen conflict. Burgess and Burgess cite a concept from John 
Burton in defining intractability through the distinction between the long-term, underlying 
(usually intractable) conflict and the innumerable dispute episodes that occur within the context 
of the larger conflict (Burgess & Burgess, 2006). In this sense we might understand frozen 
conflict as this type of long term, underlying and intractable conflict, but where these dispute 
episodes are either so infrequent or low-level, or are played out in less obvious forms such as 
militia activity or structural violence that they do not register as what is commonly considered 
conflict. 




1. In terms of actors, intractable conflicts involve states or other actors with a long sense 
of historical grievance, and a strong desire to redress or avenge these.  
2. In terms of duration, intractable conflicts take place over a long period of time.  
3. In terms of issues, intractable conflicts involve intangible issue ch as identity, 
sovereignty, or values and beliefs.  
4. In terms of relationships, intractable conflicts involve polarized perceptions of 
hostility and enmity, and behavior that is violent and destructive.  
5. In terms of geopolitics, intractable conflicts usually take place where buff r states 
exist between major power blocks or civilizations. 
6. In terms of management, intractable conflicts resist many conflict management 
efforts and have a history of failed peacemaking efforts (Bercovitch, 2003).  
 
All of these characteristics can be seen in ongoing frozen conflicts su h as those in Georgia-
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh or Cyprus.  Although the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict will be 
discussed at length in the next chapter, a brief discussion here will expand upon how this conflict 
reflects Bercovitch’s characteristics listed above. The first characteristic, a long sense of historical 
grievance between actors, is ever-present between Georgians and Abkhazians. There has been 
disagreement over the status of Abkhazia in relation to Georgian since beforoth areas were 
incorporated into the Russian Empire, and the decline over time, in terms of strength and 
numbers, of Abkhazian nationality is a grievance that most Abkhazians blamethe Georgians for. 
In terms of duration, the present conflict has lasted since 1992, although it could be argued that it 
began before the Soviet era. The issues at stake are those of national identity and sovereignty, 
which on both sides have been battered by seventy years of Soviet rule. In terms of relations, both 
Abkhazians and Georgians view the actions of the other actor as direct assaults on their national 
identity and sovereignty. While the parties’ actions have not been overly physicall  destructive 
since the early 1990’s both exhibit behavior that it destructive to their relationship with each other 
and to their chances for resolution. The Georgian government has repeatedly embraced rhetoric 
that calls for reunification and restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, highly aggressive 
language from the Abkhazian point of view. Meanwhile, as Abkhazian leadership moves 
increasingly closer to Russia (for example, carrying Russian passports), they also foster Georgian 
fears of renewed Russian domination. In terms of geopolitical placement the Abkhazian conflict 
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can be thought of not only as a buffer between Georgian and Russia, but between Russia and 
Europe or “the West.” Finally, in terms of conflict management efforts, the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict has resisted multiple negotiation efforts, numerous grassroots peacebuilding projects, and 
attempts by third parties to intervene (Lynch, 2001).  
 In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, historical grievances can be traced bak to the 
emergences of Armenian and Azerbaijani nationalism in the late nineteenth century, as the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region plays a significant role in the mythology of both nations. In duration, 
the current conflict erupted in the late 1980’s and despite the signing of a well-obs rved ceasefire 
in 1994, the conflict still exists as this paper is written. Like the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, the 
issues at stake in Nagorno-Karabakh are those of national identity and sovereignty, which are 
both intangible and non-negotiable (Lynch, 2004).  Polarized perceptions of hostility are present, 
as both groups view the other as an oppressor and part of a hostile coalition. For Armenians, 
Azerbaijan is seen as the close ally and ethnic cousin of its western neighbor, Turkey, leaving 
them mostly surrounded by hostile neighbors, and the majority of their border clos d. Meanwhile 
the significant support that separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh have received from the Armenian 
Diaspora is likely viewed by Azerbaijanis as western support of Armenian aggression. 
Furthermore, highly destructive and violent behavior was seen between 1988 and 1994 (Lynch, 
2004).    
 Geopolitically, Nagorno-Karabakh may be seen as a buffer state between Arm nia and 
Azerbaijan, but it is difficult to see these as major power blocks. However, Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh could be seen as part of a buffer-region (the Caucasus) which makes up 
something of a border region between Christian Europe and the Islamic Near-East. In terms of 
Bercovitch’s final characteristic, the conflict over Nagorno-Karab kh has been resistant to 
resolution and has a history of failed peacemaking efforts, including parallel talks between the 
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OSCE and both Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as bilateral talks between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan hosted in France and later in the U.S. (Lynch, 2004).   
 Like the conflicts in Georgia-Abkhazia and in Nagorno-Karabakh, the frozen conflict in 
Cyprus also reflects the characteristics of intractable conflict as described by Bercovitch (2003). 
The conflict involves Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Although these two specific groups 
share a history of mostly harmonious coexistence, their parent nations, Greeceand Turkey, have a 
long history of hostile and grievous relations that begin as early as theOttoman conquest of the 
Byzantine Empire and Constantinople. The current conflict is most commonly traced to the 
eruption of fighting in that took place in 1974, however the current hostilities can be traced back 
to guerilla warfare that began in 1955 with Greek-Cypriot agitation for unity with Greece (Fisher, 
2001). Like the conflicts discussed above, the issues at stake in the Cyprus conflict involve 
intangible issues such as national identity. Like the other conflicts, the Cyprus conflict has also 
involved polarized perceptions of the other and destructive behavior, including violent clashed 
that have resulted in mass human displacement as well as sanctions and emb rgos that have been 
economically damaging to the parties (Fisher, 2001). Geopolitically, the island of Cyprus sits at 
the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, and has historically been a uffer between 
major civilizations and empires. Today it sits, not unlike the Caucasus region, at the border where 
Europe meets the Middle East. Finally, in regard to the characteristic of resistance to 
peacebuilding efforts, the conflict in Cyprus has eluded resolution despite efforts by the UN to 
resolve the conflict, numerous negotiations between the parties, and countless unofficial 
peacebuilding projects (Fisher, 2001).      
 Based on the proximity of these conflicts that are commonly referred to as fr zen conflict 
to the characteristics given by Bercovitch (2003) and the existing co ceptualizations of 
intractability, such as those offered by Burgess and Burgess and Azar, it would seem that it would 
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be useful in developing a working definition of frozen conflict to consider it as a certain type of 
intractable or protracted conflict. 
As mentioned earlier, the term frozen conflict typically accompanies a c rt in group of 
conflicts, namely those in the former Soviet Union. The literature that describes and analyzes the 
Soviet Successor Wars (King, 2001), can generally be sorted into two groups. The first group 
tends to analyze these conflicts singularly. They are concerned with wha might be called post-
Soviet order: state transition, democratization and development in the young succes or states.  In 
this literature, conflicts are analyzed as factors within the wider process of transition and 
democratization. Treatment of the Soviet Successor Wars in this group typically identifies roots 
of conflict in the legacy of Soviet rule, and as such tend to focus on the question of why these 
conflicts began as opposed to examining the question that this thesis is most concerned with: why 
they have failed to settle. This group includes the work of those such as G i  Nodia and Bruno 
Coppieters which will be discussed later in the case study.  
The second group of literature on the Soviet Successor Wars tends to analyze these 
conflicts jointly and comparatively, asserting that each of these conflicts, while distinct, is part of 
a certain breed of conflict that has developed in fallout of the Soviet Union. As such, authors in 
this latter group, such as Dov Lynch and Charles King, offer valuable insight into the questions 
under consideration in this review: how do we define frozen conflict and why does it go 
unresolved for so long?     
 While these works do not specifically offer a definition of frozen conflict, they do offer a 
number of characteristics of the term and common qualities of the conflicts it de cribes. Two 
works in particular were early to examine the separatist conflicts of the former Soviet Union 
comparatively, one by Edward Walker in 1998 the other by Charles King in 2001. Walker (1998) 
cites five conflicts of contested sovereignty in the former Soviet Union: Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Chechnya (Walker, 1998, 2000).  While the term 
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“frozen conflict” is not specifically used, he does list several similarities between the conflicts 
listed above, which are useful in grasping the characteristics that describe frozen conflict. “In all 
five cases” he notes “cease-fires have ended most of the violence, but sttlements on legal status 
remain elusive” (Walker, 2000 p.152). The lack of settlement specifically on the legal status of 
parties is a useful articulation of what remains unsettled in these conflicts despite a successful 
ceasefire. Walker also notes that in all five of the noted conflicts “secessionists have triumphed 
on the battlefield… [but] have failed to win international recognition” (2000 p.152). This raises 
an interesting point – that in all of these cases the victor in inital military engagement is a party 
that the international community is unwilling to recognize. It is uncertain whether this is a 
defining characteristic of frozen conflict, but is certainly a distinction worth keeping in mind.  
 In another early comparative work on the successor wars, King (2001) examines the state 
building projects of separatist states, and seeks to clarify their longevity by looking at those 
groups benefiting from the status quo. King is concerned with how the “chaos of war become[s] 
transformed into networks of profit” (King, 2001 p.524), which will certainly be reconsidered 
when this review identifies possible causes for the longevity of frozen conflict. However, in terms 
of defining frozen conflict, King provides several small pieces that contribute to that definition. 
King focuses on what he calls the Wars of Soviet Succession: Nagorno-Kaabakh, Transnistria, 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Chechnya, and Tajikistan. He notes of these conflicts that “each 
involved a range of players, including the central governments of newly sovereign states, 
territorial separatists, the armed forces of other countries, and international peacemakers” (King, 
2001 p.525). There are noteworthy distinctions made here. He notes that the actors in this group 
of conflicts are the newly formed central governments and territorial sep ratists. It may be worth 
considering whether separatism is a central element of frozen conflict. Certainly the element of 
separatism contributes to the trend noted by Walker (2000) whereby these conflicts have two 
winners: one on the battlefield, the other in the proverbial court of international opinion. It is 
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uncertain whether this is a defining factor of frozen conflict, but it may be that frozen conflict by 
definition has the tendency of forming out of separatist conflicts where separatists triumph on the 
battlefield but lose the struggle for international recognition. He also echoes Walker in noting that 
in all of these conflicts, with the exception of Chechnya, despite little progress on peace talks 
“none of the post-Soviet disputes returned to the previous levels of organized violence” (King, p. 
525).  Furthermore, King notes that the conflicts he discusses have “evolved fr m armed 
engagements to something close to equilibrium” (p. 525). This description of “close to 
equilibrium” echoes the idea of conflict becoming the status quo (Azar, 2002), and reflects a 
certain degree of stability in the conflict.  
 Dov Lynch (2004) offers a full comparative study of the post-Soviet separatist states and 
the conflicts that defined them. Building on the work of Walker and King, Lynch provides a 
thorough analysis of the status quo in each conflict (Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, 
Transnistria) and identifies factors in both the separatist and metropoli an states driving the status 
quo (Lynch, 2004). In his discussion of these conflicts as “frozen” he takes issue with the use of 
this term, claiming it overlooks certain dynamic features of both parties. This discussion is useful 
for the task of defining frozen conflict, as the reasoning behind this misnomer is helpful in 
defining it. Lynch explains in a later article that these conflicts “appe r frozen, in that little 
progress has been achieved in negotiations and the conflicts remain fixed on cease-fire lines  
established in the first half of the 1990s” (Lynch, 2005  p.192 ). But they are not frozen, Lynch 
argues that “on the contrary, events have developed dynamically, and the situation on the ground 
today is very different from the context that gave rise to these conflicts” (Lynch, 2005  p.192 ).  It 
is useful to distinguish, as Lynch does, between the frozen or immobile peac rocess and the 
conflicts themselves which are dynamic and have changed significantly since the signing of 
ceasefires in the early 1990’s. Lynch views these conflicts as beingstuck in their status quo, and 
suggests that they are held there by a variety of factors. It may be useful to think of frozen 
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conflict and its stagnation or status quo as an equilibrium, appearing to be static, but actually held 
in place by a myriad of dynamic forces. This possible conceptualization will be expanded on 
when discussing the theories of Lewin (1958, 1969) and Coleman (2000, 2006), but it is worth 
noting here the connection between the concept of equilibrium and Lynch’s objectin that the 
term “frozen” denies the true dynamic nature of these conflicts.    
Like Walker and King, Lynch also noted the uncertain status of the parti s, describing 
them as existing in “legal limbo”  (Lynch,  2004  p. 7). Furthermore, Lynch explains that “frozen” 
is an inappropriate descriptor, as while the ceasefire lines and peace process have been all but 
immobile, this does not mean that the individual parties are stagnant. Lynch’s conceptualization 
of “frozen” conflict in the former Soviet Union turns ripeness theory on its head, so to speak. In 
these conflicts parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate, however they do not seek to attenuate 
the pain through negotiation or settlement, as ripeness theory would assume. Instead, parties in 
these conflicts develop their own internal mechanisms and external sources f support to offset 
the pain of stalemate (Lynch, 2004). In this way we may conceptualize frozen conflict as one 
where parties reach a mutually hurting stalemate, but for one reason or another do not move away 
from this stalemate towards resolution. 
 Thus, synthesizing what the literature on intractability and Soviet succe sor wars tell us 
about the meaning of frozen conflict, we might describe frozen conflict in the following way. 
Frozen conflict is a particular phenomenon  of intractability where the conflict experiences a long 
period of what seems to be stagnation or non movement. This period occurs after most of the 
violence in the conflict is ended by ceasefire, but leaves the conflict unresolved and  parties in a 
state of destructive and painful ambiguity – particularly in regard to parties’ legal relationship 




The Longevity of Frozen Conflict 
 With an understanding of what is meant by frozen conflict, this review  may continue 
with the main task of exploring what explanations existing literature may hold for the longevity 
of frozen conflict. As with the task of defining this type of conflict, the literature exploring 
intractability and factors behind its resistance to resolution is aopportune starting point.  
 
 Intractability. Intractability is rooted in a number of factors and circumstances. In 
Edward Azar’s writing on protracted social conflict (PSC), he makes the helpful distiction of 
factors that contribute to the genesis of the conflict and factors of the process dynamics, which 
contribute to the entrenchment (or intractability) of the conflict (Azar, 1990). Azar describes four 
clusters of variables that are preconditions for protracted social conflict. Multicommunal 
societies, particularly when the communities are politically mobilized, are likely to experience 
PSC. Deprivation of human needs for physical security and for access to political institutions are 
another main generator of protracted social conflict, particularly when such deprivations are 
institutionalized by the state or ruling party, referred to as distributive injustice (Azar, 1985) or 
what Galtung calls structural violence. 
 Azar also describes certain factors that contribute to the entrenchm t of such conflicts. 
First, he notes that protracted conflicts tend to go from one-issue-conflicts, provoked by a 
triggering event, to complex multi-issue-conflicts that are far more difficult to negotiate. As a 
power imbalance is likely to exist between parties, the weaker group tends to seek external 
assistance, turning the conflict into a multi-party, regional conflict which amplifies its scope and 
makes the conflict more protracted (Azar, 1985). Furthermore, protracted conflicts tend to 
generate certain conditions, which at the same time further reinforce the onflict. These include 
the deterioration of physical security for all parties, the degeneration of political and state 
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institutions, domination of war culture and fearful vigilance, and increased dependancy or cliency 
on external parties (Azar, 1985).  
 The Beyond Intractability database assembled by Heidi and Guy Burgess also offers a 
number of treatments, both brief and in-depth, on causes and characteristics of inractability. A 
treatment offered by Michelle Maise cites a conflict’s intractability as being grounded in high 
stakes, non-negotiotiable issues such as morals, identity, the pursuit of justice, or basic human 
needs. “Because conflicts grounded in these issues involve the basic molds for thought and action 
within given communities and culture, they are usually not resolvable by negotiation or 
compromise. This is because the problem in question is one that cannot be resolved in a win-win 
way. If one value system is followed, another is threatened”  (Maiese, 2003).  In another essay by 
Heidi and Guy Burgess, intractability is said to stem from irreconcilable moral differences, high-
stakes distributional issues, and identity conflicts over social status and privilege. When all three 
of these factors are involved the conflict tends to be particularly resistent to resolution (Burgess & 
Burgess, 2003).  
 Most interestingly, in an essay for the Beyond Intractability database, Heidi Burgess 
notes that it is the benefits of conflicts that cause them to be intractable, noting: “if disputants did 
not believe staying in the conflict was better than resolving it (considering both emotional and 
material factors), they would be more likely to resolve it” (Burgess, 2004). Profiteers, among both 
the parties and external onlookers, have vested interests in the continuation of hostilities and are 
often in positions to contribute to further hostilities.  
 In summary, intractability literature suggests that much like more c mmon intractable 
conflicts, the longevity of frozen conflicts stems from a perfect storm of factors. First the conflict 
is rooted in high stakes issues like basic human needs, in non-negotiable issues like id ntity, and 
irreconcilable morally rooted differences. In other words, the causes of intractable conflict create 
a zero-sum situation. Furthermore, these conflicts grow and stem from one-issue, bi-party 
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conflicts into multi-issue, multi-party conflicts which makes their r solution far more complex 
and dificult (Azar, 1985). Intractability also notes the development of conditi s hat reinforce 
the conflict. These include increased dependancy on external parties (Azar, 1985) as well as the 
development of profiteering parties and networks that become invested in the conflict remaining 
unresolved (Burgess, 2004). These various factors identified by scholars in the field of 
intractability or protracted conflict shed light on factors in frozen conflict that hinder progress 
towards resolution, but still leave unanswered the question of why parties in frozen conflict find 
themselves stuck between stages of the peace process.  
 
Conflict settlement, power-sharing and ripeness. Another approach to explaining the 
longevity of frozen conflict is to ask why they do not settle. The vast literature on conflict 
settlement and resolution lays out numerous factors that affect parties’ willingness to negotiate 
and the viability of the agreements they reach. We might sort these various factors, as William 
Zartman (2000) does, into two or three schools on the subject. Probably the oldest school on 
resolution and settlement looks at the substance of the negotiations and the provisions and 
structures provided in the agreements to explain their success or failure. This school includes the 
literature on power-sharing, consociational structures, and pluralistic in itutions. The second 
school on resolution looks at the timing, rather than the substance, of negotiations to explain their 
success or failure. This is the school to which William Zartman, Dean Pruitt, and others that work 
on ripeness and readiness theory belong.  The third school of thought on conflict resolution 
includes those such as John Paul Lederach and Herbert Kelman, and focuses on the relationship 
between disputants as a key factor in settlement success.  In reality, it is most common that all 
three sets of factors will be present in any negotiation or settlement situation. However, each 
school offers a set of theories and frameworks that are undoubtedly useful in explaining the 
protracted nature of some conflicts. 
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In looking at the substantive components of conflict settlement, the literatur  varies from 
those looking strictly at ceasefire to material interested in the imple entation of an agreement. 
Virginia Page Fortna (2004) examines interstate ceasefire agreements, identifying certain factors 
that correlate with ceasefires that are able to prevent renewed fighting. Factors such as ending war 
in a draw rather than decisive victory, a history of conflict between th belligerents, perceived 
threat, and shared borders have a significant negative impact on ceasefire success. Long and 
costly wars, however, are claimed to be more conducive to lasting ceasefire. M anwhile, Fortna 
claims that factors such as power symmetry between belligerents, the number of states involved, 
and democratic regime shifts are not as significant as is often thought in international relations. 
Fortna claims, however, that while these underlying factors have a strongimpact, they do not 
determine the prospects for peace, and that peace lasts longer with stronger agreements in place. 
Agreements within ceasefires that “alter incentives by raising the cost of breaking a cease-fire, to 
clear up uncertainty about belligerents’ actions…or to reduce the possibility of accidents or 
spirals” are likely to increase the ceasefire’s holding power (Fortna, 2004, p.215). More 
specifically, measures such as demilitarized zones and third party involvement prove particularly 
effective. Like much of the ceasefire or settlement literature, Fortna acknowledges and identifies 
those situational and environmental factors that most strongly affect pea e agreements, but argues 
that the substance of the agreement can override these factors. However, for th  purposes of this 
paper, the results in such ceasefire literature are misleading. Within Fortna’s framework, 
agreements are considered successful so long as active or violent conflic d es not reemerge; as 
such, frozen conflicts such as those in Cyprus, North and South Korea, and in parts of the former 
Soviet Union would fit the model of successful agreements. Since it is no only the suspension of 
armed conflict, but the lack of resolution to the root causes of conflict and he resulting stagnation 
that this paper is concerned with, a more comprehensive framework for agreement success is 
required.   
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On the other hand, literature that focuses on the settlement of intrastate conflicts such as 
civil wars and separatist conflicts tend to view success as occurring when root causes of the 
conflict are dealt with and a tangible plan for future coexistence is agreed upon. Walter (2002) is 
concerned with why some civil wars are settled and others rage on, and in those fact rs that 
contribute to successful implementation of the terms of the agreement. Walter (2002) highlights 
third party involvement and power-sharing agreements as necessary factos in the successful 
acceptance and implementation of a peace agreement. She proposes that we examine the 
resolution of conflict in a three-phase framework. This first phase is the process of getting parties 
to the table, so to speak, and the conditions and motivations that cause parties to enter into 
negotiations. The second phase is where parties reach a mutually acceptable agreement; this stage 
considers both the substantive and environmental factors that enable agreement. The final phase 
looks at the implementation of the agreements. Walter is mainly concerned with the second and 
third phase, and those aspects of settlement that make a peace settlement conducive to signing 
and compliance. Walter lays out the credible commitment theory which posits that combatants in 
civil wars will “sign and implement a peace settlement only if they ar confident that their 
military forces will be safely consolidated and that power will be shared once they relinquish 
their own political and military assets”  (Walter, 2002, p. 15). This is done through a third party 
security guarantee, particularly during demobilization, and strong power-sharing agreements that 
distribute political, territorial, and military power.  
 Focusing on the issue of power-sharing, Caroline Hartzell and Mathew Hoddie seek to 
differentiate between power-sharing agreements and argue that power-sharing arrangements that 
are more extensive and multi-dimensional are more likely to succeed in maintaining peace 
(Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2007). Hartzell and Hoddie identify four areas or 
forms of power-sharing: political, territorial, military, and economic. Agreements that include 
power-sharing arrangements in all four categories are more likely to succeed than those with 
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power-sharing in only one area. Their framework also identifies otherfactors, both substantive 
and situational, that influence the success of a peace agreement. First, actors with previous 
experience with democratic institutions are more likely to craft a lasting agreement. Furthermore, 
wars of long duration increase the likelihood that parties will craftan enduring peace, however 
wars yielding a high casualty rate are unlikely to end in durable peace. Third party enforcement is 
also a key factor in this framework, as is the timeframe. Hartzell and Hoddie find that settlements 
negotiated in the post-Cold War era tend to more successful. They also claim that the risk of war 
breaking out again declines with the passage of time.  
 These theories all underline the argument that while factors like relative power and 
timing are significant, they can be overridden by a strong agreement. In opposite fashion, 
theorists that focus on the timing of peace negotiations claim that even he best possible 
agreements will fail if the timing is not right for resolution. Two of the main proponents of this 
claim are William Zartman’s ripeness theory and Dean Pruitt’s modification of this which he calls 
readiness theory.  
 The intention of ripeness theory, as Zartman explains, is to identify “why, and therefore 
when, parties to a conflict are susceptible to their own or others’ efforts to turn the conflict toward 
resolution through negotiation” (Zartman I.W., 2000, p.228). There are two central components to 
ripeness: the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate and the perception of a way out. The 
mutually hurting stalemate is a situation where “parties find themselves locked in a conflict from 
which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them” (Zartman I.W., 
2000, p.228). Or, one may say that a mutually hurting stalemate is reached when both parties 
perceive themselves to be a point where the costs of continued conflict outweigh he expected 
costs of negotiation. This moment may be, but is not necessarily, enhanced or induced by a past, 
impending, or recently avoided catastrophe which can serve as a deadline or imp tus for 
movement towards negotiation. The second component, a way out, need not be a specific solution 
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that parties can identify going into negotiations. Rather, it is only necessary that parties have a 
sense that a negotiated settlement is possible, and that the other party also has the motivation to 
seek it (Zartman I.W., 2000).  Therefore, the working definition of ripeness, as posited by 
Zartman is: “if the (two) parties to a conflict (a) perceive themselve  to be in a hurting stalemate 
and (b) perceive the possibility of a negotiated solution (a way out), the conflict is ripe for 
resolution” (2000, p.229). 
 Ripeness theory, as posited by Zartman, has had numerous reworkings and contestations 
since its emergence. One of the prominent modifications of this theory is Dean Pruitt’s readiness 
theory.  Pruitt offers readiness theory as revision and elaboration of Zartman’s ripeness theory. 
Readiness is treated as a variable whereas ripeness is typically treated as a state, and describes the 
thinking of an individual party rather than a moment of joint thinking in the confli t (Pruitt, 
2007). Pruitt offers four main criticisms of ripeness theory: 
(1) “Ripeness theory only seeks to explain entry into negotiation. Yet it makes 
sense that conditions which encourage entry into negotiation should …also 
encourage all of the following: throwing large human resources into the 
negotiation, taking significant risks to achieve agreement, making deep 
concessions, and thus moving toward or to agreement.”    
(2) “Ripeness is viewed as a state rather than a variable; situations re either ripe 
or unripe. This is fine for an initial, heuristic set of ideas but … viewing ripeness 
as a variable allows us to postulate that as ripeness strengthens… agreement is 
more likely to be reached.”   
(3) The antecedents of ripeness are viewed as joint states that simultaneously 
affect both parties to the conflict … a more flexible theory would analyze the 
motives and perceptions of each party separately. This would make it easier to 
explain the asymmetric patterns that are often found in reality.”  
(4) “Ripeness theory has a list-like quality that does not distinguish between 
types of antecedents” (Pruitt, 1997).  
 
Based on these criticisms, readiness theory is offered as a modification of sorts. Parallel to 
ripeness theory’s components of the mutually hurting stalemate and a perceived way out, 
readiness has two components: motivation and optimism.  This theory posits that: “a party will 
move toward resolution of a heavily escalated conflict (entering negotiation, making concessions, 
etc.) to the extent that it is (a) motivated to achieve de-escalation and (b) optimistic about finding 
28 
a mutually acceptable agreement that will be binding on the other party” (P uitt, 1997, p.239). 
Motivation to end the conflict is not entirely unlike the mutually hurting stalemate; parties 
achieve this motivation when escalation or the status quo are no longer viabl  or ttractive 
options. Optimism, however, serves as a gating variable that determines the extent to which the 
motivation to end conflict is expressed as conciliatory gestures and behavior, which are necessary 
to successful negotiation (Pruitt, 1997). The component of optimism differs from its counterpart 
in ripeness theory, a perceived way out. In addition to the perception that a negoti ted settlement 
is possible, optimism also requires working trust and lowered aspirations. This conceptualization 
of optimism helps to explain why some negotiations fail even though adequate motivation to 
resolve the conflict exists (Pruitt, 2007). 
 
Relational approaches and reconciliation.Rather than focusing on the timing or 
substance of a peace agreement, there is a third group of peace theorists that focus on the 
relationship between the parties, and attribute failed negotiations to the failur  of parties to 
transition from an antagonistic, zero-sum relationship to a more cooperative and win-win 
relationship.  
 Early major contributions to this school of thought were made by Herbert C. Kelman.  
Largely influenced by the work of John Burton and his theory on the centrality of human needs 
and their satisfaction in the resolution of conflict, Kelman developed a third party approach to 
conflict that has been termed interactive problem solving (Kelman, 1998). Like Burton, Kelman’s 
approach and understanding of international and inter-communal conflict is “anchored in social-
psychological principles” (Kelman, 1998 p.190). Being derived from needs theory and informed 
by social-psychology, Kelman’s approach to conflict places emphasis on the relationships 
between parties and their respective representatives on an individual level. Kelman notes “there 
are many aspects of international conflict and conflict resolution for which the individual 
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represents the most appropriate unit of analysis” (Kelman, 1998 p. 191). He continues “ hus we 
can identify certain processes central to conflict resolution … that of necessity take place at the 
level of individuals and interaction between individuals” (Kelman, 1998 p. 191).  
From these premises Kelman developed the problem solving workshop. This form of 
intervention gathers politically influential individuals (but not necessarily political office holders) 
of each party for intensive but unofficial meetings. These are not negiations, and are not 
convened for the purpose of reaching political settlements, but are intended to produce change 
among workshop participants on the level of individuals and interpersonal interat on. With this, it 
is intended that participants will develop the ability to work cooperatively and engage in joint 
problem solving, with the hope that the proposals and ideas reached cooperatively in h  
workshops will feed back into official negotiations (Kelman, 1998). It may seem self-evident that 
the interaction between party representatives is important to the succs  of conflict settlement. 
However, the orientation of third party interventions toward the improvement of relationships and 
the interaction between key individuals in each party marks a departure from other conflict 
resolution strategies. Interactive problem-solving contributes to “the development of new 
approaches to conceptualizing and conducting the macroprocess of conflict resolution and 
international relations” (Kelman, 1998 p.197). 
 Another influential figure in the relational school of thought is John Paul Lederach. In his 
work, Lederach emphasizes a paradigmatic shift in the resolution of armed conflict from 
traditional negotiation between state representatives to the rebuilding of relationships between 
parties. Lederach builds on the early concepts of Adam Curle who emphasized the roles that 
balance of power and awareness of the conflict play in the readiness of parties to negotiate (Curle 
1971 as cited by Lederach 1995). Confrontation between the parties, along with the role of 
advocacy, leads to a balancing of power, making negotiation possible and creating a role for 
mediation. He explains “sucessful negotiations and mediation lead to a restructuring of the 
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relationship…this result is what Curle refers to as increased justice or more peaceful relations” 
(Lederach, 1995  p.14).  
 This focus on the restructuring of the relationship between parties is the core of 
Lederach’s conceptual framework for reconciliation. “This paradigmatic shift” he explains “is 
articulated in the movement away from a concern with the resolution of issues and towards a 
frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of relationships…The 
framework must address and engage the relational aspects of reconciliati  as the central 
component of peacebuilding” (Lederach, 1997  p.24). Reconciliation is the approach that follows 
from Lederach’s conceptualization of protracted conflict and of the central role that relational 
reformation plays in resolution. The concept of reconciliation as Lederach posits it, rests on three 
working assumptions: 
1. “Relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term solution 
2. Engagement of the conflicting groups assumes an encounter, not only of 
people but also of several different and highly interdependant streams of 
activity. 
3. Reconciliation requires that we look outside the mainstream of international 
political traditions, discourse, and operational modalities if we are to find 
innovation” (Lederach, 1997  p.27). 
 
This approach to conflict settlement marks a departure from traditional state-centered diplomacy 
and peace negotiations in two ways. First, the focus on improvement of relations between parties 
rather than the settlement of disputed issues allows conflict resolution activities to take any 
number of forms. These include the problem solving workshop as promoted by Kelman, and later 
by others such as Ronald Fisher (1997), as well as a host of other unofficial, non-state centered 
activities. Second, the reconciliation approach requires that the process of conflict resolution 
incorporate the entire society rather than focusing entirely on heads of state and officals. This 
approach looks for influential figures at all levels and in all areas of  society, such as business 
leaders, media figures, clergy, or grassroots community leaders, and seeks to ngage them in the 
conflict resolution process. In a word, it could be said that the relational or reconciliatory 
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approach seeks to build not just a peace agreement, but a peace-seeking society. Such alternative 
approaches to building peace in and between conflicting societies has come to be t rmed track-
two or unofficial peacebuilding, and numerous other scholars such as Louise Diamond and John 
McDonald (1995) and Louis Kriesberg (1989), for example, have contributed to the expansion 
and opening of the concept of peace-building in this way.  
    
Wars of Seccession & De-Facto States. Contrary to some of the above mentioned 
literature which looks at characteristics of the peace process to explain the continuation of 
conflict, the compartive literature on the conflicts in the Soviet successor states focuses on 
characteristics of the parties. In particular, this literature focuses on the separatist states and their 
impact on the conflict’s dynamics. Charles King and Dov Lynch point to the existence of these 
separatist regions and their development into (somewhat) functioning states as complicating the 
dynamics of the conflict and its resolution. As King explains: “the crystallization of independent 
statelike entities has meant that the resolution of these conflicts is not so much about patching 
together a torn country as about trying to reintegrate two functionally distinct administrations, 
militaries, and societies” (King, 2001 p.525). King also explores the implications of these state-
building projects on parties’ motivations to settle. As the stagnant conflict evolves into systematic 
normalcy, a variety of groups and individuals become invested in the status quo; as King notes, 
asking “cui bono” can illuminate a number of forces acting to maintain the status quo. Examples 
abound:  
Both the separatists and their erstwhile opponents in central governments benefit 
from the un-taxed trade and production flowing through the former war zones. 
Even in less unsavory ways, individuals inside and outside the conflict areas have 
an interest in maintaining the status quo—from poets who have built careers 
extolling their newfound statehood to pensioners worried about how their meager 
incomes might be further diminished if the country were once again integrated. It 
is a dark version of Pareto efficiency: the general welfare cannot be improved—
by reaching a genuine peace accord allowing for real reintegration—without at 
the same time  making key interest groups in both camps worse off (King, 2001 
p.525). 
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King asserts an additional aspect of the motivation to maintain the status quo, claiming that the 
governments running the separatist states often function as well as their central state adversaries. 
That separatists have been able to “build states that now function about as well  the recognized 
countries of which they are still formally constituents,” King asserts, is the real obstacle to 
settlement (2001,  p.535). This argument is certainly persuasive, but only in cases where it is the 
reality. While this was most likely the case in 2001 when King published the articl , the Georgian 
metropolitan state has experienced tremendous economic growth and increased stability since the 
Rose revolution in 2004, with GDP growth of nearly 10% in 2006 and 12% in 2007 (The World 
Fact Book 2008: Georgia, 2008). Thus, while there may have been a time when separatism was in 
part motivated by the ability of the de-facto state to function and better provide f r its constituents 
than the metropolitan state, this no longer the case and should not be the obstacle to ettlement 
that King argues it is. Of course, the most recent round of fighting between G orgia and Russia, 
in late Summer 2008, undoubtedly had an effect on the relative level of Georgia’s state 
functionality. Russian attacks devastated much of the state’s military capacity and national 
infrastructure, disabling major roads and transportation hubs, and creating a mass humanitarian 
crisis as thousands of Georgians living in or around the areas of conflict fled to other parts of 
Georgia. As of yet it is too early to know what long term effects the August war will have on 
Georgia’s economy, or if it will slow the tide of foreign investment that has had a large part in 
driving the country’s economic growth.  
Dov Lynch further explores the de facto states of the former Soviet Union, cit ng their 
existence as the main reason for the asbsence of progress toward settlement (Lynch, 2004). He 
cites a combination of external and internal drivers as being behind the status quo that has 
dominated these conflicts since the early 1990’s. (He also emphasizes that the conventional 
wisdom attributing this status quo to primarily to external drivers, namely th  role of Russia, is 
misconcieved and narrow sighted.)  
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Because his focus is specifically on the separatist states in these conflicts, the internal 
drivers that he speaks of refer to things being done inside or by separatist state . He points out 
three main drivers: the insistence on absolute sovereignty based on internat onal conventions and 
adherence to the principle of national self-determination, fear and insecurity, and subsistence 
systems that have developed under the weak governments and foster the grow of criminal 
elements in the economy (Lynch, 2004). First, the existence of these separati t states in isolation 
for so many years has bolstered their belief in sovereignty. Aside from the basic elements of 
sovereignty: territory, population, and government, these de-facto states have also developed 
limited institutions and financial systems. These systems reinforce the belief and insistence on 
their right to sovereignty.  Furthermore, the strong sense of fear and insecurity in the de-facto 
states has also led them to bolster their security in whatever ways they can, and typically they 
maintain a military with rather wide mobilization capacity. These military forces are part of the 
state-building projects that have sustained the separatists during the long frozen periods of the 
conflict. Finally, the economic isolation felt by separatist states for many years has led to the 
creation of subsistence systems for survival and a return to primitive economic systems such as 
barter (Lynch, 2004).      
Externally, Lynch points to Russian intervention, the role of international org nizations, 
and the role of the metropolitan states. The term metropolitan, as Lynch uses it, refers to the 
central state from which the separatist or de-facto states have seceded; in the cases Lynch 
examines the metropolitan states would be Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Lynch modfies 
King’s claim that the separatist states are probably better off than their metropolitan counterparts, 
pointing out several reasons for why the metropolitan states are not particularly enticing to the 
separatists.Of these external drivers, Lynch lists the assist nce of international organizations, 
particularly humanitarian organizations, for enabling the separatist states and keeping them afloat 
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in terms of meeting the most basic needs of their populations (Lynch, 2004). He also points to the 
role played by the metropolitan states and Russian intervention.   
This book was published shortly after the Rose Revolution, and therefore cannot account 
for the massive economic upturn experienced in Georgia after 2004, nor the violence experienced 
in the summer of 2008, but it does improve on King’s claims by focusing on the perception held 
by separatists that they may be better off, rather than claiming this to be a reality. Again, 
however, this raises the question of whether this perception is still wide y held or whether the 
prosperity experienced in Tbilisi has made ripples in Abkhazia. Lynch also notes, that regardless 
of economic improvement, the metropolitan state of Georgia is still dominated by nationalist 
politics, and caters to the radically nationalist Abkhaz Government in Exile made up of former 
Georgian officials from the pre-war government of Abkhazia (Lynch, 2004). So long as 
Georgia’s political system is dominated by nationalist figures it is unlikely to appeal to minority 
separatists.  
Lynch acknowledges Russia’s role in maintaining the status quo and protecting the 
separatist states, but denies the claim that many (especially the me ropolitan states) make that 
Russia is the key factor in the emergence and resolution of these conflicts, focusing rather on 
developments in the separatist states themselves. However, the fighting between Georgian and 
Russia during the summer of 2008 showed dramatically just how much of a player Russia is in 
these conflicts. While the outcomes of this brief war have yet to be determined, it is very possible 
that Abkhazia or South Ossetia may achieve either indepenence or annexation with Russia due 
primarily to Russia’s insistence and formidable power.  
 We might adopt Lynch’s conceptualization of these conflicts with regard to ripeness 
theory disscussed earlier. Hurting stalemates have been reached in all the Soviet successor 
conflicts, but rather than turning to settlement to attenuate the pain of stalemate, parties develop 
internal mechanisms, such as subsistence and barter based economic systems, as well as reliance 
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on external sources of support to help offset the pain of stalement. On the other hand, it might be 
argued (perhaps by supporters of ripeness theory) that these conflicts have not in fact reached a 
true mutually hurting stalemate or have not yet reached what might be considered as a threshold 
of ripeness. Lynch makes two arguments in his work that add to this conceptualization of 
ripeness. First, he argues that it is only in regards to offical peace negotiations that these conflicts 
are frozen, where in reality they are not really frozen at all but are in fact rather dynamic beneath 
the surface. Second, he argues that the status quo in these conflicts is maintained by certain 
driving factors that originate inside the separatist states and that act on the separatist states.  
Perhaps it is possible to intregrate these arguments into an understa ing of this conflict 
as framed by the theory of ripeness. This conceptualization would say that the stagnation or 
intertia of frozen conflict is due to the fact that although  parties have reached a hurting stalemate 
the conflict has not yet reached a point of intensity or painfulness severe nough to motivate 
parties to settle (which will be referred to as ripeness for resolution for the sake of clarity). In the 
case of Georgia and Abkhazia parties do not reach this threshold because factors such as state 
building projects in the de-facto states, external support, and profiteering help separatist groups 
subsist through the stalemate and therefore keep the conflict or staus quo at a tolerable level of 
pain. Charles King briefly referred to this status quo as “something close to equibrium” (2001, p. 
525), and although his work did not elaborate on the use of this term, the notion of equilibrium 
will become more useful as literature on social change is explored later in this review. This 
conceptual framework that integrates Lynch’s arguments with the idea of ripeness as a threshold 
illustrated below.     
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Figure 1: Forces keeping the status quo below the threshold of ripeness for resolution. 
 
However, if we are to take this as compelling explanation for why the conflicts of the former 
Soviet Union have not settled, there are some problems that must be accounted fr.  As 
previously discussed, both King and Lynch’s theories are based at least somewhat on the 
assumption that the governing bodies of the separatist states function as well as th ir counterparts 
in the metropolitan states.  
 Furthermore, the synthesis described above offers some possible explanation for why 
such conflicts seem unable to escalate to a point where the conflict is ripe for resolution. 
However, it fails to explain why the conflict has not particularly de-escalated in the more than a 
decade since ceasefires were established. There has been little warming of relations, opening of 
borders, or loosening of restriction, and what there has been was rather fleeting. In other words, 
while factors such as de-facto state building and international assisstence push the conflict’s level 
of intensity down, what is pushing back up so as to maintain the equilibrium or status quo that has 
reigned for so long? 
Ripeness for Resolution 
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It seems then that part of accounting for the longevity of frozen conflict is understanding 
why it does not de-escalate to the point where manageable relations are reach d or can be 
negotiated. One primary factor that could be seen as preventing the de-escalation of such 
conflicts, and in particular the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, is the presenc of displaced peoples 
who desire but are unable to return to the regions from which they fled. In the case of Georgia, 
there is a population between 200,000 and 300,000 ethnic Georgians who lived in Abkhazia but 
fled during the war in the early 1990s. These internally displaced persons (IDPs) are a significant 
factor in the conflict; and a large majority express a desire to rturn to Abkhazia but are unable to 
do so under current conditions. However the frozen nature of the conflict and the current status 
quo are enough for many IDPs to retain the hope of eventual return.  
 With this sizable population being such a significant factor in the resolution of this 
conflict, a consideration of the dynamics of prolonged displacement, as well as the political role 
of organized IDP coalitions (in this case the Abkhaz Government-in-exile) may shed some light 
on the inertia that this review seeks to understand.  
 
Prolonged displacement & refugee dynamics. In the last fifty years, predominating 
attitudes to refugees and other forcibly displaced persons have shifted dramatically.  Previous to 
World War II, the provision of sanctuary to those viewed as fleeing unjust persecution was 
common practice in much of western culture. This was a tradition largely stemming from and 
beginning with the English offering of sanctuary to the French Huguenots in the late seventeenth 
century (Marfleet, 2006). In the Cold War era, the notion of “refugee” was more politicized, with 
the term often connoting one who has defected or fled from an enemy state. Until 1980, in fact, 
the U.S. government limited the term refugee to mean persons fleeing communis (Whitaker, 
2003). However, with the fall of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War attitudes towards 
forcibly displaced persons shifted towards policies of exclusion and limited granting of amnesty. 
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Such populations have in many ways come to be seen as an economic and security burden to host 
states, and perceptions of displaced persons have shifted from victims of broad geopolitical 
conflict to conflict inducing populations and opportunists.  
 Another shift in policy has occurred in terms of preferred approaches to displaced 
populations. Prior to the end of the Cold War, it was generally accepted that the nature of the 
individual’s flight meant that return was not generally perceived as a viable option. Integration 
and third country resettlement were generally preferred as long-term solutions. In the post-Cold 
War world, however, voluntary repatriation has become a primary focus in the refug e field. This 
focus has been largely based on the assumption that displaced persons want to return. Although 
this is very often the case, this assumption has also led to some rather ominous repatriation 
operations that were far from voluntary. Such was the case in several instances such as the 
repatriation of Rwandan refugees from Tanzania, refugees repatriated f om South Africa to 
Mozambique, and Tamil asylum seekers forcibly repatriated from Switzerland in an agreement of 
the Swiss and Sri Lankan governments (Black & Koser, 1999). 
 This policy shift goes hand in hand with shifting perceptions of displaced persons and the 
changed nature of war. Such populations are often viewed as hazardous, costly, and detrimental 
by host countries, particularly in the context of conflict. In some cases wh re host countries 
border the conflict region, refugees and IDPs are marginalized and isolated for fear that their 
presence will encourage the conflict to spill across the border. In other instances, such as is often 
the case with populations of internally displaced people, displaced populatins become a form of 
leverage in the conflict. Their return becomes wrapped up in the terms of victory for the host 
country, meaning that their integration into the host society comes to be seen as a sign of accepted 
defeat. As such, many host countries opt to keep refugees and IDPs separated from he rest of the 
population, often restricting them to camps or concentrated centers near the bo der.  Policies of 
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this sort have been seen with Rwandan refugees in Tanzania, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 
and with various groups in the Balkans.  
 This increasingly strong view of voluntary repatriation has also had an effect on the 
approach taken to conflict resolution in some cases. In many cases, internat onal efforts to resolve 
conflict focus largely on creating conditions that allow refugees or otherdisplaced persons to 
return; this was, for example, a prominent approach to the conflicts in the Balkans, and was a 
significant component of the Dayton Accords (Whitaker, 2003). It is possible to s e how this 
approach may lend itself to a dangerous sense of false resolution: glossing ver the roots of 
conflict in order to create the speediest return possible to normalcy. Furthermore, many NGO’s 
and relief organizations that provide aid to displaced persons are expanding their mandates to 
include activities in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. While this indicates an honorably 
broad scope, it also means that organizations and their service providers are being pushed into 
performing duties that they may not have the capacity or qualifications for (Ferris, 2003).  
 One can understand why, in most cases, voluntary repatriation would be the optimal
long-term solution to displacement. However, the complexities and contradictions of return are 
greater than they may initially seem. The literature on return and repatriation identifies a 
phenomenon referred to as the myth of return as central to this issue. The myth of return refers, 
most basically, to the desire and aspiration entertained by refugees, other forcibly displaced 
persons, and immigrants to return to their country or region of origin. The term myth is used 
because this belief is often held in situations where people have been displaced for years or even 
decades, and where realistically return is highly unlikely. The myth is in many cases a coping 
mechanism rather than the actual anticipation of returning. It is a way of dealing with the 
dilemma of living in two different contexts: in the displaced community (even if this community 
is limited to the family) and in the host society (Al-Rasheed, 1994). It is also important to note 
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that the myth of return is a term created by outside researchers to describe a particular mindset; 
the term “myth” is not typically used by displaced persons to describe their own views.  
 The myth of return occurs not only in individuals but also in displaced communities, 
where it is often acted out and reinforced. Refugee scholar Roger Zetter (1999) offers a 
conceptualization of the myth of return as an adaptive coping mechanism. It may be more helpful 
to think of this phenomenon as the myth of return to home, rather than simply the myth of return, 
because what is mythologized is the idea of the home that was lost rather th n simply the act of 
returning. The idealization of returning to home is a way of expressing hope for th  eventual 
restoration of what was lost, both physically and symbolically (Zetter, 1999). Zetter 
conceptualizes the refugee’s world or experience as a triangle, whose three points represent the 
past, future, and present. The continuity of this triangle therefore reprsents the continuity to life 
as we are constantly transitioning from past to present and from present to future. However, as 
Zetter explains, the experience of forced displacement fractures the triangle and severs the 
connection between the points of past, present and future. As this occurs the all-important 
element of continuity is destroyed. In the refugee triangle the parameter of the past is fractured, 
and the past-present and past-future connections are damaged or jeopardized. As such, 
contradictory behaviors of simultaneously adapting to place and mythologizing the return home 
can be understood as parallel efforts to repair or restore the fragmented triangle (Zetter, 1999).      
 While those such as Zetter attempt to understand the dynamics of this phenomena, others 
such as Daniel Warner emphasize the idealization that goes on with the my  of return, and the 
way in which this makes repatriation more difficult and more paradoxical than one may initially 
believe.  Warner argues that the myth is rooted far more in nostalgia than the recollection of 
reality. Return very often becomes a social and political motto within displaced communities, 
leading both the community and outsiders to embrace return as a policy and strategy, while 
overlooking the complexities involved in doing so.  There is a “considerable gp between policy 
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makers’ idea of voluntary repatriation and the actual experience of refugees” (Warner, 1999 
p.161). Warner explains that the nostalgia of home is in part due to the desire in people to 
reconcile the present with the past. However, this rift cannot be closed; we cannot go back 
because that to which we may wish to return is no longer there. Warner also claims that in some 
ways, our desire to prioritize the return of refugees is, in a way, a reflection of our own desires to 
return to a world of alignment and symmetry.  As a result, voluntary repatriation is inclined to 
overlook the extreme complexity of what happens to refugees once they find themselv s in their 
country of origin.  
 The conceptualization of the myth of return lends some depth to the issue of return that 
policies of voluntary repatriation can overlook or oversimplify.  It also provides the realization 
that for displaced persons, the desire or promise of returning home is probably far more complex 
and conflicting than it may first appear. In approaching the issues of prolnged displacement and 
return as significant factors in protracted conflict or frozen conflict it is important to consider the 
complexity of return and ask what degree to which displaced persons wrestle ith doubt and fear 
about returning.  
 
Field Theory. These questions and issues may be better illuminated by looking at the 
social-psychological literature about group decision and social change. Social scientist Kurt 
Lewin’s theories on the subject of opposing forces introduce another way of looking at 
motivation, change, and the resistance to change. Lewin’s field theory posits that here are 
restraining and driving forces at work against each other within an individual’s own “field.” In 
this view, a lack of change is the result of “opposing and countervailing ‘forces’ that continuously 
operate to produce what we experience as stability” (Brager & Holloway, 1992). Restraining 
forces work against change while driving forces move toward it, thus when these forces are 
relatively balanced the result is stability (Lewin, 1969). The framework derived from this theory 
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is known as force field analysis, which seeks to identify the opposing forces within a given social 
field with the intent of manipulating these forces to produce a desired change. Today, this type of 
analysis is most often used in organizational contexts to help plan for and facilitate change within 
an organization. However, many refugees and IDPs who experience long term displacement often 
find themselves in a state of limbo, so to speak, unable to return and unable or unwilling to 
integrate. As such, consideration of the driving and restraining forces within a community of 
displaced persons may yield some insight into this seemingly stagnant situation. 
Lewin’s work is concerned with issues of change and planning for change, particularly 
certain types of social change within group or organizational dynamics. In evaluating prospects 
for social change, Lewin identifies several factors that influence group action: channels, gates, 
and gatekeepers. Channels are the means through which the group acts or collects resources. In an 
experiment aiming to bring about change in the food eaten by selected families, the channels 
identified are their means of getting food, such as buying or growing it (Lewin, 1958). Gates or 
gating agents, as well as the disposition of the gatekeepers that control them are a significant part 
of systems. As Lewin explains: “the constellation of forces before and after the gate region are 
decisively different in such a way that the passing or not passing of a unit through the whole 
channel depends to a high degree upon what happens in the gate region” (Lewin, 1958  p.199). 
An example of this might be university admissions. An admissions board may set up trict 
policies to keep all but the most qualified students out; however once a student is admitted, the 
university does all that it can to propel the student toward success. In this case the admissions 
process is a gate, and the individuals who sit on the admissions board are gateke pers.  
Lewin’s theories regarding motivation and his concept of quasi-stationary equilibria may 
be most illuminating to the discussion here. Lewin’s work is offered as an lternative to the 
prevalent thinking of his time which assumes that action is a direct result of motivation. On the 
contrary, Lewin argues that this motivation passes through a constellation of conditions which 
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may or may not lead to action. From this, Lewin derives the concept of a force field containing 
countervailing forces that either drive or restrain action (Brager & Holloway, 1992). However, 
this is susceptible to the misinterpretation that the slightest change in either force will produce 
action, and this is not the case. As Lewin explains, if this were the case “a state of blockage or 
extremely inhibited action results rather than that clear one-sided action which follows a real 
decision” (Lewin, 1958 p.203). Rather than either restraining or driving forces gaining a slight 
edge, what allows decision to be made is when the potency of one alternative is dimini hed such 
that the other alternative dominates the situation.  
 The state resulting from a balance of driving and restraining forces is what Lewin terms 
quasi-stationary equilibrium. It may be useful to consider long-term displacement as resulting 
from a long standing state of quasi-stationary equilibrium, where the forces driving and 
restraining the decision to integrate into the host population (or alternately to return) are balanced. 
Or, on another level, the stagnation of frozen conflict could be interpreted in this way as well. It 
could be said that the forces driving the parties towards resolution are on balance with the forces 
restraining them. Interpreting the status quo of these frozen conflicts as a quasi-stationary 
equilibrium may illuminate some of the factors impeding progress.  
 It should be noted this sort of force field analysis is intended for social phenomena that 
can be regarded as a process rather than a thing (Lewin, 1958). However, it seems that long term 
displacement can be viewed as a process, a series of group and individual decisions and action. 
The stagnation of frozen conflict can likewise be considered a process, an active engagement in 
the status quo.  As such it seems that keeping an eye to the conflicting forces that drive towards 
the resolution of frozen conflict and those that restrain it may be a useful way to approach the 
inertia that appears to dominate the status quo.   
 One area where this concept has been applied to conflict is in literature on the concept of 
inducing ripeness. This concept is based on the idea discussed earlier that there is a certain point 
44 
where intractable conflicts become ripe for resolution. As it is conceived by Zartman (2000), 
ripeness occurs at the point of mutually hurting stalemate – a point where the con inuation of 
conflict is seen by parties to be more painful than the cost of settlement. The concept and 
literature around inducing ripeness is concerned with finding ways to bring parties to this point of 
ripeness without having to reach a mutually hurting stalemate or experience th  violence and 
destruction that it often takes to get parties in an intractable conflict to get to that point.  
 Coleman (2006) lists “fostering ripeness” (p. 549) as a main guideline to appr aching 
intractable conflict, and refers to ripeness as “a commitment to a change in the nature of the 
relations of the parties from a destructive orientation toward a more constructive state of 
coexistence” (2001, p. 549). Coleman also notes the value of Lewin’s theory of social change in 
approaching the task of fostering ripeness in an intractable conflict. “The study of the conditions 
for change” he notes “begins appropriately with an analysis of the conditions for ‘ o change,’ that 
is, for the state of equilibrium” (Lewin, 1947  p.208) as quoted by Coleman, 2006).  Coleman 
goes on to assert that therefore “to better locate and comprehend the various p ths to ripeness in a 
conflict it is valuable to attempt to understand the dynamic forces that keep a conflict in a state of 
‘unripeness’” (Coleman, 2006 p.550). This can be applied to frozen conflict in the same w y that 
Coleman applies it to intractability. Frozen conflict therefore should be viewed as equilibrium 
whose apparent stability comes from the opposing forces acting upon it, rather th n as a static 
state. This corroborates well with the concerns that Lynch (2004) and King (2001) express 
regarding the term “frozen” and the lack of activity or motion it implies. As they both argue, 
these frozen conflicts are quite dynamic and the players and context have changd sig ificantly 
since the outbreak of conflict. If we view the frozen state of these conflicts as a state of quasi-
stationary equilibrium, the change and dynamic nature that Lynch is concerned with is a 
contributing force to this frozen nature rather than a contrary phenomenon. 
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 Coleman goes on in his discussion of equilibrium to note how this concept from Lewin 
can be more specifically applied to induce ripeness in a conflict. The state of “unripeness” can be 
broken by either adding driving forces or removing restraining forces. However, driving forces 
that can induce ripeness in intractable conflict include the experience of catastrophe, the 
perception of hurting stalemate, or the threat of physical force (Coleman, 2000), and the addition 
of such forces to a conflict system will increase tension, aggressivene s and emotionality, and 
create fatigue. These are less than ideal conditions for peacebuilding. On the other hand, the 
removal of opposing forces in a conflict system, such as rage, distrust, or hopelessness, can alter 
the balance in the equilibrium while reducing tension (Coleman, 2000). Furthermore, Coleman 
goes on to cite the concept posited by Burgess and Burgess (1996, 1997) that due to the z r -sum 
and non-negotiable issues that are typically at stake in intractable onflicts, it may be more 
effective for third parties to orient their intervention to focus on the process of the intervention 
rather than the outcomes of the intervention. Coleman notes that “if their initial attention is 
focused on creating a fair and effective process, perhaps a range of possibilitie  wil  emerge 
leading to a sense of openness to negotiation in general” (2000, p.306). By combining these two 
premises on the approach to intractable conflict, Coleman proposes that “interventions aimed at 
removing resistance-forces related to the conflict process will result in great disputant ripeness 
than interventions that introduce driving-forces related to the outcomes of the conflict” (2000, 
p.306).              
 
Conclusions 
 There are numerous theories and observations offered by various fields that contribute to 
a better understanding of frozen conflict and the reasons for its longevity, some more compelling 
than others. Certain theories, factors, and schools of thought stand out as particularly 
illuminating. The concept of ripeness is central to understanding why these conflicts are so 
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resistant to moving forward in the peace process. Similarly, explanations offered by Dov Lynch, 
Charles King and other scholars of the post-Soviet sphere are particularly helpful in identifying 
the role that the de-facto states play in perpetuating the status quo. While these theories, when 
synthesized, help us understand why the conflict has not escalated to a breaking point, we require 
further explanation to understand why the conflicts do not de-escalate. The sizabl  population of 
displaced people in such conflicts (Georgia-Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Cyprus), and the 
dynamics underlying their prolonged displacement are a key to understanding the i ertia of 
frozen conflict. Such populations are significant stakeholders in these conflicts, and the fact that 
after decades of displacement they do not fully integrate into their host population ensures that 
these conflicts will not fade away or de-escalate while these populations remain in limbo.  
 This review has discussed the ways in which factors such as de-facto state building, 
international aid organizations, and other structures act as attenuating fac ors in the conflict, 
pushing the level of the conflict’s intensity down. However, it may be necessary here to expound 
on how the factor of IDPs or other displaced populations serves as a force that pushes up on the 
conflict intensity level. It seems that there are some obvious ways th t a displaced population 
might have this effect. Displaced populations can organize politically to wield influence in their 
host community and with the parties involved in the conflict. It is also not unheard of for 
displaced populations to supply recruits for or even organize paramilitary organizations that take 
on an active role in the conflict. The displaced Palestinian population is just one example of these 
phenomena. However there are other less obvious ways that a displaced population can act as a 
driving force that actively pushes the intensity of a given conflict up, or similarly act as a 
blocking agent that passively prevents the intensity of the conflict from de-escalating. The study 
in this paper seeks to shed some light on these less obvious ways that a seemingly passive or 
inactive IDP population can act as a force in frozen conflict.   
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 One such avenue through which a displaced population can act as a force is through eir 
relationship with the governing elites involved in the peace process. As discussed earlier in this 
review, a displaced population that is unable or unwilling to return home, and at the same time 
does not integrate into the host society for any number of reasons maintains a p rticular 
relationship with the governing bodies of that host society. Generally speaking, host countries 
should theoretically be highly motivated to secure the return of any displaced population within 
their borders. In particular, when a host country is one of the parties in the conflict, the presence 
of a displaced population should provide motivation in the peace process. As Julie George notes 
in regards to the Georgian government: they  
“have many reasons to exhaust bargaining strategies to regain the Abkhaz 
territory. For one, the IDP situation has exhausted the government’s housing and 
health resources. Georgian cities were not prepared to accept the onslaught of 
more than a 1/4 of a million people needing homes, employment and basic care” 
(George, 2003). 
 
However, as George also notes, political elites often have incentives to maintain stalemate and 
prevent resolution. In the case of Georgia, which will be discussed in greater d tail later, certain 
government apparatus draw their power and authority from the presence of the displaced 
population as a distinct and segregated population. Furthermore, if a group of governing elites is 
able to leverage the displaced population for advantage in negotiations, to win favor from the 
international community, or for reasons of political popularity, it is possible that these incentives 
can outweigh the motivations to secure their return through successful peace processes. However, 
if the attitudes of the refugee population itself are to carry significa ce and be worth 
consideration within a realistic assessment of the conflict, these attitudes must somehow support 
the escalating system hypothesized here. This is the crux of what the proceeding study 
investigates: the attitudes of the IDP population, and how they play a concrete role in 
perpetuating the conflict.   
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Finally, if we view the conflict through the framework offered by Kurt Lewin and field 
theory the inertia or frozenness with which this paper is concerned appears not so much as a lack 
of any movement, but rather a point of equilibrium between opposing forces. Furthermore, field 
theory can be of use in understanding the limbo in which the displaced populations in the e 
conflicts live, perhaps lending clues to why the conflict appears stuck, in the way that the 
displaced populations also appear stuck. 
 Focusing on the relationship between frozen conflict and displacement that has developed 
in this review, it appears that there are two plausible alternative rival hypotheses that explain the 
stagnation of frozen conflict, and the role of displaced persons in it.  
 The first hypothesis looks at the issue on the conflict level, and builds on the concepts 
offered by Zartman and Lynch. This hypothesis posits that the frozen conflict exists at certain 
equilibrium, at a level of intensity or painfulness that is below a threshold where the conflict is 
painful enough that parties are motivated to settle, or one might say where the conflict is ripe for 
resolution. However, this equilibrium is also at a level that is too high to be ignored, or to allow 
relations between parties to normalize on their own. Some of the drivers that Dov Lynch 
identifies, such as the state-building projects and de-facto state structures of the secessionist 
regions, peacekeeping forces, and international organizations push the level of intensity down, 
keeping it below the point of ripeness. At the same time the sizable displaced population, 
particularly if organized and politically mobilized, as well as the activities of paramilitary or 
partisan organizations keep the level of conflict intensity up, preventing de-escalation. Thus the 
conflict is “stuck” so to speak between these countervailing forces so a to appear immobile or 
frozen. See figure 2. 
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Figure 2: The equilibrium of frozen conflict. 
  
The second hypothesis looks at the conflict at the internal level of thedisplaced 
population.  This hypothesis posits that although the official claim of refugee or IDP groups is to 
return to the area from which they were displaced, there are countervailing forces within 
displaced persons on both community and individual levels. The forces for return and for 
recompense which are more visible are counterbalanced by less visible forces against return, thus 
leaving the population in an uncertain state of limbo. The conflict of these forc s, acted out in 
displaced communities, therefore prevents the return of the displaced population while also 
preventing their integration into the host community.  
 The remainder of this thesis will illustrate the testing of these hypot eses on a particular 
case, that of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict and in particular the IDP population that has resulted 











As the Soviet Union collapsed, much of the world’s attention turned to the dramatic 
events taking place in Russia and Eastern Europe. Revolutions in Eastern Europe, the 
reunification of Germany, and tumult in Moscow dominated headlines in the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s. Soon thereafter, headlines streamed in about armed conflict in little known places 
like Georgia and Azerbaijan. In this area the emerging states of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
and Georgia were all engaged in open conflict in the early 1990’s.  
 In the newly formed state of Georgia, conflict raged between the metropoli an state and 
two breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both conflicts were violent and bloody, 
inflicted tremendous damage, and carried high costs for both the separatist prtie  and the state of 
Georgia. In the years since the conflict, there has been some movement toward resolution 
between Georgia and South Ossetia. Multiple negotiations have yielded both successes and 
setbacks between the parties, yet despite the setbacks, there has be n movement in the Georgia-
South Ossetia conflict, and the movement has been more or less in the direction of resolution. The 
conflict between the Georgian State and Abkhazia, on the other hand, has made no such progress 
toward resolution.  
 This chapter will offer a background of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and the 
population of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) produced in this conflict. Like other conflicts 
in this region, the Georgian Abkhazian war erupted shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. A 
ceasefire in 1994 put an end to the armed conflict and, despite occasional eruptions of violent 
skirmishes, has held since. In the period since the ceasefire, Abkhazian Georgian relations have 
51 
been suspended. Abkhazia has been isolated by an internationally mandated blockade and is 
unable to trade, crippling any aspirations for economic growth. Meanwhile a populati n of 
150,000 - 200,000 IDPs that fled to Georgia have been unable to return to their homes for over a 
decade. This chapter will discuss the history of Georgian-Abkhaz relations and look at the root 
causes of conflict that developed before and during the Soviet era.  
This chapter will also look at the events occurring in what might be called the frozen 
period of the conflict (1994-present), including attempts at negotiations and third party attempts 
at intervention. This case will also focus particularly on the IDP population created in the war: 
this population’s distribution in Georgia, the resources and aid available to them, and their effect 
on the greater Georgian state. The issue of return is paramount in dealing with this population; 
and this study will also discuss previous attempts at return, IDP positions on return, and other 
third party attempts to work with the IDP population.  
 It is important to bear in mind the context within which the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict 
has played out. During the span of this conflict the state of Georgia has dealt with civil war, 
revolution, another secessionist region, South Ossetia, and most recently a brief but intense war 
with Russia. All of these issues and events have molded the environment in which the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict exists, and have profoundly affected the Georgian government’s capacity for 
dealing with this conflict as well as the way both sides have approached the conflict and its 
settlement. Meanwhile, Georgia’s neighbors to the south, Armenia and Azerbaijan, h ve been 
engaged in a similarly frozen conflict involving the secessionist region of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
while similar separatist tensions in other Soviet successor states such as those between Moldova 
and Transnistria have also been ongoing. While these conflicts have not necessarily had a 
profound effect on each other, they are typically discussed by scholars of Soviet and post-Soviet 
affairs as a distinct group of conflicts, involving similar root causes, key issues, and triggering 
points. Finally, the events in Kosovo play an identifiable role in the events of the Georgian-
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Abkhazian conflict as well as the other Soviet successor wars. The independence of Kosovo, and 
the support given to it by the Western Powers has not gone unwatched in other parts of the former 
Soviet Union, and is claimed by separatist regions like Abkhazia, as well as by the Russian 
government who has supported some of these separatist de-facto, as precedent and evidence for 
why they are entitled to independence as well.       
 
Roots of Conflict: Pre-Soviet 
 The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia certainly has roots in Soviet federal structure 
and the Soviet approach to national and ethnic groups within the USSR. Yet it also has a history 
that begins long before the rise of the Soviet Union, and it is worthwhile to examine the more 
ancient roots of this conflict. The Caucasus region has historically been home to numerous and 
distinct ethnic groups and many have maintained a distinct identity throughout centuries of rule 
by outsiders such as the Persian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. Abkhazians and Os etians are 
just two of many distinct groups such as Adjarans, Mingrelians, Swanians, and a sizable minority 
of Armenians whose identity and languages persist in modern day Georgia.  
 The degree to which the Abkhaz have stood apart from Georgians throughout history 
varies according to the source. The fact that both Georgians and Abkhazians have spent much of 
modern history under Ottoman, Russian, or Soviet rule further complicates any attempt to 
establish historical precedents regarding the two groups’ relationship. It is generally agreed upon 
that Abkhazians and Georgians are ethnically distinct. As Liana Kvarchelia explains:  
For centuries, Georgians and Abkhazians, peoples with very different ethnic
origins and languages, lived in neighboring territories. There were periods in 
their history when Abkhazia, as a separate principality, was under Georgian r 
Ottoman vassalage. There was also a period when the western and some eastern 
areas of Georgia were part of the Abkhazian Kingdom.  (1998, p.18) 
 
However, there is disagreement about Abkhazians’ origins, which is relevant to both sides’ 
claims to rightful sovereignty over the modern day territory of Abkhazia. Some claim that 
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Abkhazian statehood, based in and around modern-day Abkhazian territory, has existed for ov r 
1,200 years (Kvarchelia, 1998). Meanwhile there are other historical theories, espoused primarily 
by Georgian scholars, which claim that Abkhazians are the relative newcomers to the territory, 
which was previously under Georgian domain (Kvarchelia, 1998).  
 When discussing the ancient origins of Georgians, Abkhazians, and their relationship, it 
is important to bear in mind that the unified political entity that is now called “Georgia” is a 
relatively new creation. Before Russian rule, the territory that now makes up the modern state that 
is the Republic of Georgia was essentially divided into two kingdoms or two main groups of 
kingdoms. Throughout much of its history, Georgia has been divided into eastern and western 
kingdoms or principalities by the Likhi mountain range that runs north to south through central 
Georgia. The eastern part, most commonly know as Kartli (or Iberia in cl ssi al recordings) is 
home to the capital city Tbilisi. The western part was known by classical authors and the ancient 
Greeks (among others) as Colchis, and to Georgians by names such as Imereti or Abkhazeti 
(Suny, 1988). There are instances of eastern and western Kingdoms being consolidated un er one 
ruler, most notably under Bagrat III in the early 11th century (Suny, 1988), yet such instances are 
more uncommon than not.  
Throughout its long history, Georgia has been dominated by foreign empires, and as the 
Ottoman and Persian empires rose in the 14th century, Georgia became a crossroads and a 
battleground between the empires. Although the entire south Caucasus region traded hands 
between Turkish and Arab powers several times, by the early 17th century East and West Georgia 
were largely divided by their loyalties. Western Georgia pledged loyalty to the Ottomans while 
Eastern Georgia ruled at the discretion of Iranian shahs (Suny, 1988). One effect of Ottoman 
influence in Western Georgia was the adoption of Islam by both Abkhazians and Adjarans (Suny, 
1988).  
54 
 Towards the end of the 18th century, Georgian rulers turned to their increasingly imperial 
neighbors to the north. Russian hegemony offered protection and security that was seen s 
preferable to the conflicting and tumultuous rule of either the Persian or the Ottoman Empire. 
Eastern Georgia, or Kartli, was the first to come under Russian protection, in the late 1770’s 
(Slider, 2005); and by 1804 all of modern day Georgia was officially annexed by imperial Russia. 
However, as Russian and Ottoman tensions grew, parts of Western Georgia, including Abkhazia, 
became pawns that great powers played against each other. “During the Crimean War, the Turks 
stirred up the Abkhaz against Russia at the time of the [Ottoman] invasio  of Mingrelia” (Lang, 
1962, p.97), and Sukhumi subsequently became a launching point for the Ottoman invasion of 
Western Georgia (Lang, 1962).  
The Russians consolidated their rule in Abkhazia shortly after the end of the Crim an 
war. During the long era of Russian rule that followed (as part of both the Russian Empire and the 
Soviet Union), Abkhazians would suffer numerous abuses at the hands of these new rulers. The 
years after the war coincided with the annihilation of the Circassian , a north Caucasian ethnic 
group with whom the Abkhaz had cultural and ethnic connections (Lang, 1962). Many 
Circassians were exiled to Turkey, and numerous Abkhazians followed them. Tis period also 
saw massive deportations and forced exile from the area in and around Abkhazia. Many 
Abkhazians and other people of North Caucasus fled or were deported to Turkey. “The first 
deportations of Muslims from the region by the Russian Empire started in 1828 with the victory 
in the war” (Tarkhan-Mouravi & Sumbadze, 2006 p.284) while the main flux of Abkhazians we t 
to Turkey during 1864-1878. These people, who became known as the Makhajirs or the Muhajirs, 
are said to number over 400,000 in Turkey today (Kvarchelia, 1998; Tarkhan-Mouravi et al., 
2006). Whether these numbers are accurate or not, they point to the fact that Abk zians view the 
period of Russian rule as a time of persecution when Abkhazian national identity was assaulted 
by Soviet policies of both “Georgification” and “Russification.” 
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 Following the Russian Revolution and overthrow of the Tsars in 1917, Georgia declare  
independence under the protection of Germany in 1918. It should be noted that in this shor -l ved 
Georgian constitution, little indication is given to the status or sovereignty of Abkhazia 
(Coppieters, 2001). Although this independence was recognized by major European powers and 
even Vladimir Lenin in 1920, it was overthrown in 1921 when Georgia was invaded by the
Bolshevik army (Lang, 1962). In 1922 Georgia joined the Soviet Union as part of the 
Transcaucasian Federative Republic.    
 
Soviet Roots of Conflict 
 Many scholars and analysts of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict see it as having roots in the 
Soviet Period. Some point to the treatment of ethnic minorities under Soviet rule while others 
point to the Soviet federal structure as a source of conflict. Before delving into these theories 
though, it may be helpful to outline several key events in the early Soviet period. In the initial 
years of the Soviet Union, Georgia was incorporated as part of the Transcauca ian Federative 
Republic, along with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Each of these entities carried the title of 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) within Transcaucasia; and at the outset the 
Abkhaz also maintained this status as Soviet Republic putting it on equal footing with Georgia 
(Toft, 2001).  This status was codified in Abkhazia’s constitution in 1925, which today serves as 
the legal basis of their claim for independence.  Abkhazia was later incorporated as a part of 
Georgia in 1931, when Stalin reorganized the federal structure of the Soviet Union. At this point 
Abkhazia became an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic under the jurisdiction of he Union 
Republic of Georgia (Lang, 1962).  
 Stalin’s policies of terror and purging were felt throughout the Soviet Union in the 1930’s 
and 1940’s. The Caucasus was no exception, and any expression of national discontent was 
targeted as potentially mutinous. However, it was also during this period that Abkhazian national 
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identity was particularly assaulted. Under various Soviet policies, influxes of non-Abkhazian 
workers immigrated to the region and the Abkhazian language was subordinated to both the 
Russian and Georgian languages. As Soviet historian David Marshall Lang explains: 
“By 1926, autonomous Abkhazia, covering 3,240 square miles, had a population 
of 174,000 of which the Abkhazians themselves accounted for less than one 
third. Under the Second Five-Year Plan, Abkhazia was directed to step up 
tobacco production substantially, and more Russians, Georgians, Armenians and 
Greeks were brought in to work on new plantations and industrial projects. The 
Abkhazians, who resented these encroachments on their cherished autonomy, 
protested and in the end, fell completely into disgrace with the Kremlin" (1962, 
p.256).   
 
These policies, aimed at weakening the Abkhaz national identity, were imposed by the Soviet 
regime and accomplished through policies of “Georgianization,” making it difficult or Abkhaz 
nationalists to identify the source of the national oppression they experienced (Coppieters, 2003). 
These policies became a major grievance for Abkhazians and a significant motivator in the 
conflict that erupted in the early 1990’s. They were further exacerbated by thedebate that 
developed between Abkhaz and Georgia scholars in the 1970’s and 1980’s, in which eac  amp 
developed new theories and unearthed new evidence that their own people first inhabited the area 
around Abkhazia and that the other group (Georgians or Abkhaz) were the relaiv  newcomers to 
the area (Coppieters, 2001).  
 Throughout this period, Abkhaz authorities petitioned the Soviet central government in 
Moscow to remove the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic from Georgian jurisdiction and plce it 
under Russian rule. Each time the request was denied, but certain cultural concessions were given 
instead, providing greater power in regional government and media (Zverev, 1996). Finally, in 
1989 several thousand Abkhaz signed the “Lykhny Declaration” which called for the formation 
of a Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia, separate from Georgia (Lynch, 2004). This 
declaration launched an outbreak of violent clashes and a string of events that would develop into 
the conflict that remains unresolved today between Georgia and Abkhazia.     
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Outbreak of War 
 The years 1989-1994 were a remarkably tumultuous time in the Caucasus region, 
particularly in Georgia. It is important to remember the extent of this tumul  when discussing the 
events leading up to and during the Georgian-Abkhaz war. Within this same time frame the 
Georgians also declared independence, fought another separatist war with South Ossetia, and 
experienced a military coup d’état that ousted the country’s first preident, installed a second 
president, and resulted in civil war.  
Georgian nationalism and the desire for autonomy were growing in the late 1980’s and 
coincided with the signing of the Lykhny Declaration. Georgians, particularly those in Abkhazia, 
reacted negatively to the declaration. These reactions mingled with the strong anti-Soviet and 
anti-communist sentiments of the time. Later that year armed clashes broke out in Sukhumi over a 
schism that developed between Georgian and non-Georgian faculty at the university n Sukhumi. 
The Georgian faculty left the university to found a branch of Tbilisi State University in Sukhumi 
(Lynch, 2004; Zverev 1996; Coppieters, 2003), which was subsequently subjected to 
vandalization and attacks.  
In October 1990 Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected as Georgia’s first president, and in 
April 1991 Georgia declared its independence from the USSR. Gamsakhurdia’s election did little 
to quell fears of marginalization by ethnic minorities within Georgia, as he was known to be 
radically nationalistic and to support exclusionary state-building policies that alienated minorities 
(Lynch, 2004). Later in 1991, Gamsakhurdia negotiated an agreement with Abkhaz leadership 
that would grant Abkhazians over-representation in the regional parliament nd guarantee a non-
Georgian majority. The agreement was wildly unpopular with Georgians nationwide and 
generally failed to resolve the tension between Abkhaz and Georgian groups in Abkhazia (Lynch, 
2004; Zverev, 1996; Coppieters, 2003).  
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In the winter of 1991-1992 Gamsakhurdia was ousted by a coalition of military and 
paramilitary groups, sending him into exile and installing a military council headed by Eduard 
Shevardnadze. However, even after the violent clashes in Tbilisi had ended, Gamsakhurdia 
retained substantial support in the western regions of Georgia where “Zviadist” forces were 
organized (Lynch, 2004). Shortly after taking power, the military council headed by 
Shevardnadze abolished the 1978 Georgian constitution and replaced it with the pre-Soviet 
constitution of 1921 in which the legal status of Abkhazia is not specified (Coppieters, 2003). 
Later in July 1992, the Abkhazian parliament responded by declaring that Abkhazia would revert 
to a 1925 constitution which described it as an independent Soviet republic.   
The eruption of armed conflict shortly followed, with Georgian forces marching into 
Abkhazia on August 14, 1992 (Lynch, 2004; Zverev, 1996). The reasons for the Georgian 
offensive are not generally agreed upon. Some sources simply explain that Georgian forces 
moved in (Lynch, 2004). Others explain that the march was done in response to Zviadist military 
activity in the area of the Georgia-Abkhazia border which threatened the railroad line running 
through Abkhazia to Russia. As such, some sources describe the movement of Georgian troops 
into Abkhazia as a police action (Zverev, 1996; Coppieters, 2003).   
 At first the Georgian troops overwhelmed the Abkhazian forces, pushing them out of 
Sukhumi and forcing them to withdraw to Gudauta in the northwest part of the region. However 
in 1993, bolstered by Russia support in the form of weapons and Slavic officers (Lynch, 2004) as 
well as fighting forces from the North Caucasus, the Abkhaz launched a series of h ghly 
successful counter-offensives. In late September 1993, Abkhaz forces captured Sukhumi, thus 
expelling the Georgian forces and causing the majority of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia to flee 
(Zverev, 1996; Coppieters, 2003).   
 UN sponsored talks between Georgia and Abkhazian began in Geneva in November 
1993, and a formal ceasefire was signed in December. Further talks resulted in an agreement 
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signed in April 1994 to deploy a peacekeeping force to maintain the ceasefir  line. This 
agreement was not implemented, however, due to disagreement over who should sponsor the 
peacekeeping force (PKF) and where they should be deployed. Finally in May 1994 an agreement 
was reached on the specifics of the PKF (Walker, 2000). This agreement specified the creation of 
security zone (demilitarized zone) within 12 km of Inguri River on both sides. It also called for an 
additional restricted-weapons zone within 12 km of either side of the security zone (see map on 
following page). The agreement also specified that the peacekeeping force would operation under 
a CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) mandate and that troops would come from a 
number of CIS states. This CIS peacekeeping force would be charged with monitoring the 
security and restricted-weapons zones, and would “promote the safe return of refugees and 
displaced persons, especially to the Gali district” (Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of 
Forces, 1994  p.3). The activities of this peacekeeping force would also be monitored by the UN 
Observer’s Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The figure below illustrates the territorial provisions 
of the agreement.  
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Figure 3: Map of demilitarized area. 
 
 
Only part of this agreement was implemented, however. A small fraction of the IDPs 
have been able to safely return, and the “CIS” peacekeeping force is composed entirely of 
Russian troops (Walker, 2000). Yet, by and large the basics of the ceasefire nd demilitarized 
zones held without incident until August 2008, with the exception of the skirmishes that took 
place in Gali in the spring of 1998.  
Gali is a region in the southeast of Abkhazia, bordering Georgia, and was a m jor 
Georgian population center before the war. By the spring of 1998, between 40,000 and 60,000 
Georgian IDPs had returned to the Gali region, partly under the supervision of a low-profile 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commission on Refugees) repatriation program. The program was 
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relatively successful: conditions in Gali improved and drew significat amounts of humanitarian 
aid from external sources (Coppieters, 2005; Walker, 2000). However the Georgian returnees 
were without formal security guarantees, and were frequently harassed by the Abkhazian militia 
who sought to demonstrate sovereignty over the region. In response, the Georgian guerilla or 
paramilitary group know as the White Legion adopted the task of providing protection to the 
Georgian returnees (Nodia, 2000; Walker, 2000). The White Legion, who was openly supported 
by the Georgian Abkhaz-government-in-exile, carried out raids and attacks on both the 
Abkhazian militia and the Russian PKF. The Abkhaz responded by moving 1500 militia embers 
to the Gali region, carrying out counter-raids on Georgian villages where t  White Legion were 
believed to be based. Fighting ensued, and in 1998 erupted into what has come to be called the 
“Six-Day War,” and the majority of the newly returned Georgian villagers, approximately 50,000, 
fled the area – being displaced for the second time (Nodia, 2000; Walker, 2000). These events 
made painfully clear the need for renewed efforts at negotiations and in particular “dictated a 
clear need for regulating the return of refugees to Abkhazia” (Coppieters, 2005, p.287). Today it 
is estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 Georgians have returned to the Gali region. These 
returnees, however, are typically discriminated against by local authorities, and often are unable 
to register, unable to vote, and are often subject to highly inflated tax rates (Coppieters, 2005). 
Many other IDPs that live in parts of Georgia near the Abkhaz border now eturn during the day 
to work their farmland or orchards in the Gali region. 
 Since the 1998 outbreak of violence in the Gali region little has tran pired in regards to 
either the resolution of the conflict or the status of the IDP population created in it, and the 
conflict has remained largely frozen since its outbreak. However, the summer of 2008 saw the 
renewed heating of tensions along the Georgian-Abkhaz border. The outbreak of fighting 
between Georgian and Russian forces in August, 2008 began in and around the separatist r gion 
of South Ossetia, but a second front of fighting soon opened along the Georgian-Abkhaz border, 
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with the fighting spreading into the Georgian border city of Zugdidi. One would imagine that this 
most recent fighting would affect the ability and willingness of Georgian IDPs to travel between 
their land in Gali and their current homes in Georgia. It has likely also affected those 10,000-
20,000 Georgians that have chosen to unofficially return to Gali. However, it should be noted at 
this point that the study upon which this paper is based, as well as most of the supporting 
theoretical research, was conducted and compiled well before this most recen  round of fighting 
broke out. As such, it is unable to address in depth the effects that the fighting in the summer of 
2008 had on the long-term outlook of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict or the Georgian IDP 
population. In addition, it is also possible that some aspects of this conflict may have changed 
since the data in this study was collected.      
 The preceding section has reviewed some of the historical events and factors tha  are 
related to the development of conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia. The roots of this conflict 
have been attributed to historical factors as recent as the handling of ethnic and minority 
dissatisfaction during the infancy of Georgian statehood, to the policies implemented during 
Soviet rule, and as old as the emergence of consolidated kingdoms in modern-day Georgia and 
Abkhazia as much as 1,200 years ago. The following section will discuss some of the central 
theories on how this conflict developed and emerged, and what issues are at its core. 
  
Theories on the Conflict 
 Theories that attempt to explain the outbreak of conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia 
highlight a number of factors. The federal structure that emerged in the Soviet Union under 
Stalin’s rule is credited by many Soviet scholars with fostering separatist ambitions in various 
regions across the former Soviet Union after its fall by setting up locally run governing 
institutions in certain ethnic minority regions and thus endowing these regions with varying 
degrees of regional autonomy. Not only in Georgia, but in Azerbaijan and Moldova, Central 
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Asia’s Ferghana Valley, and in various Russian regions such as Chechnya and Tart rstan ethnic 
tensions have arisen that can be traced to the region’s status under the Soviet Federal system. In a 
related but different group of interpretations of the conflict, theories credit the ineptitude of the 
fledgling Republics in the building of multi-ethnic states and inability to accommodate the 
concerns of ethnic minorities within their borders. Still others point to the unyielding nationalist 
fervor that consumed the people of the successor states as well as the autonomous regions within 
them. This uncompromising nationalism created a political environment particul rly hostile to the 
development of power-sharing arrangements. Most likely, all of the factors emphasized by these 
theories collaborated to create the conditions from which the conflict was born, but each theory 
tells a great deal about the position both parties were in during the late 1980s/early 1990s.    
  The behemoth USSR was comprised of dozens of distinct ethnic groups and natioalities. 
Bruno Coppieters explains that the Soviet structure was highly contradictory: it was highly 
centralized politically yet rather decentralized at the administrat ve level (2003). To dampen the 
threat of nationalist ambitions and secession, a federative system was created that conferred 
varying degrees of autonomy and recognition on the many ethnic groups and nations throughout 
the Soviet Union. The fifteen Union Soviet Socialist Republics, which would later become the 
same fifteen former Soviet states, enjoyed the highest degree of autonomy under this system. 
These republics were in theory created around major ethnic groups or titular nationalities, such as 
Kazakhs, Uzbeks, or Georgians.  Smaller national and ethnic groups were often given recognition 
with varying degrees of autonomy within the other Union Republics. Below the Union Republics 
were the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSR’s), below these were the Autonomous 
Regions or “Oblasts,” and below these, the “Otkrugs” (George, 2001). The Union Republic of 
Georgia contained three such autonomies: The ASSRs of Abkhazia and Adjara, and the South 
Ossetia Oblast. During the Soviet era this system worked to pacify and control the many ethnic 
groups and nations that made up the USSR, often employing a “divide and conquer” strategy in 
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the process. This ensured that any ambition on the part of these smallr titular nationalities for 
greater autonomy became the problem of the Union Republics, rather than the central Soviet 
governance in Moscow. Furthermore, this federal system weakened national unity within the 
fifteen Union Republics, which in turn weakened their ability to pursue any ambitions of 
independence they may foster. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union the remnants of these 
Soviet structures and the nationalist ambitions they often fostered, in many cases exacerbated 
ethnic tensions that had been kept latent for decades (George, 2001). 
Other theorists point to flawed state-building practices at the outset of independence. 
Monica Duffy-Toft points to the challenges inherent in multi-national state-building and the 
conditions present in Georgia that made it even more difficult. “The combination of the shock of 
independence, combined with long simmering nationalist resentments and a large, powerful, 
imperialist neighbor, made it impossible for Georgia to establish stable institutions capable of 
moving it towards its goal of a strong, multinational and democratic state” (Toft, 2001 p.123). As 
a multi-national state emerges, minorities must decide whether to voice con rns to the majority 
or exit the state; and the rhetoric and policies of the national majority tend to determine this 
decision. Fierce nationalism dominated Georgian politics at the time, as exemplified by 
Gamsakhurdia’s radically nationalist and often exclusionary rhetoric. Abkhaz (and South 
Ossetians, for that matter) interpreted such rhetoric and policy as driving towards a Georgian 
nationalizing state, making the option of exit the preferred course of actin, even if it meant 
subjugation to another state (Toft, 2001). 
  In a similar manner, Coppetiers points to the inability of the Soviet successor states to re-
federalize the various ethnic groups within their borders. Despite the exist nce, and success, of 
the extensive federal system throughout the Soviet era for accommodating natio alist ambitions, 
newly formed successor states were unable to retain or remodel this fderal system to 
accommodate national minorities. Coppetiers explains that this resulted from the resistance to 
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power-sharing that emerged. “A strong stand against power-sharing agreements with other 
national communities was made by all political elites and publics of the newly independent states, 
including the breakaway republics” (Coppieters, 2001 p.11). This resistance, he explains, was 
partly due to the way that democratization during the Soviet break-up coincided with mass public 
mobilizations in defense of national interests (2001).   
All of these theories point to a combination of conditions present in Georgia and 
Abkhazia at the fall of the Soviet Union that enabled the development of conflict while disabling 
both parties’ capacity for dealing with tensions non-violently. It should be understood that the 
overwhelming motivation of both the Abkhazian and Georgians in the lead up to conflict should 
be characterized as fear. Paranoia and uncertainty ran rampant during these tumultuous years, 
with the actions of both parties usually feeding rather than alleviating the others’ anxiety. The 
actions of both parties were largely governed by the fear of marginalization. In the face of 
Georgian nationalism that was so fervent that it often was manifested a  an attitude of “Georgia 
for Georgians” at the expense of minority rights, ethnic groups such as the Abkazians feared that 
subjugation to Georgian statehood would equate to destruction of Abkhaz national identity. 
Likewise, Georgians were shaky in their new and unstable statehood, and feared th  prospect of 
absorption or invasion by Russia. They viewed claims for minority rights or increased regional 
autonomy as a perilous threat to state sovereignty, and at times suspected such claims to be the 
result of collusion with Russia. Furthermore, both groups were so traumatized by the experience 
of Soviet rule that avoiding what they perceived as continuation of this experi nc  became 
paramount. Unfortunately, as is often the case in ethnic conflict, these fears were more perception 
than reality.  
 In summary, the major interpretations of the development of conflit between Georgia 
and Abkhazia all point in one way or another to the legacy of Soviet rule and the instability 
surrounding the breakup of the Soviet Union. Some theories emphasize the power given to 
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regional nationalities under the federal system employed by the Soviets and claim that this system 
essentially primed a number of regions for separatist conflict. Other theo ies focus more on the 
inability of the successor states to adequately accommodate these ti ular nationalities, either 
through the structural inability to develop the power-sharing mechanisms nece sary for a multi-
national state or through the public and moral inability of the majority in these states to make 
room for ethnic minorities within their sweeping nationalist fervor and natio list rhetoric. 
However, fear and the perception of the other party as a potential threat to the independence and 
autonomy that was so feverishly clamored for at the fall of the Soviet Union is a central factor in 
all of these interpretations. However, as much as these analyses of events tell about the 
emergence of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, they do not explain why the conflict has been so 
resistant to resolution, or why it entered and has largely remained in a frozen state since the 
implementation of a ceasefire. As such, it is necessary to explore the events and attempted efforts 
at resolution that have transpired since the initial period of armed conflict ended in 1994.   
 
Attempts at Resolution  
Although negotiations have proceeded almost continuously since the ceasefire in 1994, 
remarkably little progress has been made in them. The status quo that settled in shortly after the 
ceasefire has more or less remained. As Ghia Nodia explains of early negotiations: “the 
continuous meetings of delegations were more ritualistic in their character: the parties knew they 
were expected to negotiate, but believed that in fact the solution depended on Russia, and each 
hoped to reach a separate deal with the latter. Until then, they could just enjoy visiting places like 
Geneva” (Nodia, 2000). Increased tensions in Gali, the “Six-Day War,” and the threat that the 
situation may devolve into full-scale war, injected a new sense of urgency and importance into 
the negotiations. There was a realization that in order to reduce violence the delegations would 
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have to work together, relying on their own negotiating skills, rather than focusing on Russia 
(Nodia, 2000).  
Additionally, in June 1997 Abkhazian President Vladislav Ardzinba met with the 
Georgian Foreign Minister and senior Russian officials. It was reported that a possible agreement 
was reached during these talks. The details were not made public, but the agreement reportedly 
specified that the two parties agreed to live “within the confines of a shared state within the 
boundaries of the Georgian SSR as of 21 December 1991” (Walker, 2000 p.164). The tentativ  
agreement also provided for the repatriation of Georgian IDPs, but did not specify a timetable and 
allowed the Abkhaz to continue the lengthy process of screening returnees (Walker, 2000).  
The tentative agreement fell apart before it was signed. Hardliners in both Georgia and 
Abkhazia rejected various provisions, and the agreement began to collapse under the w ight of 
this disapproval. Russian officials attempted to resuscitate the agrement with shuttle diplomacy 
between Ardzinba and Shevardnadze, but to no avail. The groups then turned to the United States 
and the UN, requesting a peacekeeping force to replace the existing Russian force, but both 
replied that their peacekeeping forces were already overstretched  (Walker, 2000). In August 
1997, the two presidents signed a no-use-of-force agreement, which was seen as a major 
breakthrough, but produced little movement in the peace process, as it did notaddress the key 
issues of status and return. Talks continued with increased intermittency, but produced no 
workable solution to these key issues.  
In a more recent attempt to breach this stalemate, UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General Dieter Boden released a discussion paper on the conflict in 2002. The paper, 
commonly known as the Boden Document, attempted to outline a possible compromise between 
the parties with the hopes of re-engaging them in negotiation. In its essence th document 
suggests that Abkhazia return to Georgian sovereignty with the greatest l vel of autonomy and 
self-rule possible. The document also recommended the gradual return of limited numbers of 
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IDPs, first to the Gali region and later to other parts of Abkhazia. The Abkhaz authorities rejected 
these suggestions, and refused to officially acknowledge the document (Coppieters, 2005).    
 Like the Boden document, most suggestions for resolution offered by scholar  involve a 
return of Abkhazia to Georgian territory with the greatest possible autonomy for Abkhazia. Most 
solutions to the issue of status suggest that the parties enter a “common state” arrangement, which 
would most likely take the form of a federal or confederal association (Lynch, 2004; King, 2001, 
Walker, 2000). Approaches to the IDP question suggest a gradual return of IDPs, starting with a 
large scale return of IDPs to the Gali region and gradual return in other parts of the region 
(Lynch, 2004). If this proves to be unworkable, others suggest that the Abkhazian borders be 
redrawn to place certain former Georgian enclaves (such as Gali or the Kodori Gorge) under 
Georgian jurisdiction (Walker, 2000).      
 
The IDP Population 
One of the largest and most painful effects of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia 
is the population of Georgians from Abkhazia that have been displaced since the outbreak of the 
war. Abkhazia was an ethnically mixed region at the time of the war, with Abkhazians 
comprising about 17% of the population, Georgians comprising 44%, and other groups such as 
Russians and Armenians around 31% (Zverev, 1996). Between 250,000 and 300,000 Georgians 
fled the region in 1992 and 1993 and very few have returned. 
 Many (42%) of these internally displaced peoples (IDPs) initially settled in the 
Samegrelo region, which borders Abkhazia, and particular in the regional capital Zugdidi. Other 
sizable populations relocated to Tbilisi (33%) and Imereti (12%) (Gotsiridze, 2003). Recently, 
however, large numbers of IDPs have been relocating to the Tbilisi area in s rch of work. Nearly 
half of this population lives with other IDP families in collective housing provided by the 
government. These facilities are typically large institutional buildings leftover from the Soviet era 
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such as schools, hospitals, and Sanatoria (Soviet vacation lodging for the proletariat masses). 
Unemployment is high for IDPs, particularly those living in collective centers, and residents there 
often subsist off small patches of arable land around these buildings converted to gardens or 
livestock pens.  
 “At the most basic level, IDPs are a drain on the resources of the new states” Lynch 
explains of the cost of the displaced population to the Georgian state (2005, p.95). The aid 
received by these IDPs is paltry in most ways, yet collectively it is enough to be a costly burden 
to the government, particularly a government that in recent years has struggled to fund such 
essentials as a military and police force. In 2001, expenses for the Ministry of Refugees amounted 
to 57.2 million Lari (GEL), or approximately 27.6 million US Dollars (USD). This amounted to 
just over 6% of the state budget, equal to healthcare and education expenses combined. However, 
on the ground this expenditure only amounts to a monthly stipend of 7-11 USD, “bread money” 
as many IDPs call it, for reasons easily discerned (Gotsiridze, 2003). Furthermore, government 
subsidies for utilities in collective housing units amounted to 25 million GEL in 2001. Certain 
services are provided by city governments, such as public transportation: it is estimated that the 
city of Tbilisi provides such services at a cost of around 8 million GELper year, 5% of the city’s 
budget (Gotsiridze, 2003).   
 The effect of this population, which constitutes between 5-7% of Georgia’s general 
population, is vast. Their presence has been a significant factor in Georgia’s development and in 
negotiations with Abkhaz authorities. The IDP question is a major point of contenti  in the 
settlement of the conflict, and will most likely prove to be one of the trickiest issues to work 
through in any successful peace agreement. 
 The IDP issue in many ways goes to the heart of what the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is all 
about. For Abkhaz nationalists the issue of Georgian IDPs is tied to the threat of cultural and 
national annihilation. Abkhazians fear that a massive influx of Georgian IDPs would make them a 
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minority in their land once again subjecting them to retaliation and loss of electoral control; and 
the sheer numbers make this a compelling source of fear. For the Georgians the IDP population 
not only poses a significant challenge to growth and democratization in the new stat , but is also a 
painful reminder of the unexpected military defeat and loss of a treasured region of the country. 
The relative social isolation and dependence of this population has negatively impacted the 
political, social, and economic growth of the state, and return of IDPs has been ac ntral demand 
in Georgia’s approach to the Abkhaz conflict (Lynch, 2004).  
 As George Khutsishvili explains, the issue of IDP return is a central pa t of both parties’ 
actual and declared positions as well as part of the best and worst case scenario for each. The 
positive ideal scenario for Georgians would likely include the “rapid return of all IDPs to their 
homes,” while the negative ideal would see the Abkhaz “expatriate all remaining or returned 
ethnic Georgians” (Khutsishvili, 2006, p.290). By the same token, the positive ideal scenario of 
the Abkhaz would require Georgia “not to raise the issue of repatriation of the refugees.” Even 
more telling is the Abkhaz negative ideal scenario which would have the Georgian government 
“forcibly settle masses of refugees in Abkhazia, giving them a free hand in occupying Abkhaz 
homes whenever claimed by the repatriates and allowing acts of vengeance” (Khutsishvili, 2006, 
p.291).  
 Stalemate over the IDP issue cannot be understood without seeing the perceived 
demographic threat that they pose to Abkhazian ambitions of sovereignty. Before the conflict 
erupted in 1992, ethnic Abkhaz made up only about 18% of the population of Abkhazia, while 
ethnic Georgians composed nearly 42% of the population. Sizable Armenian, Russian, and Greek 
populations made up the remaining 40%. Thus, even after the expulsion of most of the Georgian 
population, ethnic Abkhazians are still outnumbered in the region by non-Abkhaz. The return of 
roughly 250,000 ethnic Georgians to the region poses a threat to whatever demographic and 
electoral authority the Abkhaz may have now.  
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This stalemate is then further compounded by the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile. This 
governing body is comprised of ministers and parliament members from the pre-conflict Abkhaz 
government that were forced to flee in 1992, and is considered the official representative body of 
the IDP population in Georgia. This organization wields a significant amount of power and 
influence in Georgian politics and is notoriously hard-lined regarding IDP return and Georgian 
sovereignty over Abkhazia. This body consists of 25 delegates and a supreme presidium, and 
maintains among other things 11 ministries and a department for foreign affairs (Lynch, 2002; 
George, 2003). The Government-in-Exile also draws a budget from the main Georgian 
government, part of which is dispersed through this body to provide the monthly pension that 
many IDPs receive and part of which includes a military budget (George, 2003). The stated 
purpose of this body, and the group of political elites that run it, is to provide a representative 
governmental apparatus to the IDP population until the regional government in Abkhazia can be 
restored.  It follows then that the authority and existence of this apparatus is dependant on the 
existence of the IDP population as a distinct and separate entity within Georgia. This body has 
not faced election since it originated in 1992 and will likely “continue to rpresent the IDPs until 
a new political regime is established in Abkhazia” (George, 2003 p.26).  Because this group 
draws its authority from the ambiguous status quo of the IDP, whereby this population remains 
displaced but non-integrated in Georgian society, it would follow that this group would have little 
to gain from either a negotiated settlement or from increased integration of the IDP population 
(George, 2003).  
The way in which the apparatus of the Abkhaz government in exile could be said to
bolster the conflict is two-fold. First, as a powerful group of elites within t e Georgian political 
system the Government-in-Exile often takes a hard, radically nationalist line on conflict 
settlement issues, and are often the first to call for military responses to incidents that arise, and 
are thus able to impede the ability of the Georgian government to compromise or bargain in 
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settlement negotiations. Second, this structure of having the IDP population represented 
specifically by this special government body also gives the rest of the Georgian government a 
way out of answering directly to the IDP population. It does this by “channeling the political 
force of the 250,000-strong IDP population” thus acting as a “safety-valve in domestic politics” 
(Lynch, 2002 p. 844). If the government does not have to answer directly to the IDP population, it 
is then able to pursue a more hard-line position on Georgian sovereignty in Abkhazia and the 
return of the IDP population, which is far more politically popular than advocating  settlement 
involving compromise or power-sharing. This Abkhaz Government-in-Exile ther for  links the 
existence of the Georgian IDP population as a segregated and distinct entity in Georgian society 
to stalemate producing behavior by government elites. This behavior in turn is la gely responsible 
for the lack of movement in the would-be Georgian-Abkhazia peace process, and serves to 
entrench the conflict in its frozen state.  
 
Conclusion 
 This section has attempted to provide the background information about the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict and the IDP population that resulted from it that is needed to understand the 
context in which the study presented in this paper was conducted. The intertwining histories of 
Georgia and Abkhazia are long and complex. The origins of the conflict between hese actors that 
remains unresolved today is largely traced to the era of Soviet rule, the systems of regional 
governance that were set up during that period, and the trauma that both groups were so eager to 
escape as that era ended. However, one cannot fully understand the claims for independence 
made by Abkhazians or the claims for sovereignty over that land made by Georgians without 
understanding the pre-modern and early-modern history of this region. The cascade of events that 
came during and shortly following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the rapidity with 
which the build-up to war occurred shows that latent tensions had surely been mounting between 
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these groups during the final decades of Soviet rule. The war that resulted, though arguably brief, 
was intense and highly destructive; and among these tragic results were the displacement of as 
many as 250,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, the vast majority of who remain in other parts 
of Georgia today and continue to live as displaced persons nearly fifteen years later.  
 This section also looked at the frozen period that developed after a ceasefire was signed 
in 1994. As this state of “frozen-ness” is the primary concern of this paper, this section has 
reviewed the major attempts at resolution or negotiated settlement in the attempt to identify 
events or historical-political factors that may have contributed to the unique qualities of this 
frozen state that have been thus far discussed in this paper. The history of this conflict as written 
does not offer sufficient answers as to why such conflicts take on this frozen state and then go 
unresolved for so long. The following sections describe the methods and results of the tudy that 
was conducted in the context of the Georgian-Abkahzian conflict and the IDP population 
involved in it. This study will attempt to shed light on the nature of frozen confli t and on the 
question of why some such conflicts go unresolved for so long. The review of literature relevant 
to this question produced two plausible hypotheses on this issue. 
One hypothesis suggests that frozen conflict exists at an equilibrium of sorts and is kept 
in this equilibrium by the opposition of forces that both drive the intensity of the conflict up and 
those that push the level of intensity down, keeping the conflict below a breaking point that 
would demand action toward resolution. This hypothesis offers examples such as de-facto state 
building and international organizations as the de-escalating forces while factors such as 
paramilitary activity and the presence of IDP populations serve as driving factors that push the 
level of conflict intensity up. Given the connection between the presenc  of the IDP population, 
the power wielded by the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile, and the bargaining behavior of 
government elites, the following study attempts to identify the degree to which the attitudes of the 
IDP population in the context described in this chapter does serve as a drivingfactor.  
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The second hypothesis suggests that a key to understanding the protraction of frozen 
conflict lies at the internal level of the IDP population, and in the opposing forces at work in this 
population. These opposing forces compel IDPs either to stay in the host community or to return, 
and it is this contradiction of forces that prevents the return of the displaced population while also 
preventing their integration into the host community. With respect to this hypothesis, the 
following study seeks to identify and understand the forces compelling the Georgian IDP 
population to stay and integrate or those forces compelling them to return to Abkhazia, and n 
doing so attempts to understand the quasi-stationary equilibrium at work in this community 
(Lewin, 1958). Both of these hypotheses which will be explored in the proceeding study with the 





















 This study seeks to identify causes and variables that help in understanding frozen 
conflict, its seeming resistance to change, and the role of displaced people in froz n conflicts. The 
study was conducted with the aim of exploring these issues and relationships in greater depth by 
investigating a particular population of displaced persons involved in frozen conflict. I  the 
context of this study, the respondents are all Internally Displaced Persons living in Georgia that 
were displaced from homes in Abkhazia as a result of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict of the 
early 1990’s.    
 This study is exploratory in nature; it is done with the intent of expanding and deepening 
the understanding of the relationship between frozen conflict and displaced populations, nd of 
generating, rather than testing, hypotheses. As such the depth provided by studying the 
experiences and perceptions of individuals within the context of a single conflict study was 
preferred to the comprehensiveness of a comparative study. This format allows for greater insight 
into the more intimate dynamics of displacement and this particular form of intractability.  
The subject field of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict was narrowed to a s udy of the IDP 
population produced in this conflict. This allowed a more in-depth and compact study to be 
conducted, and focused on a population that is pivotal in the conflict, yet is also accessible, as 
high-ranking government officials and negotiators typically are not. Fur hermore, there are few 
accessible and published studies of this population, and existing literature proved to be unable to 
address this study’s questions pertaining specifically to the role of IDPs in this conflict.  
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 However, for the sake of clarity it should be noted that this is not a case study in the 
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The investigation conducted in the course of this project is a classic 
survey study; its aim is not to investigate the case of a particular conflict, but rather to investigate 
players in a conflict who operate under a certain set of circumstances. Sp cifically it seeks to 
investigate people who are and have been displaced by a conflict that has come to be considered a 
frozen conflict. The respondents interviewed in this study are individuals who demonstrate these 
characteristics who, for mostly practical purposes, all happen to be involved in the same conflict. 
Certainly there would be advantages to conducting a study that pulled respondents from a variety 
of conflict contexts. Such an approach would provide a more comprehensive sample, and would 
allow the investigator to draw more widely applicable conclusions. However, given the scope of 
this study, as well as logistical limitations such as time and resources, the way to best pursue the 
goal of developing a deeper and more intimate understanding of the phenomena described in th s 
paper was to focus on a microcosmic slice of this phenomena by choosing to interview 
respondents from a single conflict context.      
 
Procedure 
 This study sought to create greater understanding of the relationship between the 
phenomena of frozen conflict and the populations displaced by it. To do so, the study hoped to 
explore the thoughts and perceptions of individual IDPs displaced by the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict. The study was conducted on a site visit to the Republic of Georgia in the summer of 
2007, and its central focus was the interviewing of Georgian IDPs displaced during the 1992-
1994 conflict in Abkhazia. Interviewees varied in age, gender, socio economic status and 
location. IDPs below the age of 18 were excluded from the study for two reasons. First, the 
interviewing of minors would introduce complexities and vulnerabilities that the study was not 
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designed to accommodate; and, it seemed necessary that interviewees be at l ast 4-5 years of age 
at the time of the conflict to have sufficient recollection of the events around it.  
 The subject pool was selected from four cities in Georgia that are major IDP population 
centers: Tbilisi, Zugdidi, Kutaisi and Batumi. A majority of subjects live in collective centers, the 
collective housing sites provided to the influxes of IDPs by the Georgian government. Most of 
these collective centers are converted from large institutional facilities such as hotels, hospitals 
and schools. Many tend to be on the outskirts of town and are often more self-reliant or subsistent 
than typical Georgian residences. The primary reason for the prominence of this characteristic in 
the sample was the difficulty in finding IDP interviewees that lived in private residences.  
 The research instrument used is a questionnaire developed for the purpose of thi  study. 
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) includes both closed and open-ended questions, and wa 
designed to gather both qualitative and quantitative data. It was developed in English and 
translated into Georgian with the aid of faculty and staff at Tbilisi State University. The 
questionnaire was then piloted with a staff member at TSU who is also an IDP from Abkhazia. 
This piloting was conducted to ensure that the questionnaire did not contain any offensive items 
or language, that the questions were comprehensible to interview participan s, and that the 
questionnaire was translated accurately.  
 The questionnaire contains two sections. The first section gathers demographic 
information about the subject such as age, gender, and place of residence before displacement. 
This section also contains some open ended questions about aid received by participants and their 
perspective on integration and return. The second section contains questions about subjects’ 
perspectives on conflict, and seeks to gather their perceptions of Abkhazians and feelings about 
the prospect of future contact and coexistence with Abkhazian’s. Within these sections there are 
clusters of questions attempting to glean information about several central topics: the aid received 
by IDPs, perceived integration into the host community, feelings toward Abkhazians, feelings 
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about the prospect of return, desired conditions of return, and experience with conflict resolution 
processes and willingness to engage in them.    
The construction of the questionnaire was largely informed by various theories discussed 
in the literature review. The overarching structure asks for respondents’ thoughts on both the 
circumstances of their displacement and quality of life since displacement as well as their 
perceptions of Abkhazia and the prospect of returning there. The questionnaire was constructed as 
such in an effort to identify forces, as per Lewin’s theory of force field analysis, acting on the IDP 
population pushing/pulling in the direction of either integration or continued desire to return to 
Abkhazia. In particular, the series of questions that ask about the aid and assistance received by 
IDPs, as well as items asking about how they feel they have been treated by the host community 
attempt to identify the forces at work around the integration of the IDP community. Meanwhile, 
the questionnaire also contains items such as: “if you were to return, what fears might you have 
about doing so?” and “if you were to return, what part of this would be most challenging for 
you?” Such items are intended to identify forces acting on the population in regards to the 
possibility of return.  
The literature on prolonged displacement and refugee dynamics covered in the literature 
review also informed a number of items on the questionnaire. Zetter (1999) describes the 
contradictory behavior of simultaneously adapting to place and mythologizing return home as 
part of the myth of return. In this vein, the questionnaire features several items asking 
respondents if they wish to return and why. These items are followed by a section asking 
respondents the degree to which feel integrated in the host community, and asks them to rate the 
treatment they have received from the host community. This section als  asks whether 
respondents wish to return to the same area or town, or even the same home, from which they 
were displaced. This ties into Warner’s discussion of the myth of return and the nostalgia and 
idealization it involves.  
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Later in the interview, respondents are asked to talk about how they feel about 
Abkhazians in general, and how comfortable they would feel with varying degrees of contact or 
closeness with Abkhazians. For example, respondents are asked whether they would be willing to 
dialogue with Abkhazians, and whether they would be able to live in the same town or become 
friends with Abkhazians. Such items are included in the questionnaire in an effort to get a sense 
for the level of animosity that may exist between the communities, and in a way to gauge the 
parties’ relationship in regards to ripeness or readiness for res lution, as per the theories of 
Zartman (2000) and Pruitt (1997) discussed earlier. In addition to asking respondents about their 
feelings towards Abkhazians, the questionnaire also features several items that ask, in an indirect 
way, about the political conditions surrounding return. For example, respondents are asked: 
“under what conditions would you be willing to return to Abkhazia?” and “what would it take for 
these conditions to exist?” These are asked in an effort to gauge the entrenchment of the 
community in its positions and the negotiability (or lack there of) of such positions. In this way 
the questionnaire aims to get a better idea of the general level of intractability of this conflict as 
seen by the IDP community.      
 The interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, typically the location of greatest 
convenience for the interviewee. Several interviews were conducted in classrooms offered by the 
Department of Conflictology at Tbilisi State University, and most were conducted in the homes 
of interviewees. Interviews lasted between 20 and 45 minutes, depending on the leng  of the 
responses given. The interviews were semi-structured, in that they followed the prepared 
questionnaire, but that probing and clarifying questions or statements were not scripted ahead of 
time. This structure let the interviews gather the desired information while allowing participants 
to expound on topics of particular concern to them. Although interviews were conducted face to 
face, they were for all practical purposes anonymous, as names and contact information were not 
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taken from interviewees and in that the researcher could not possibly identify or locate 
participants on an individual basis.  
 Out of 45 interviews conducted, 42 were conducted with the assistance of a transl tor. In 
most cases this translator also served as a guide, meaning that they had knowledge of where to 
find IDP enclaves within their city or neighborhood, and helped in locating these enclaves and in 
recruiting interview subjects. The three interviews conducted without a translator were with 
interviewees fluent in English, who were recruited through acquaintance with the researcher.  
Five different translators assisted in the interviews, all of them IDPs. The fact that they were all 
IDPs was unintended by the investigator, but it should not be extremely surprising that they were. 
It is entirely possible that the various colleagues and acquaintances that assisted in finding or 
introducing translators to the primary investigator, given knowledge of the study’  topic, would 
opt to recruit IDPs to act as translator for the study. Subjects in Tbil si and Zugdidi were located 
with the assistance of translators, who also served as guides to collective c nters with which they 
were already familiar. Interviews in Kutaisi were conducted through a translator at the offices of 
the Kutaisi Teachers Union, an educational NGO. Subjects were recruited by staff members of 
this organization, and include their acquaintances and colleagues. Subjects in Batumi were 
located with assistance from the Ministry of Refugees in Adjara; and were recruited with the aid 
of a translator.  
 The questionnaire was reviewed with all translators prior to conducting in erviews to 
ensure understanding of the questions and their purpose. Interviews were conducted in Georgian 
language, using the Georgian translation of the questionnaire that had been dev loped. Responses 
were translated to English to be recorded. These responses were record d in writing by the 
researcher, and when circumstances and subjects permitted, were also recorded by digital voice 
recorder.  Prior to the start of each interview, the nature and length of the interview process, the 
purpose of the study, and the identity of the researcher were explained to subjects. It was 
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discovered that it was particularly important that subjects know that the researcher was not 
working for an NGO or humanitarian aid organization.  This was an important pr ctice for two 
main reasons. The first is that in some IDP communities there appeared to b  a degree of 
animosity felt toward the relief or humanitarian aid community, which likely is connected to a 
sense of disappointment in relief organizations and the significat drop in aid received by the 
Georgian IDP community after the Georgian-Abkhazian war ended in 1994. The second reason is 
that it was critical to the ethicality of the study to make clear to respondents the purpose of the 
interviews and what would, and what would not be done with the information they provided. 
Specifically, it was important that respondents not be misled into thinking that the study was part 
of aid-related or government-related study in which they may believe that their responses could 
carry certain consequences, such as the receipt of increased aid.          
 
Summary 
 Data gathered in this study was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Qualitative 
factors calculated include factors such as place of residence befor  displacement, age, gender, and 
current place of residence (in private or collective housing). The data corresp nding to close 
ended items in the questionnaire was also analyzed quantitatively. Responses to op n ended 
questions were analyzed qualitatively for indication or reference to r ain themes related to the 
hypotheses posed here, such as security or return. Themes emerging from the data, such as 
deference to government and disempowerment were also analyzed. Results of this analysi , as 











 This study is based on interviews conducted with 45 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
of Georgian ethnicity who were displaced from Abkhazia as a result of the Georgian-Abkhazian 
war in the early 1990’s. The data presented in this section consists of the responses given in these 
interviews. This study was conducted in an attempt to give further understanding to the questions 
posed thus far in this paper.  The primary question that is pursued here is: what accounts for the 
longevity of certain conflicts, particularly those that are typically l beled as frozen conflict, and is 
there a connection between displaced populations produced in these conflicts a d their longevity? 
A review and synthesis of existing literature pertaining to this question has yielded two plausible 
rival hypotheses.  
In brief, the first hypothesis suggests that frozen conflict exists at a sorof equilibrium 
and is kept in this equilibrium by the opposition of forces that drive the conflit and those that 
push the level of intensity down, keeping the conflict below a breaking point that would demand 
action toward resolution.  This hypothesis suggests that factors such as de-facto state building and 
international organizations serve as de-escalating forces while factors such as paramilitary 
activity and the presence of displaced populations serve as driving factors that push the level of 
conflict intensity up. Looking specifically at the factor of refugee presence, this analysis seeks to 
answer whether the IDP population produced in the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict does indeed act as 
a driving force in the conflict.      
The second hypothesis suggests that a key to understanding the protraction of frozen 
conflict lies at the internal level of the IDP population, and in the opposing forces at work in this 
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population. These opposing forces compel IDPs either to stay in the host community or to return, 
and it is this contradiction of forces that prevents the return of the displaced population while also 
preventing their integration into the host community. With respect to this hypothesis, the analysis 
seeks to identify and understand the forces compelling the Georgian IDP population to stay and 
integrate or those forces compelling them to return to Abkhazia, and in doing so attempts to 
understand the quasi-stationary equilibrium at work in this community (Lewin, 1958).  
This body of information is analyzed with a two tiered approach. The first level of 
analysis looks at the conflict at the level of the IDP community, and looks at re ponses given by 
the interviewees with respect to particular questions that attempt to draw out  and identify the 
forces and motivations compelling IDPs to stay or return. The second level of analysis attempts to 
understand the IDP population as a factor in the broader Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Rather 
than looking at the data on an item-by-item basis, this level of analysis looks at the whole body of 
information collected in the interviews, and identifies themes that emerge from the data regarding 
the IDPs’ perception of the conflict and their role in it. This two-tiered analysis is also preceded 
by a look at the demographic profile of the subject pool.  
 
Demographics 
 45 individuals were interviewed in this study. The demographic information recorded in 
these interviews included age, gender, and current city or region of residence. Interviewees were 
also asked for limited information about the conditions of their flight from Abkhazia such as the 
date they left Abkhazia and where they initially went after leaving. 
 In terms of current residence, interviews were conducted in four cities/regions: Tbilisi, 
Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and the Batumi Region which includes both the city of Batumi and a smaller 
nearby town called Khabuleti. The breakdown of individuals interviewed by current location is as 
follows: 
84 
• Tbilisi - 14  
• Kutaisi – 9 
• Zugdidi – 9 
• Batumi – 13 
 
It should be noted that while these four areas represent the largest centers of IDP populations, 
they are not proportional to the distribution of the IDP population in Georgia today. For example, 
just over half of the IDP population currently lives in Tbilisi, while Tbilisi interviewees make up 
roughly one-third of this study’s subjects. (Characteristics and flawsin sampling will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.) The study also found that 62% of the people 
interviewed currently reside in compact or collective center with other IDPs. These compact 
centers are usually large buildings previously used as hotels, schools, hospitals, etc. that were 
converted to house the influx of IDPs during and after the war with Abkhazia.  
 Persons interviewed hailed from six different areas in Abkhazia: Gali, Sukhumi, 










Figure 4: Place of Origin 
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Figure 5: Map of Abkhazia 
 
A very limited correlation emerged between subject’s place of origin in Abkhazia and the area to 
which they relocated.  7 out of 9 Zugdidi interviewees hailed from Gali, and of the 15 people 
originally from Gali, 7 relocated to Zugdidi. This correlation is most likely explained, however, 
by the fact that Gali and Zugdidi are in close proximity, essentially bordering ach other.  A small 
correlation also appears between people hailing from Sukhumi and those relocating to Tbilisi (6 
out of 14 people from Sukhumi relocated in Tbilisi). This study does not have the capacity to 
explain such a correlation, but one may speculate that certain evacuation systems may have 
brought IDPs from Sukhumi to Tbilisi, or the fact that Tbilisi is by far the largest population 
center in Georgia may also explain this correlation.  
 Of the 45 people interviewed, there were 14 men 31 women. This proportion reflects a 
bias in this study’s sampling rather than the actual proportion of men to women in the Georgian 
IDP population.) The subject pool was also broken down by age group as follows: 
25 & Under 26-35 36-45 46-55 55 & Under 
14 (31%) 6 (13%) 9 (20%) 9 (20%) 7 (16%) 
 
86 
No particular correlation was found between origin and age, origin and gender, or age and nder, 
indicating that flight from Abkhazia was not limited by age or gender, but occurred across the 
Georgian population in Abkhazia.   
 What may be more significant, in terms of demographic data, is informatin bout the 
circumstances of Georgian IDPs’ flight from Abkhazia. Information such as t e date on which the 
interviewee left Abkhazia, or where he/she first went after leaving Abkhazia can provide some 
information on the nature of this sample.  
 The IDPs interviewed all left Abkhazia between 1991 and 1993, with the majority (75%) 
leaving in 1993. The following diagrams show when the IDPs left Abkhazia, Figure 8 shows this 
by month and Figure 9 shows a day-by-day breakdown of the month of September 1993, during 

























Figure 7: When respondents left Abkhazia: by date 
 
As the figures show, there is a spike in the number of IDPs leaving in September 1993, 
particularly between September 26 and 29. This corresponds to the events taking pl ce in autumn 
1993, namely the resurgence of Abkhazian forces and the driving of Georgian forces fr m most 
of Abkhazia. In particular these dates correspond to September 27, 1993, the day on which 
Abkhazian forces captured Sukhumi and which is known to many Georgians as the Fall of 
Sukhumi. From the fact that such a large portion of the interviewee pool left within a short period 
of time, one could inference that those who left were motivated by a tangible sens  of threat or 
fear.    
  As this demographic data was recorded basically for the purpose of creating boundaries 
around the study’s subject pool, this pool may be summarized as follows. Interview respondents 
are randomly (if not equally) spread across gender and age groups. They are originally from 
various parts of Abkhazia, but represent primarily the population centers of Sukhumi and Gali; 
and they have settled in the larger population centers in Georgia. Many left Abkhazia in the later 
part of 1993, particularly in late September, 1993 correlating with the fall of Sukhumi to 
Abkhazian military forces, and a majority of respondents currently reside in compact centers. 
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This sample roughly represents the majority of IDPs in terms of the characteristics of place of 
origin, the time of flight from Abkhazia, and place of settlement in Georgia. However it should 
not be considered as entirely representative of the greater IDP population in Georgia for reasons 
that will be discussed in a later section. Thus, with a profile of the IDPs included in this study, we 
can move on to the main substance of the interview data.    
  
Level 1 – Forces within the IDP Community  
  This first level of analysis addresses the hypothesis largely informed by Lewin’s theory 
of quasi-stationary equilibrium (1958), positing that the stagnation of the IDP community is 
reflective of the stagnation of the overall conflict. This stagnatio  in the IDP community is the 
result of an equilibrium formed by opposing forces that both compel the population to stay and 
settle in the host country or to return to the conflict area from which they fled, in this case 
Abkhazia. The section of the analysis seeks to extract from the pool of interview data the forces 
and motivations compelling IDPs both to stay and to return to Abkhazia. To do this, the interview 
questions, and corresponding answers, are sorted into groups. These four groups are sorted to 
address IDPs’ desire to return, their current situation in the host territory, the perceived situation 
in their home territory, and IDPs’ perceived skills and ability in handling conflict. It should be 
noted that the way in which questions are grouped in this analysis does not reflect th  order in 
which they were asked during the interview process. (The questionnaire shown in Appe dix A 
reflects the order in which questions were asked in interviews). Furthermore, in processing the 
responses for each interview item, the analysis had the capacity to look fr patterns based on 
region, age or gender and will discuss the appearance of noticeable patterns as hey come up.   
 
Desire to return. It is logical to first establish what the stated motivations of the IDP 
community are regarding return. Subjects were asked about their desire to return and the reasons 
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for wanting to do so. Of the 45 individuals interviewed, 42 said that they wanted to r turn to 
Abkhazia. All of these 42 said that they wanted to return to Abkhazia to live there, and would go 
back to the same town or area that they were from. Of the three who did not want to return, two 
said they would still want to go back to Abkhazia to visit, but did not want to live there because 
they had established a life in their current city (Tbilisi in both cases). The third stated that she is 
too old to make the journey back. As such, it seems appropriate to say that there is a very strong 
stated desire within the pool to return to Abkhazia.  
 The subjects gave a variety of reasons for wanting to return to Abkhazia. For the 
purposes of this analysis, these responses were grouped into positive reasons for wa ting to live 
in Abkhazia and negative reasons for not wanting to live in their host community. In other words, 
the responses were separated into those that show the drawing or pulling force of living in 
Abkhazia and those showing a driving force pushing away from integration in the host 
community. From the 42 interviewees that expressed a desire to return, this grouping showed that 
41 positive responses were given while three negative responses were given. (It should be noted 
that many responses cite more than one factor or reason, so some responses may be double-
counted and appear in more than analysis category.)   
The negative reasons given all addressed a general dislike of living conditions in the host 
community. One respondent explained: “I don’t like here, in here it’s very good to be a guest, but 
in Abkhazia it’s very beautiful country” (Interview T5, 2006), while another said “I think of the 
whole time I’ve lived here that I am as a ghost” (Interview Z3, 2006).  
 Overwhelmingly, however, the reasons given for wanting to return referenc d aspects of 
life in Abkhazia that the individual enjoys or longs for.  The following groups were the most 
common reasons given: 
• Reference to “my own” or “because it’s mine:” Cited by 18 interviews. 
• Reasons of homeland or place of birth connection: “I was born there.” Cited by 12 
interviews. 
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• Love of the land: “Abkhazia is a beautiful place.” Cited by 7 interviews. 
• They miss and want to see family and friends. Cited by 6 interviews. 
• Reasons of ancestral ties: it is where their parents/grandparents were born. Cited in 6 
interviews. 
• Superior quality of life. Cited by 6 interviews.  
• Desire to regain or live in the individual’s lost house. Cited by 4 interviews.  
• Desire to visit graves. Cited by 2 interviews. 
 
The predominant group of reasons given for wanting to return includes those such as: “bec use it 
is mine, it’s my land” (T14, 2007) or “because I want to live in my own house” (T3, 2007). It 
seems that such motivations could be interpreted two ways. At once they seem to represent a 
sense of rights-based entitlement or ownership. Yet they also seem to referenc  the desire for a 
sense of ownership and permanence. It may be noteworthy that 12 of these 18 respondents 
currently live in collective housing (2 live in private housing, 4 are unknown).  
Cross referencing these responses with age groups also found some possible correlation 
between respondents age 25 and under and reasons in the category of “it is myown country” or 
“it is my own home” as well as reasons that reference connections to place of birth such as the 
motherland or homeland (see chart below for the cross-reference of age groups and reasons to 
return). Note that many interviewees under the age of 25 were quite young (11 or under) when 
they left Abkhazia, and therefore may not have developed more tangible or material driven 
reasons for wanting to live there, such as higher quality of life. This suggests that intangible 
drivers or motivations, such as connection to the motherland, may be quite strong in younger 
IDPs.  
In fact, looking at the breakdown of reasons for returning in the whole sample, we see 
that intangible reasons dominate tangible ones (36 references to intangible reasons, 26 references 
to tangible motivations). The strength of these intangible motivations will be important to bear in 
mind when the analysis looks at IDP perceptions of return and the rather tangible difficulties they 
anticipate there.   
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The qualification of tangible and intangible motivations reflects two larger groups that 
emerged from the responses given. Responses citing the aesthetic value of the land, the desire to 
visit graves, superior quality of life, longing for friends and family, and the desire to regain 
houses abandoned in Abkhazia were all considered tangible motivations. Meanwhil , ancestral 
ties, reasons of homeland or motherland, and references to “my own” or “it’s my house” were 
grouped as intangible motivations. These classifications require some explanation. Two grouping 
emerged naturally from the set of responses. Some of these responses were motivations for return 
that one could begin to grasp and even conceive of ways that such motivations could be satisfied 
by some alternative means other than returning to Abkhazia. To give an elementary example, if 
one’s motivation to return is to regain a superior quality of life that they experienced prior to 
fleeing, then one could conceivable devise ways to elevate that person’s quality of life in another 
part of Georgia such that it would fulfill the needs driving this motivation. While some of these 
tangible motivations have more easily conceivable alternatives than o er, they are similar in that 
the possibility of such alternative ways of satisfying the motivation is feasible. On the other hand 
it would be far more difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of anything that would alternatively 
satisfy ones desire to return to their motherland or return to a place wherthey have ancestral ties. 
There is nothing other than the place they left (Abkhazia in this case) that can satisfy these 
motivations.  
There is another way to think of this distinction. The motivations in the tangible group all 
describe or refer to aspects of one’s life in Abkhazia; one’s quality of life, friends and family, the 
ability to visit family graves, and having a house are all aspects of one’s life or lifestyle. On the 
other hand the intangible motivations of ancestral ties, motherland/homeland, and “my 
land/house” are all connected to the essence of that person’s conception of Abkhazia. These 
intangible motivations do not refer to aspects of their life in Abkhazia that are now absent, but 
refer to Abkhazia itself, and for that there is no substitution. The distinction between these two 
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groups of motivations is important to the peacemaking process and negotiation of IDP return. The 
group’s motivations for returning, and the tangibility of these motivations, affects whether and by 
what means these motivations and the underlying interests and needs that accompany them can be 
fulfilled. Tangible motivations are more likely to be connected to earthly and material aspects of 
one’s life such as one’s house or friends and family. By contrast, intangible motivations are more 
connected with certain psychological phenomena than with any material aspects of life. As such, 
a peace process or negotiated agreement on return would have to accommodate these two groups 
of motivations in different ways, and would have to approach the interests underlying them in 
different manners.  























Total 8 2 6 6 4 18 6 12 
- 25 2   1  8 1 7 
26-
35 
  1 1 3 2   
36-
45 
2 1 2 1  4 3 1 
46-
55 
4 1 2 2 1 3 1 2 
56 +   1 1  1 1 2 
Table 2: Breakdown of motivations by age group. 
 
Situation in host community. Understanding conditions in the host territory is central to 
identifying the forces that compel IDPs either to stay or to return. This section examines 
conditions for IDPs in the parts of Georgia where they now live in order to bet er understand 
these motivations. In doing this it looks at the assistance that Georgian IDPs have received in the 
host community, the current aid situation, and their views on integration ino their new 
communities outside of Abkhazia.     
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 The study found that most of the IDPs that were interviewed received at last some sort 
of assistance directly after being displaced. This assistance is said to have come in a variety of 
forms and from a number of sources. When asked what type of assistance they receiv d, 37 
people out of 45 respondents (82%) reported that they received some sort of aid, including food, 
clothing, a place to live and other services. They also reported having received this aid from a 
variety of sources: predominantly from the government, but also from foreign aid, the Red Cross, 
and local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The tables below show the 
breakdown of these sources.  
Types of Aid  
Food 34 75% 
Products* 15 33% 
Clothing 12 26% 
Place to Live 10 22% 
Money 3 7% 
Job 1 2% 
Nothing 8 18% 
*Products = non-food groceries such as soap,  
detergent, toiletries, etc 
 
Sources of Aid 




Foreign Aid 7 16% 
Red Cross 12 27% 
Local NGOs 8 18% 
UN/UNOMIG 2 4% 
Do not Know 3 7% 
Relatives & Neighbors 2 4% 
Table 3: Types and sources of aid received by respondents. 
 
 
After the initial influx of IDPs, however, the amount and frequency of aid receiv d dropped off 
dramatically. 37 of 45 interviewees say that now they receive 11 (or 14) Lari2 per month from the 
government. Nine of these 37 reported having received other aid such as light or electricity, or 
receiving food and products on an irregular and infrequent basis, while the other 28 claimed that 
they receive only the 11 Lari payment. Seven respondents reported that they receive nothing. As 
such, it seems that the quality and amount of aid received by IDPs has gone down, and that the 
assistance situation for many has gotten worse since the initial wave of id received directly 
following their flight from Abkhazia.  
                                                          
2 At the current exchange rate of roughly 1 USD = 1.5 Lari (GEL), this monthly IDP pension is worth 
approximately 7-9 USD. 
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 When asked how assistance could be made better, the respondents gave a variety of
answers. Many suggested simply that more be done: more money and aid be given, that it be 
given more frequently, and that more types of help be offered. Some suggested that here be 
training and job opportunities created for IDPs while others expressed the belief that the 
effectiveness of aid was hampered by government corruption and problems in distribution.  
Interview B8, for example, responded that “a lot of humanitarian goods were coming here, but I 
heard that the Georgian government was exchanging for things they wanted and keeping this” 
(B8, 2007). Interview B6 similarly responded that “humanitarian aid coming from foreign parties 
was going to ministry and in their pockets, and was not reaching IDPs” (B6, 2007). Several oth r 
approaches were offered as well: 
• Give More (money,  aid, “help”) - 9 
• Do not Know - 6 
• Eliminate Corruption - 6 
• Improve how aid is delivered/organized - 9 
• Return them to Abkhazia- 4 
• Give them their own house/property - 4 
• Give Jobs - 3 
• Opportunities/Education/Training Programs - 2 
  
 
The individuals interviewed were also asked several questions about their integration into the 
general population in their area. The study asked participants about the natur  of their integration, 
how well they perceive themselves to be integrated, and how integration could be facilitated. 
Overall, 56% of respondents reported themselves to be generally well integrated and 31% found 
themselves poorly integrated. Meanwhile another 13% (6 people) did not directly address the 
question but rather gave answers such as “the Adjarans have been very good to us” (B8, 2007). 
This may be explained by the way in which certain subjects were solicited, something that will be 
discussed in the research discussion. This could also reflect a personal o  culturally rooted felt 
need to be diplomatic or circumspect or not disclose negative sentiments to strangers or outsiders. 
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 Interviewees were also asked to rate the treatment they have received in their host 

































Figure 8: Integration in host community. 
 
As the figure shows, the overall sentiment from the IDPs that were interviewed is that they have 
been well treated by their host community. In addition 56% of interviewees reported that they 
consider themselves well integrated. This is somewhat surprising in contrast to the 77% that 
reported that they currently receive either no aid or only 11-14 Lari per month in aid, as this 
should demonstrate that conditions have worsened for IDPs during the time of displacement. One 
may speculate that perhaps participants’ views and expectations of other Georgian citizens are 
quite different from their views and expectations of the government.  
Participants were also asked for suggestions of how integration could be improved or 
facilitated. The most common answers were the need for permanent normal homes, employment 
and a combination of the two; and, interestingly, improved relations with the local p pulation was 
also a predominant answer.  Also interesting was that the answers of 9 out of 13 interviewees 
from Batumi were spread between “improving relationships with the local p pulation” and “we 
can’t/won’t integrate.” This suggests that the relationship betwe n the general population and the 
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IDP community in Batumi and the Adjara region may be particularly tense.  Th  response to this 
question breaks down as follows: 
• Permanent home/ not live in compact centers (11)* 
• Employment (9)* 
• Improved relationship with local population (9) 
• Rights - 2 
• Do not know or can’t answer – 5 
• We won’t/can’t integrate so send us back – 6 
• Integration is not a problem – 2 
• Other  - 5 
*7 said both a home and employment. 
 
The data pertaining to IDPs’ perspectives on the current situation in their host communities gives 
us a less than clear picture of the forces and motivations either keeping them in or driving them 
away from their current homes outside of Abkhazia. On one hand, the aid they receive has 
diminished to nearly nothing, and although only one third of interviewees considered th mselves 
to be poorly integrated, all but 2 interviewees were able to offer suggestion for how they be 
helped to integrate more fully, and of these nearly two thirds suggested concrete tangible 
measures that could conceivably be implemented by the government or other organizations.  
 This information shows decreased resources and a lower quality of life as a tangible force 
compelling these individuals to either go back or somehow exit their current way of life. At the 
same time, the suggestions for better integrations indicate that there is a motivation in the 
majority of respondents to find employment and private housing if given the opportunity, and in 
this way more fully integrate with the local community. What this suggests is that there should be 
little to no motivations for IDPs to remain in their current state or lifestyle, which is that of 
prolonged displacement and segregation from the general Georgian population. However, the 
persistence of this lifestyle among IDPs suggests that there ar  l ss obvious forces pushing the 
IDP community both away from integration and away from return. These issu s may be clarified 
by looking at IDP perceptions of their home territory and the prospect of return there.  
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Perceptions of home country. In order to identify some of the factors that would both 
draw and repel IDPs from returning to their home territory, the study asked participants a number 
of questions about the challenges and difficulties they would anticipate if returning to Abkhazia 
and how they look at the possibility of coexistence with the Abkhaz. Given the breadth of this 
information, this section is broken into two smaller sections, one pertaining to fears and concerns 
expressed regarding return and the other pertaining to relationships with Abkhazians. This section 
also touches on the issue of security, which the information shows is a definite factor in the study 
of IDP perceptions and motivations.  
 Participants were asked a number of questions regarding their feelings about Abkhazians 
in Abkhazia, contact with Abkhazians, and the possibility of coexistence. The study shows that 
roughly half (47%) of the people interviewed have had contact with Abkhazians s nce being 
displaced and roughly half (53%) have not. It also found that, when asked, the majority, 67%, of 
interviewees expressed positive or innocuous feelings toward Abkhazians, while only 15% 
expressed feelings towards Abkhazians that were overtly negative or aggressive (do not know or 
can not say – 9%; other – 9%). The negative feelings expressed inclu ed comments such as: “I 
feel to them aggressive, because they are aggressive, they are aggressor, they who live in my 
house and who is aggressive to me, why I cannot be aggressive to them.” However, this person 
then added “I say this about Russians, Abkhazian people are “blind gun” or weapon for them” 
(T1, 2007). In nine of these responses the participant echoed this sentiment that the Russians or 
other minorities in Abkhazia (such as Turks or Armenians) are more responsible for their 
displacement. In fact, there was a certain phrase used in several of these responses that referred to 
the Abkhazians as a “blind gun,” inferring that the Abkhaz were essentially used as a tool for 
Russian aggression.  
 Participants were also asked to rate, in terms of difficulty, certain aspects of coexistence 
with Abkhazians. Individuals rated these tasks on a scale of one to five, one being very simple 
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and five being very difficult. They were asked about the difficulty of living in the same town as 
Abkhaz people, living next door to Abkhaz people, being friends with Abkhaz people, and 


























Ease of Coexistence Scales




Ease of Task: 1= Very Easy, 5= Very Difficult
 
Figure 9: Georgian IDPs ease of contact with Abkhazians 
 
As the figure shows, 1 was the most common rating for all the aspects of coexistence mentioned. 
However, note that the spike for sharing land is noticeably lower than the others, and has the 
highest number of 5 ratings. A number of interviewees (14) showed difficulty with this question 
and answered such as “I don’t want anything of others – I want only what is mine” (B13, 2007) or 
“if it’s mine, why?” (T11, 2007). 
 The study shows thus far that a fraction of the IDPs interviewed harbor overtly negative 
or aggressive feelings towards Abkhazians, while many others appear to have a rather 
conciliatory or non-threatening attitude. However, the data from the scal  questions suggests that 
if pushed, this conciliatory attitude may give way to a more aggressive stance. As the figure 
shows, most respondents found the idea of living next door to, befriending, or living in the same 
town as Abkhazian to be easy and non-threatening. However, the sharing of important things such 
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as land or other resources enters a gray area, so to speak. Arriving at an agreement of how limited 
resources are to be shared between two or more groups requires more close work and cooperation 
than simply living in the same town as someone. As the data shows, there are lss respondents 
that answered one (easy) and more that answered 5 (difficult) for this item than any other, and 14 
respondents struggled with the question. This suggests that the level of uncertainty and required 
cooperation that comes along with the sharing of resources is uncomfortable for many IDPs. 
However, these are exactly the kinds of challenges that are common in the rein egration or 
repatriation of displaced populations, and the level of discomfort with such tasks displayed in this 
study’s sample suggest that the IDP population may be less prepared to once agai  coexist with 
Abkhazians than they claim to be.       
Interview participants were also asked to describe any challenges they would foresee if 
returning to Abkhazia, and any fears they might have about doing so.  A variety of answers were 
given, and responses were initially separated into two groups: significant ch llenges and minor or 
no challenges (which includes responses where there was expressed optimism about overcoming 
the challenge). 62% of interviewees anticipated significant challenges, while 12% expected minor 
or no challenges (Other: 11%).   
The classification of responses as either significant or minor/insignificant was based on 
the respondent’s perception of that challenge rather than the substance of what the challenge is. 
For example, many respondents named the need to rebuild their house or find a new house as a 
challenge. An answer such as “the biggest problem will be reconstructing of everything lost - 
finding what they had there” (T14, 2007) would be classified as a significant ch llenge. However, 
a response such as “after war everything is ruined - lost houses… but if we go back we will 
rebuild our houses” (B10, 2007) would be classified as insignificant because of the respondent’s 
expressed perception of this as a surmountable challenge.     
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It may, however, better illustrate the collective response to this question to indicate the 
types of challenges that are anticipated. Challenges that fall under “starting a new life,” such as 
finding a home and a job, were the most commonly mentioned (roughly half of the responses).  
Other challenges included relationship based and emotional challenges (six interviewees) such as: 
“the most serious [challenge] would be cooperation with Abkhaz and to make friendship” (K2, 
2007); as well as challenges to their security such as: “trust… we never know if someone will 
come to our house at night” (B3, 2007). Meanwhile, seven interviewees responded that they 
would not expect any significant challenges. For example: “for the government to gain control of 
Abkhazia (is the main problem) – then it would be very easy” (K4, 2007). Another ffered that 
“the joy of being back would be greater than any problems there” (B1, 2007). 
 Responses to the question of what fears they may have about returning were brok n down 
into groups of significant fears and minor fears. The responses were grouped by th  same criteria 
as the responses to the challenges of returning. That is, the categorization of the response was 
based not on the substance of the fear noted in it, but by the significance or sev rity placed on that 
fear by the respondent. 49% expressed fears or concerns about returning, while 22% expressed 
minor or no concern (other or not applicable - 20%). The most common fear mentioned was that 
of security and protection (13 respondents) followed by the fear of beginning another c nflict 
(seven respondents).  Other fears included relational problems such as friend hip and acceptance, 
while several people responded that in regards to return, they had fear but they were not sure of 
what. 
 In an attempt to press the issue of fears and concerns from a different angl, subjects 
were asked about their willingness to confront Abkhazians in different situaions. First, subjects 
were asked whether they would be willing to participate in a dialogue with Abkazians, and if so, 
what fears or apprehensions they may have about doing so. Asking about willingness to dialogue 
allows the instrument to address the present respondents with the possibility of contact in a 
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different way. The idea of dialogue is more immediate and less vague than the general idea of 
contact with Abkhazians. Dialoguing presents the respondent with a more precise m ntal image 
of contact: being face-to-face with Abkhazians and discussing difficult iss es with them. 
Furthermore, the question about dialogue presents the respondent with a premise of contact with 
Abkhazians in a controlled and presumably secure situation. 87% responded that they would be 
willing to participate, while only 11% said that they would not. The fears or concerns expressed 
by those willing to participate included apprehension about discussing difficult topics, bringing 
up painful emotions, and first impressions. Only one person expressed any fear of violence or 
being threatened. Later, interviewees were also asked whether they would be willing to return to 
Abkhazia under the status quo (i.e. without state protection) provided that they were first able to 
meet and build relationships with people that would be their neighbors there. T  answer was 
overwhelmingly “no.” Only 6% would be willing to return under these conditions, another 6% 
said they did not know, and 88% was not willing, with many adding that under no circumstances 
would they return to Abkhazia without the protection of the Georgian state. 
 The fact that 88% of this pool demands Georgian protection as a pre-condition to return 
underscores the seriousness of certain fears and trepidations expres d by the IDP population and 
discussed in these findings. A common aspect of the fears and challenges mentioned is that many 
have to do with not experiencing again what the IDP community has already experienced. The 
fear of beginning another conflict is the most obvious expression of this, yet concerns about 
security and protection may stem from the threat they experienced that triggered the initial flight 
from Abkhazia. Furthermore, the challenges of “starting a new life” would not be unlike the 
challenges that IDPs faced when it became apparent that they would not be returning to Abkhazia 
right away.  One can see how these fears and concerns could be rather strong mo ivations against 
returning, particularly without the safeguard of Georgian government control. Fu thermore, these 
fears were compounded in 1998 when roughly 50,000 Georgians that had returned to the Gali 
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region in eastern Abkhazia were forced to flee again due to pressure from Abkhaz militia groups 
(Lynch, 2001). In addition to the trauma of this re-displacement in 1998, the fighting in August 
2008 and the widespread displacement of Georgians that resulted from it has likely had a deep 
impact on the Georgian IDP community and likely strengthened the fear of repeating the 
experience of displacement. This remains to be assessed. Yet recognizing the significance of 
these events, it is quite possible that the government protection or security gua antee that the IDP 
community demands before going back is not simply to protect against violence or crime, but also 
to protect them from repeating the experiences of flight and displacement.     
 
Conflict skills. One force acting on the possibility of return may be the perceived lack of 
skills to handle the perceived challenges that IDPs may face upon retur. The final section of this 
initial level of data analysis pertains to the interviewees’ skills, ability, and confidence in 
handling and confronting the conflicts they may face in either remaining or returning. If we are to 
understand the apparent stagnation of the Georgian IDP community as being the resul  of
opposing and counterbalancing forces, then a perceived shortage or surplus of skill and adeptness 
in handling conflict could serve as one such force. In this section participans were asked about 
their experience and preferred methods for handling conflict, whether these methods would apply 
to conflicts they may face if returning to Abkhazia, and given these opinions on conflict, under 
what conditions they would be willing to return.    
 To establish previous experience with conflict and cooperation with Abkhazians, 
participants were asked if they had participated in any peacebuilding or grass-roots reconciliation 
projects or activity with Abkhazians since being displaced. 25% had partici ted in such an 
activity and 75% had not. This 25% may be a misleadingly high figure as subject were found 
through purposive convenience sampling, which may have selected for IDPs with more exposure 
to peacebuilding and conflict resolution methods than the average Georgian IDP.   
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 Participants were then asked to think about the types of conflicts they most often face in 
their current lives (such as with family or neighbors) and to describe the ways that they usually 
approach or deal with these conflicts. Responses were categorized as generally as either evasive 
approaches, proactive approaches, not sure, and other. 42% of people responded with avoiding or 
evasive approaches to conflict such as “I try always to avoid such sit ations” (K9, 2007) or “I try 
to be patient because I fear retaliation” (B3, 2007). 27% of people noted proactive approaches 
such as “to compromise and [have] supportive attitude to counterpart” (T12, 2007) or in some 
cases trying to win. However, few gave responses that might be considered aggressive or 
defensive. The types of conflict that participants expect to face in the event of return to Abkhazia 
include conflicts about property issues and stolen property, and conflicts about participation in the 
war and losses experienced because of the war. 29% of people responded that thy expected little 
or no conflict if returning to Abkhazia.  
 Participants were also asked to think about how they would handle the conflicts that they 
expected to face in Abkhazia. The various answers given were grouped into approaches th t 
relied on outside authority, such as the government or legal measures, and approaches th t self-
reliant. 35% gave responses that they would turn to an outside authority to deal with conflicts, 
while 42% stated that they would use conflict approaches that were self- liant. Most of these 
self-reliant approaches were rather vague, however, such as “I will reso ve with diplomacy and 
with talk” (T1, 2007) or “I will try to solve with peace” (Z5, 2007). 
 These findings show that a sizable portion of the IDPs interviewed tend to avoid conflict 
and prefer to resolve conflicts and disputes through outside authorities. At the same time, there is 
another sizable group that cited taking proactive approaches to conflict a d preferred to solve 
conflicts themselves. However, in looking at the proactive and self-reliant approaches that were 
offered, very few offer anything more specific than “with diplomacy,” “with talking,” or “will 
solve peacefully.” Even when respondents were probed with questions such as “what if 
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diplomacy doesn’t work” little more specific strategy was given. In addition, 29% of interviewees 
expect little or no conflict and 75% have had no experience working cooperatively wth 
Abkhazians since displacement. What these results may indicate is that while the IDPs that were 
interviewed may have some skills and confidence to deal with potential conflicts, they may also 
be unprepared to deal with conflicts they may encounter if returning. 
  With these conflict handling issues in mind, Participants were asked about return and the 
conditions that would be necessary for them to return. It should be noted that this set of questions 
was developed later in the study, and that it was only asked to individuals that express d a desire 
to return. As such this set of questions was asked to 32 of the 45 IDPs that were interviewed. 
From these 32, the following conditions were given as necessary for return: 
• Peaceful conditions/ no war – 10 
• Georgian Jurisdiction- 8  
• Government protection/guarantee – 7  
• Russians leave – 3 
• Just for Abkhazians to say its ok – 1   
• Economic improvement –  5  
• Restoration/ rebuilding – 2  
• Other – 5  
*Some respondents gave answers that fell into more than one category, for example listing both economic 
improvement and Georgian jurisdiction as necessary to return. Such answers were counted for each 
category they addressed.  
  
Finally, participants were asked if there were any conditions under which they would return to 
Abkhazia under the current status quo, or in other words without Georgian control over the 
territory. Overwhelmingly participants said they would not be willing to reurn without Georgian 
jurisdiction: 88% said no, 9% answered yes, and 3% responded that they did not know. 
Considering that one third of the IDPs interviewed expect not to face any conflict once they 
return, and that no one expressed the anticipation of insurmountable conflict, it seems curious that 
almost all of the people interviewed would refuse to return without the Georgian state having 
jurisdiction over the region.  Similar to the assertions made in the previous section, this 
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contradiction suggests that protection from Abkhaz may not be the only reason for wanting there 
to be Georgian state control over Abkhazia. As was suggested in the previous sections, this may 
be part of a broader desire to avoid repeating the experience of displacement and the various 
traumas that accompany it. Or, it is possible if not likely, that there is another reason or force 
connected to this demand for Georgian jurisdiction despite a relatively confident outlook on 
potential conflict with Abkhazians.   
 
Conclusions. This section of the analysis has identified a number of forces and 
motivations at work within the Georgian IDP population. However, it has not yet identified a 
clear group of forces that would explain the stagnation or non-movement of the IDP population. 
Reviewing these forces, the study finds that a mix of tangible and intangible motivations are 
pulling and pushing IDPs towards return, integration, and their status quo. 
 The section regarding IDPs’ desire to return showed that the goal of returning to 
Abkhazia on a permanent basis was nearly unanimous among the interviewees, and that beneath 
this stated desire was a collection of intangible yet apparently very strong motivations for return. 
The section regarding IDPs’ perceptions of integration and the host community where they 
currently live showed overall that there are no apparent forces drawing IDPs toward their current 
status quo.  Meanwhile, there appears to be the motivation and ambition toward things that would 
lead to greater integration such as employment and housing outside of a collective c nter. What 
this indicates is that there must, on some level, be forces that are pulling IDPs into their current 
situation of prolonged displacement and non-integration. While the study has shown that there are 
certainly deficiencies in the assistance given to IDPs, and that more could be done to facilitate 
integration, on some level it is ultimately the decision of individual IDPs and IDP families to 
actively pursue integration. Therefore, there must be something that makes the segregation and 
limbo of the status quo preferable to integration.  
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 This is all further complicated by the sections about IDP perceptions of the home 
territory, the possibility of coexistence, and their perceived ability to deal with conflict. When 
asked about possible fears and concerns about returning, the study found that a majority of 
respondents expressed some fears and possible challenges about returning to Abkhazia. 
Furthermore, the most prominent fears were in regard to security, protection, and the fear of 
starting another conflict. This shows that, despite the stated desire to return, there are very 
tangible motivations for not doing so. Furthermore, this section shows that as st ted a conciliatory 
attitude towards Abkhazians is far more prevalent than an overtly aggressive one. However, when 
confronted with the task of sharing or perhaps giving something up for Abkhazian counterparts, a 
more aggressive attitude comes to the fore in a portion of the interview es.  
 At the same time, the section on perceived conflict skills shows mixed and contradictory 
results regarding conflict handling skills, confidence in dealing with confli t, and needs for return 
among those interviewed. The study found a high degree of stated confidence in the ability to 
handle and deal with whatever conflicts IDPs may face if returning to Abkhazia. In fact one-third 
of those interviewed anticipated facing no conflict if returning. Yet this section also showed little 
experience dealing with conflict, and tendency to turn towards outside authorities to resolve 
conflicts. It also showed that the primary conditions required for return are a peace deal, a 
security guarantee, and Georgian jurisdiction over Abkhazia. In fact, the overwhelming majority 
of IDPs said that under no conditions would they return to Abkhazia without the Georgian 
government having control over the region. As this demand seems to contradict the somewhat 
confident and optimistic outlook on coexistence with Abkhazians, this may suggest that there is 
something other than simply protection from Abkhazians that IDPs would get from Ge rgian 
control. And, as was posited earlier, what IDPs may be looking for in Georgian security 
guarantees may also be protection against experiencing that which IDPs have alre dy 
experienced: not simply the peril and fear of flight, but also the challenge a d upheaval of starting 
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over. The table below summarizes the forces for and against return to Abkhazia and for or against 
staying in their current locations.  
 Forces for staying Forces for returning 
+ 
• High stated level of integration 
• Motivation to integrate (displayed 
through desire to find permanent 
housing and employment) 
• Stated desire to return. 
• “Intangibles” given as motivations for 
return (i.e. drivers that cannot be 
replaced or supplanted outside of return 
to Abkhazia) 
• Low stated anticipation of conflict.  
• Conciliatory attitude towards Abkhazians.  
- 
• Lack of permanent homes and 
employment. 
• Diminishing and insufficient aid.  
• Fear of personal security or threat. 
• Fear of starting another conflict and 
threat of reliving the experience of 
displacement.  
• Challenge of starting over again.  
• Lack of conflict skills. 
Table 4: Summary of forces for staying and returning to Abkhazia.  
 
 Thus what this section has done is highlight inconsistencies and identify places where 
there should be a strong force acting on IDPs but there does not appear to be. In other words there 
appears to be a gravity of sorts keeping a large portion of IDPs in their status quo despite their 
stated preference for the markers of integration such as employment and stable housing. Yet, one 
thing that this part of the analysis does seem to suggest is that the at i udes and motivations of 
individuals in the IDP community are behind the forces that act against ech other to produce the 
inertia that keeps this population in the current status quo. This suggests that the attitudes of this 
population are connected to the status quo that it maintains by neither returning no i tegrating. 
As such this also suggests that their attitudes are connected to elite governing apparatus that rely 
on the IDP status quo for authority, and in turn use this authority to act as driver and agitators in 
the conflict. In the next section, the analysis will attempt to identify and make sense of broad 
themes present within the whole body of interview data. By looking at the emerging themes the 
analysis should be able to give a deeper understanding to these gaps, and to ide tify the role of 
this community within the broader conflict.  
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Level 2 – Emerging Themes 
 The previous analysis yields useful information about the forces and motivations at work 
within the Georgian IDP community, as well as what might be thought of as black holes within 
the field of forces acting on and within the IDP community. These are plac s where a seemingly 
strong force appears to have less impact on the movement and motivations of the IDP community 
than it aught to. This would lead one to expect an equally strong counter force to develop in 
opposition, yet there are places where no such counter-force is readily apparent. These places 
where it seems that there should be some force either pushing or pulling to maintain the 
equilibrium, but where no such force is apparent are what may be thought of as these black holes 
within the field of forces acting on the Georgian IDP population. However, an item-by-item 
analysis of the interview data can only do so much to provide an understanding of this p pulation, 
its motivations, and its role in the Georgian Abkhazian conflict. Patterns and themes also emerge 
from looking at the interview responses as a whole body of information instead of breaking it 
down by item. This second level of analysis will identify some of these themes, some of which 
are informed by the literature and others which emerge from the data. These themes speak to the 
role and position of this IDP community within the theatre of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as 
well as having relevance to understanding IDPs in frozen conflicts more generally.  
 The first level of analysis dealt largely with the first hypotheses about opposing forces 
within the IDP community, seeking to identify these forces. The second level of analysis deals 
with the second hypothesis by trying to better inform our understanding of the rle of the IDP 
community in the greater Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The second hypothesis in thi  paper 
asserts that frozen conflict is held at equilibrium between a low-intensity level of non-conflict and 
the threshold in intensity that can be thought of as ripeness; and that it is held there by forces that 
both drive and suppress the conflict. This equilibrium remains at a level of intensity high enough 
that peace is unlikely to develop from de-escalation and fading of the conflict; yet it is at a low 
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enough level of intensity that peace is unlikely to result from a mutually hurting stalemate and the 
resolution ripeness it is said to induce (Zartman, 2000). While this studyis not able to test this 
hypothesis in whole by examining all of the factors involved, it can begin to test it by looking at 
one of these driving or suppressing factors and determining the role that this f c or plays.   
 
Selective aggression. There are a number of ways that a given population or party may be 
identified as a driving factor in a conflict. Driving factors ae those which serve to perpetuate or 
escalate the conflict, and parties may act in this capacity in a variety of ways that are too 
numerous to list. For example, a group can act as a driving factor directly by taking up arms in 
the conflict, or more indirectly by supporting a faction involved in the fighting, by demanding 
that their side continue fighting, or by obstructing the peace process in any number of ways. The 
Georgian IDP population has acted as a driver for the conflict in some of th more obvious ways 
that a group can. For example, the IDP population supplied men that fought in the Georgian-
Abkhazian war of 1992-1994, and the Georgian-Abkhaz Government in Exile, comprised of 
Georgian members of the pre 1992 Abkhazian regional government, has been a staunch opponent 
of any form of Abkhaz sovereignty. However, in the attempt to illuminate the role that the 
Georgian IDP population has played in this conflict, this study sought to identify some more 
subtle trends in this population that may either confirm or disconfirm their rol  as a driving force 
in the conflict. 
One way to begin may be to look for signs of aggression and ill-will towards Abkhazians 
expressed by IDPs. This may seem like an unpromising direction, as earlier in th  analysis the 
study found that when IDPs were asked about their feelings towards Abkhazians 76% responded 
with feelings that were generally positive or non-threatening, while only 15% showed overtly 
negative and malevolent feelings. However, looking for less obvious signs of aggression towards 
Abkhazians shows some hostility in more than 15% of the interview pool. To illustrate, selective 
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aggression is shown by some interviewees whereby certain groups of Abkhazians, such as one’s 
neighbors, are viewed positively while other select groups are viewed as enemies, such as 
Abkhazians who fought in the war. For example, when asked about the prospect of meeting
Abkhazians in dialogue one person said “I would be happy to meet my neighbors, but I’m not 
sure about Abkhaz I don’t know – I’m afraid I will get killed” (B9, 2007); another responded: 
“yes, I meet them if they don’t give part in the war – but the people who killed my uncle - I don’t 
want to meet them” (T7, 2007). This is particularly seen in this group of interv ews around the 
subject of the IDP’s abandoned house. The sentiment expressed by interviewe s n Kutaisi, 
“people who live in their own house are good people” (K1, 2007), is exemplary of thisselectively 
aggressive attitude towards Abkhazians. What this statement also says is “people who live in my 
house are bad.” Looking at the entire interview data, this study found 30 exampls in 22 
interviews of this selective aggression towards Abkhazians. This means that about half of the 
IDPs interviewed demonstrated this theme somewhere in their interview; and, while this is not a 
great enough portion to make a generalization about all Georgian IDPs, it does sugg t that some 
degree of hostility towards Abkhazians, though hidden or subtle, does exist in the IDP 
community. Thus it could be said that such hostility would serve to drive the conflict or at the 
least that aggression and hostility would serve to entrench a group in a chosen position, and that 
this entrenchment would drive the intensity of a conflict up. 
 
Georgian government control. The entrenchment in just such a position is another theme 
that appears in the interview data. The insistence on bringing Abkhazia under Georgian 
jurisdiction is common not only in Georgian political rhetoric, but also among IDPs when talking 
about return. This sentiment was seen quite clearly in the first level of analysis where 82% of 
those asked said they would not return to Abkhazia without an official peace deal an  without 
Georgian control over Abkhazia. However, this theme of not wanting to return without Georgian 
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control is present throughout the data, and it is in the unsolicited references to this demand that 
one can see clues as to the reason for it as well.  
 It is not uncommon in conflict for entrenchment in a position to be rooted in a rights-
focused mentality and desire to “win,” so to speak.  One could speculate that this sense of rights-
based entitlement is seen in the interviewees who said they want to return b cause “it is mine, it’s 
my land” (T14, 2007), and this is one of the possible reasons that so many IDPs insist on having 
Georgian control before  they return to Abkhazia. However, a look at the interview material 
shows that the need for protection is a central and very real reason for this demand. 29 references 
to Georgian control were seen in 27 interviews, just over half of the pool. Of these 29 references, 
18 specifically mention protection, safety, or fear, which shows that this is a considerable 
motivation in the IDP community. One respondent noted, for example, “I would be afraid, I never 
go back to this territory if I have no guarantee from our government that it is safe” (T13). Another 
noted: “when the government gives [the] promise of protection [we’ll] return” (K1). Furthermore, 
2 interviews made references to the events that occurred in the Gali region of Abkhazia in 1998. 
“There was once when [the] Georgian government already helped IDPs to go back tGali, and 
Abkhazians shoot them because it was not official” (T12).These events are discussed in detail in 
the Case Background chapter, but in brief this refers to the armed clashes that transpired in early 
1998 when a large number of Georgian IDPs moved back to their homes in the Gali region of 
Abkhazia, but did so without aid or protection of the Georgian government. Clashes between 
Georgian nationalist militias and Abkhaz forces transpired and resulted in a great deal of violence 
and the re-displacement of nearly 50,000 IDPs. For obvious reasons, this has become something 
of a traumatic event for many Georgians, particularly IDPs, and while 2 references is not a sizable 
portion of the data, it does indicate a sentiment that likely exists throug  much of the IDP 
community. As such, the study suggests that a fear-based insistence on Georgian control of 
Abkhazia as prerequisite to return is a factor within the IDP community. This insistence 
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contributes to the entrenchment of a position that is difficult to accmmodate, and as such shows 
another way in which the IDP serves as a driving factor in the conflict. Furthermore, the fighting 
that took place in August 2008 in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as into parts of Georgia 
neighboring those regions, surely had a traumatic effect on Georgia’s IDPs as well as their 
population as a whole. One could easily speculate that this would have had the effect of 
underlining and reinforcing security concerns about the prospect of returning a d would support 
fears that returning to Abkhazia without Georgian state protection would lead them to repeat the 
trauma of displacement yet again.   
  
Disempowerment. At the same time as this insistence on government control, the study 
also finds that there is a theme of deferment to government authority and of general 
disempowerment among IDPs. A theme of powerlessness or lack of agency emerged in some 
interviews. This was expressed in a variety of ways; in some casesit wa  expressed in terms of 
deferment to authority or institutions to solve problems.  For example, when ask d about what 
conflicts people expected to face if they return and how they might deal with them, a number of 
interviewees said simply that the government would solve such problems: “everything will be 
decided by government” (B7, 2007). In other instances there was a tendency towards “I don’t 
know” answers, particularly when asked to offer suggestions for programs or ways to improve 
certain services. This trend also came up in responses to questions regarding contact with Abkhaz 
and willingness to participate in dialogue. For example, one person responded: “I’m not a 
politician and meeting someone like me from Abkhazia wouldn’t mean anything, so dialogue has 
to be on government level” (B7, 2007). In another case, when asked about the prospect of return
the respondent answered “I must be president to answer these questions” (T5, 2007).  
There were 27 occurrences of responses that reflect this theme of disempow r ent found 
in 20 of the 45 interviews.  There is a fair amount of speculating that can be done about the 
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causes of this trend towards lack of agency, and the significance that it has for the study. It is 
possible and likely that to some degree this theme, and the trend towards “I don’t know” 
responses, is descended from the era of Soviet Rule, and the political culture reated during that 
70-year period during which self agency and autonomy could be limited or subjugated arbitrarily 
by the state. At the same time it is possible that this tendency is conne ted to the overall sense of 
stagnation that is apparent in so much of the IDP community, with such stagnation and 
hopelessness the task of offering alternatives and solutions begins to appear pointless. The first 
part of this analysis identified the possible existence of some unapparent force or motivation that 
pulls a large portion of this community towards the status quo. It is possible that this puzzling 
pull towards non-integration and segregation is related to the theme of dismpowerment and lack 
of agency that emerges from the data.  
 In the study of refugees and the psychology of displacement, as was discussed earlier in 
the literature review, there are certain coping mechanisms that have been observed in displaced 
communities that may be of relevance here. “Linking” tendencies have been described in this 
literature in cases where some aspect of life before displacement is r created or perpetuated in 
order to fabricate or maintain the connection between the former life, the current life of 
displacement, and the hope for future return (Volkan, 1994, 2003; Zetter, 1999; Al-Rasheed, 
1994). These linked aspects may range from placing undue importance on certain personal items 
to recreation of the old home to the maintenance of IDP communities and the IDP identity 
(Volkan, 1994, 2003).  
 The study of trauma and victimization has also noted that trauma, such as the experi nce 
of forced displacement, can severely damage one’s identity and sense of self. As Wilson (2004)   
notes: “identity involves a sense of self-sameness and continuity” (p. 114), yet traumatic 
experiences have the effect of severing one’s connections to their past and their identity. 
Similarly, Herman notes, “the core experiences of psychological trauma re disempowerment and 
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disconnection from others” (Herman, 1942, p. 133). As such, survivors of traumatic experience 
such as forced displacement are left with a weakened identity and sense of self. The identity of 
victim, or in this case the identity of IDP, serves to redress thi severed sense of self in several 
ways. Herman notes that the identity of victim carries with it a “specialness” that the victim must 
relinquish in the process of recovery (Herman, 1942). Relinquishing the specialness of victim 
identity allows the individual to regain commonality and belonging in society, but also c rries 
with it “a feeling of smallness, of insignificance, a sense that one’s own troubles are ‘as a drop of 
rain in the sea’” (Herman, 1942, p.236). When victim identity and the troubles that come with it 
are as politically charged and carry such consequences as they do in the case of IDP communities, 
recovery may not be an appealing trade-off for relinquishing this specialness. Furthermore, the 
social status of victim, and the sense of shared victimization in communities i volved in trauma 
can promote cohesion in such groups (Roe & Cairns, 2003). Membership in such groups can 
provide the needed sense of identity that is often damaged in survivors of trauma. Furthermore, in 
the case of interstate and inter-communal conflict, the self-assigned status of victim group can 
provide strength “vis-à-vis the international community, which usually tends to support the 
victimized side in a conflict” (Bar-Tal, 2003).    
     There is both comfort and power in the homeostasis of maintaining the identity of victim. 
First the displaced person draws comfort and commonality from being part of a displaced 
community and the opportunity to recreate a lost past that that community provides. Furthermore, 
the identity of victim carries a certain degree of specialness and power. As such, the degree of 
power that the displaced community retains by maintaining its identity as a separate community 
may shed light on the puzzling lack of integration the community in this study shows.     
 The amount and type of aid or assistance given to displaced persons certainly can either 
facilitate or restrict the ease and speed with which individuals integrate into host communities. 
However, on some level it is ultimately the prerogative of displaced persons to integrate into the 
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host community or to actively pursue the possibility of return by remaining segregated from the 
host community. By not integrating or perhaps on some level refusing to integrate, displaced 
persons retain a certain identity and power much in the way that a victim does. By not integrating, 
displaced communities ensure that they remain an issue for the host country/society and as such 
they ensure that they remain an issue in the conflict. Nor will the conflict fade away without 
resolution to the issue of displacement while that displaced population remains visible. By not 
integrating, communities safeguard themselves against being ignored; they ensure themselves a 
role in the conflict (even if it is minor) and with that role comes some degree of power in that 
conflict and thus some degree of control over their own circumstances.    
 
Conclusion 
 The second level of analysis has identified several themes that suggest that there are 
sentiments and demands within the Georgian IDP community that may indeed indicate that this 
community serves as a driving factor in the Georgian Abkhazian conflict. Half of the 
interviewees display signs of what could be called selective aggression. This means that when 
asked about their feelings towards Abkhazians, respondents report having no negative f elings 
towards Abkhazians in general, and only harbor anger towards the certain limited groups of 
Abkhazians, such as the single Abkhazian that has taken one’s house or only twards those that 
fought in the war.  Furthermore, there is a prominent theme in the interviews of demanding 
Georgian control over Abkhazia, and that return is conditional to this demand. By making this 
demand, the IDP community places itself as a driver between the level that the conflict is at 
currently and any possibility of it fading away or de-escalating on its own. If the DP community 
does not simply fade into the Georgian population (which it does not appear to be doing) and if 
this community makes clear that they will not be gradually returning to Abkhazia on their own 
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(without Georgian protection) then it is unlikely that the conflict of which they are a part will 
begin to fade drastically in intensity.  These forces are illustrated in the table below. 
 
 Forces for staying Forces for returning 
+ 
• Power retained by maintaining 




 • Selective or ‘hidden’ aggression towards 
Abkhazians 
• Fear of repeating experience of displacement, 
exacerbated by violent clashes in Gali in 1998 and 
events in August 2008. 
Table 5: Forces for staying and returning to Abkhazia. 
 
Both the first and second parts of the analysis uncovered signs of a powerful fear at work 
within the community: the fear of returning to Abkhazia only to have to flee again and in turn 
experience the trauma of displacement again. This fear is discussed in th  first part of the analysis 
as references to the fear of “starting the conflict again” and is also connected to the theme 
discussed in the second part of demanding Georgian state control of Abkhazia as precondition to 
return. Uncovering this fear of re-traumatization is a key part of understanding the entrenched 
position within this community of requiring guarantees of protection from the Georgian 
government as a prerequisite for returning to Abkhazia. The issue of IDP return and the 
entrenchment of both sides on this issue is, in turn, a driving force in the conflict.    
This leads to the final conclusion of these results. The first part of this analysis detected 
that there was some unapparent force towards the status quo of prolonged displacement and 
segregation that seemingly is stronger than the appeal of integration. Later, the analysis also 
identified a theme emerging from the data that might be identified as disempowerment or the 
acceptance of powerlessness, which is most visible in deference to government control. Looking 
at phenomena that have been observed both in refugee psychology and in the psychology of 
victimization, the analysis finds that there may be some connection between he resistance to 
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integration and the issue of power. As was discussed above, by remaining visibly segregated and 
thus maintaining the identity of a community displaced by conflict, the IDP population is able to 
retain an undeniable role in the conflict and thus some amount of power. Furthermore, if one 
takes this phenomena to suggest that there is some degree of intentionality on the part of the IDP 
community in maintaining the status quo, then the argument can be made that the attitudes of the 
IDP community do indeed actively drive the conflict. The status quo is maintained through some 
degree of intentionality, thus the source of authority for the Abkhaz Government-in-Exile is 
maintained; and as a notoriously partisan organization, that lobbies a hard nationalist line in 
regards to the conflict and the full return of IDPs to Abkhazia the Government-in-Exile certainly 
acts to drive the conflict. Thus, one can connect the attitudes of IDPs to the perpetuation of the 
















 As the reporting of results in the previous chapter should show, the study con ucted for 
this paper is multifaceted and somewhat complex, and produced a sizeable amount of raw data. 
Although the methods used in this thesis were as appropriate as possible for this subject, there are 
some limitations to the study and its ability to draw definitive conclusions from the data. The 
following discussion will outline caveats, shortcomings, and errors in several aspects of the study 
and analysis conducted. Such caveats are found in the study’s design, its execu ion and data 
collection, as well as the method and process of analysis.  
 
Study Design 
 The study was designed to accommodate the information needs of this research within 
the constraints posed by logistical and financial limitations, a limited period of time in which to 
collect information, as well as the political limits that exist when conducting field research about 
an ongoing or unresolved conflict. These various caveats will be discussed in turn.    
  This study was conducted to better understand the various factors at work in the 
perpetuation of frozen conflict, and the role that displaced persons play in these dynamics. It 
pursued this end by studying more closely the population of internally displaced persons that fled 
their place of origin during the Georgian-Abkhazian war in the early 1990’s. It follows that the 
discussion of this study should begin by briefly assessing the appropriateness and 
representativeness of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as an example of frozen conflict. In an 
earlier chapter the following definition for frozen conflict was offered: 
Frozen conflict is a particular phenomenon  of intractability where the conflict 
experiences a long period of what seems to be stagnation or non movement. This 
period occurs after most of the violence in the conflict is ended by ceasefir, but 
leaves the conflict unresolved and  parties in a state of destructive and painful 
ambiguity – particularly in regard to parties’ legal relationship with each other 
and with the outside world, which becomes the status quo for those involved. 
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It could be said that because the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict fits this description almost exactly, 
that it is indeed an appropriate and representative example for the study of frozen conflict. 
However, such an evaluation is not so simple. Because there is little theor tical literature 
available that offers anything resmbling a functional definition of  frozen conflict, the term  is 
largely defined by the characteristics of the specific conflicts that the term is used to describe. 
These are primarily the conflicts in Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Georgia. As such, the 
claim that Georgia and Abkhazia is an appropriate example based on its prox mity to this 
definition is a somewhat tautological argument. However, this problem would present itself if any 
of the other conflicts often referred to as frozen were examined rather than Georgia and 
Abkhazia. Furthermore, the legitimacy of focusing on Georgia as a critical case of frozen conflict 
could be argued based on its importance in ongoing regional affairs and its relevanc  to policy in 
the area. Perhaps more than other conflicts in this grouping, the Georgian Abkhazian conflict and 
its frozen  state is poised to have a significant impact on regional and international affairs. First, it 
appears at the time of writing that Georgian affairs are taking on a sigificant role in shaping US-
Russian and European-Russian relations. Furthermore, the large portion of the Caspian-
Mediterranean oil pipeline located in Georgia is often cited  as lending international significance 
to the separatist conflicts in which Georgia is engaged. Finally, the proximity of the Russian-
Abkhazian border to the site of the 2014 Olympic games, Sochi, also lends relevanc  and 
immediacy to the Georgian-Abkhazian as a critical case of frozen conflict. 
 Having discussed the appropriateness of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict as an example 
of frozen conflict, there are a number of other caveats to bear in mind with regards to the specific 
study conducted. As should be clear by now, the study only collected data and informaton from 
Georgians. For obvious reasons, it would have been ideal to conduct studies among populations 
on both sides of this conflict. It would add greater depth to the study and allow it to draw stronger 
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conclusions if it were able to provide an Abkhazian perspective on issues and themes such as the 
return of Georgian IDPs and the possibility of coexistence with Georgians.  However, given the 
limitations imposed by the current political situation as well as risks to personal security 
associated with traveling in a region not controlled by the Georgian government and where US 
embassy officials are unable to provide protection to citizens, the collection of data from 
Abkhazia was deemed beyond this study’s capacity.    
There are strengths and weaknesses to the size of the sample used in this study. It could at 
once be argued that the sample is too large in some respects and too small in other respects. A 
larger sample could increase the representativeness and generalizability of the study and allow for 
traditional statistical analysis of certain factors. At the same time, the size of the sample presented 
challenges that a smaller sample would not. Using an instrument that collec s both qualitative and 
quantitative data in a sample of this size runs the risk of collecting more inf rmation than can be 
effectively analyzed. Indeed, it was a challenge to distill the amount of data collected into 
digestible amounts while preserving the integrity of the information and maintaining respect for 
the individual subjects and the time they gave to the study.  
However, despite the challenges presented by the size of this sample, it proved to be an 
advantageous sample size for the aims of the study. First, the format of this study would not have 
effectively served a significantly larger sample than the one studied here. The interviews were 
semi-structured, which allowed for probing on some questions when needed, and posed open 
ended questions which allowed respondents to expand on topics when they so wished. As such,
the study produced a dense, rich, and highly varied body of data. On some of the open-ended 
questionnaire items this meant that no two responses looked the same, and that each required 
individual interpretation in order to extract the desired information. At 45 interviews, it is entirely 
possible to do this without losing the richness and individuality of the responses. Likely this 
approach is just as possible with a sample size of 50 or even 60 respondents. However, at a 
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certain point the sample would become too large to be appropriate for this type of individualized 
analysis, and would be unable to adequately make use of the richness of the responses given. At 
the same time this size of sample allowed to study to interview individuals from different regions 
of Georgia, of different ages, and of various walks of life. This produced a variety and texture that 
a significantly smaller sample would not generate. Thus, while admittely his prevented a depth 
of analysis that is possible with fewer subjects, it gave textur and variety to the data collected 
that a smaller sample could not have provided.  
Finally, it should be mentioned that there are certain challenges involved when targeting 
for study a group that is widely considered to be a vulnerable population. The term vulnerable 
population is typically applied to populations such as children, prisoners, the mentally disabled 
and economically or educationally disadvantaged people (Royse, 2008). When working with 
vulnerable populations the study must pay particular attention to ensuring that the study and 
participation in it does not somehow cause harm to the subject. When working with a population 
that has experienced significant trauma, such as the forcibly displaced, it is par icularly important 
to ensure that the instrument and research methods employed by the study do not cause re-
traumatization to the subjects, and that emotions brought up as a result of participation in the 
study are handled appropriately and with sensitivity.    
 
Data Collection & Sampling 
 The greatest challenges of conducting the study, and perhaps the most important caveats 
to discuss, are in regards to the process of data collection and sampling ethod used. Conducting 
interviews with the aid of a translator, unfamiliarity with local ulture, and finding subjects with 
limited personal connections presented significant challenges to the accurate collection of data 
and assembly of a representative sample of subjects. Undeniably, these challenges had an affect 
on the data collected.  
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Sampling. A number of caveats should be noted in regards to the demographics of the 
subject pool and discrepancies between this and the larger Georgian IDP population. The 
interview subjects in this study were collected through a nonprobability sampling design that 
would best be described as purposive sampling. Nonprobability sampling refers to a process that 
unlike probability sampling does not use a mathematically random process to selec  a sampling 
element, and is the type of sampling most often used in qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, 
research. As Newman and Kreuger (2003) note: “qualitative researchers focus less on a sample’s 
representativeness … the primary purpose of [nonprobability] sampling is to collect specific 
cases, events, or actions that can clarify and deepen understanding” (p. 209). In other words, the 
insight and depth of understanding that qualitative research seeks is favored o e  the 
representativeness of a sample and generalizability of a study’s findings that quantitative research 
favors.  
Within the category of nonprobability sampling, this study would best be described as 
one conducted via purposive or judgmental sampling. Purposive sampling is used in exploratory 
or field research, and is one where the investigator uses various methods to select cases or 
subjects for inclusion in the study with a specific purpose in mind or because they possess certain 
characteristics, often using the judgment of an expert to select the cases (Neuman & Kreuger, 
2003; Royse, 2008). One reason that an investigator uses purposive sampling is to study a hard-
to-reach or specialized population. In this study, subjects were selected due to membership in the 
population of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia, which is a hard-to-reach population about which 
little statistical information is available. There are advantages and disadvantages to this method of 
sampling. As Hochschild notes “Obviously, one cannot safely generalize from a sample of this 
kind to a national population” however, she continues, “intensive interviews ar  a device for 
generating insights, anomalies, and paradoxes, which later may be formalized into hypotheses 
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that can be tested by quantitative social science methods” (1981, p.23-24 as quoted in Neuman & 
Kreuger, 2003).  
Interviewees were selected based on the characteristics of being an IDP of Georgian 
ethnicity that fled from former residences in Abkhazia during and because of th  Georgian-
Abkhazian war, and were located using the local knowledge of guides in each area t at interviews 
were conducted. Interviewees from Tbilisi were recruited primarily through acquaintance with 
translators or the primary investigator. Interviewees in Kutaisi and Zugdidi were found through 
acquaintance with local peacebuilding and educational organizations, and several of the Batumi 
interviews were arranged with assistance from the Ministry of Refuges in that region. 
There are several main reasons why a random or probability sampling method was not 
particularly feasible for this study. First, the fact that the study argets a very particular group or 
population, Georgian IDPs, means that a traditional random sampling method such as random 
digit dialing would not produce viable subjects or cases for the study. Furthermore, the method of 
selected a random or statistically stratified subject pool from a list of IDPs living in the given area 
was not a feasible sampling method either, as the investigator did not have access to such listing 
if indeed they even exist. It could be argued that some quota sampling methods could have been 
better integrated into the study. In quota sampling, the researcher identifies certain demographic 
categories within the wider population, and determines proportionally how many subject  of each 
category there should be represented in the sample. For example, the study could have aimed to 
sample such that respondents were roughly half male and half female. However, th  ability to 
apply quotas to the subject pool was limited due to restrictions created by logistical issues such as 
the availability of the translator-guides needed for most of the interviews, and the limited ability 
to plan the data-collecting visits to areas outside Tbilisi. Some of the issues around the limited 
ability of the investigator to successfully apply quotas to the sample are discussed below.     
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There are several ways in which this sampling method may have affected the data. First, 
the number of IDPs living in collective centers was higher in the sample than in the general 
population: 62% in this study versus roughly half in the general IDP population (IDMC, 2006). 
This discrepancy comes from having greater access to IDPs living in collective centers relative to 
finding those living in private residences. Furthermore, interviewees were rec uited on a 
volunteer basis, and it became apparent that certain age and gender groups were more available 
and more willing than other groups to talk about their experiences. First, there was a large 
representation of women and young people. Part of this is likely due to availability, s middle 
aged men were often not at home when interviews were being conducted. This issue of timing 
could perhaps have been addressed by staggering the times when interviews were being 
conducted. However, this timing was largely subject to the availability of translators and guides.  
Another reason for this is that men that were 20-40 years old at the time of the war (or 35-55 
now) were the most likely to have participated in the war, and because of the trauma they have 
experienced taking part in this war they may be less willing to talk about their experiences. The 
proportionately lower number of middle aged men may have affected some of the data collected. 
It is possible that because of their experience with the war, this demographic would have 
expressed feelings about the Abkhazians that are more aggressive and less conciliatory than other 
demographics, and may have shown less optimistic views on the possibility and difficulty of 
coexisting with Abkhazians. We do not know whether this is the case, but because the sample is 
lacking in this demographic group the possibility exists that the data and findings may be skewed 
to present the appearance of more optimistic and conciliatory attitudes within the IDP community 
than what are actually there. 
Furthermore, the associations through which some respondents were recruitd may have 
affected the data collected from them. Namely, this may have been an issue where some of the 
respondents that were recruited through acquaintance with NGOs in Kutasi and the 
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Conflictology Department at Tbilisi State University in Tbilisi, or through the Ministry of 
Refugees in Batumi. In Kutaisi, IDPs for interview were located with the assistance of an 
educational NGO that works with the IDP community in that city. Several interview questions are 
asked that deal with the respondent’s willingness to engage in dialogue with Abkhazians, their 
prior experience with peacebuilding processes, and the ways that they personally tend to deal 
with conflict in their lives. The associations of some respondents with such groups indicates that 
these individuals were likely to have a greater familiarity with peacebuilding and conflict 
resolution practices, and are more likely to have had conflict training, therefore demonstrating 
greater ability to handle conflict in a non-destructive manner. Within the overall pool of data, 
these interviews may have had the effect of skewing the data to give the population the 
appearance of greater exposure and experience with peacebuilding processes and conflict skills 
than is accurate. 
The fact that several interviews in Batumi were arranged with the assistance of the 
Ministry of Refugees in that region may have had similar consequences in terms of collecting 
data that might be skewed or otherwise inaccurate. One such interview, number B1, is of 
particular concern as it was actually conducted in the offices of the Minister of Refugees. This 
produced noticeable irregularities in the responses given when compared to th  responses given 
in other interviews, particularly regarding the subject of assistance and aid received. For example, 
when asked about the amount or type of aid that they receive now, a very common response was 
“we only get 14 Lari ($7 US) a month,” or something similar to this. However, th  respondent in 
interview B1 responded to this question by saying enthusiastically “we get 14 Lari every month” 
and noted that this was greater than the amount they used to receive. A thorough understanding of 
the dynamics and relationship between the IDP community and the Ministry of Refugees is well 
beyond the scope of this study. However, it is safe to say that the fact that the interview given at 
the Ministry was far less critical of the Ministry and Georgian government overall shows that 
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some of the responses given in this interview may not have been entirely ingenuous. Some other 
interviews in collective centers in Batumi were coordinated by the Ministry. Specifically at the 
collective center where interviews B5-B11 were conducted, it appeared that someone from the 
Ministry had called in advance of the interview session to ensure that it would be possible to 
conduct interviews there. Again, the relationship between the Ministry of Refugees and the IDP 
population in Georgia, and the degree of disconnect between ministry rhetoric and the reality of 
IDPs’ experience is certainly related to the subject at hand in this paper, but is not its focus nor is 
it the main problem with which this paper is concerned. Certainly thereis a level of questioning 
required when data is collected in this context with the aid of government officials. However, the 
data collected in interviews B5-B11 did not differ in any noticeable or dramatic w y from data 
collected in other regions and situations. It certainly did not depart from the main body of data in 
the way that interview B1 did. As such it should not be considered to be exceptionally biased due 
to the assistance of government officials in its collection.          
 
Data collection. A number of logistical challenges also presented themselves in the 
collection of data. Foremost among these was a set of challenges presented by the use of a 
translator. Six different translators were used in the process of conducting this study. Because of 
the low-budget approach with which the study was conducted, different translaors were hired to 
conduct interviews in each region or cities where interviews were conducted. This presented the 
challenge of making sure that each new translator understood the questionnaire a d purpose of 
each item, and usually meant reviewing the questionnaire in a relatively short period of time. It 
also meant that each translator brought their own preconceptions and interpretation of the 
questionnaire to the interviews that they helped conduct. For example, when asking the question 
“would you be willing to return without state protection, provided that you wereable to build 
relationships with the people that would be your neighbors there?” one translator interpreted this 
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as “would you be willing to return under Abkhazian sovereignty?” This way of asking clearly 
creates a loaded and significantly different question. 
 An additional factor to consider about the translators and guides that assis ed in the study 
is that all of these translator-guides were also IDPs. While this was entirely unintended by the 
researcher, it presents certain issues in the data collection process that are worth considering. The 
fact that the translators assisting in the interviews were also IDPs gave them a closeness or 
intimacy with the subject of the interviews that has both advantages and disadvantages. The 
negative aspects of this factor are that, given their proximity to the issu s, there is a risk that the 
translators might make inaccurate assumptions about participant responses or assume the ability 
to interpret on their own responses or questionnaire items rather than asking for clarification. 
However there are also advantages that come from having interpreters tha  have personal 
experience with the topic of the study. First, this deeper understanding means that they are more 
likely to understand certain regional expressions and idioms used within the IDP community, as 
well as references to certain places and events. Furthermore, the fact that these translators were 
members of the community being studied significantly increased access to this c mmunity, and 
created a baseline level of trust between investigator and subjects that would otherwise have 
taken a great amount of time to build. Given the advantages of deeper understanding of issues and 
access to the IDP community, as opposed to the disadvantages mentioned above, it was likely a 
great benefit to the study that translators involved were all IDPs.        
 The use of a translator also presents challenges to recording the responses given in an 
interview. When these responses come through a translator, they are often truncated and the word 
choice is often dictated by the translator’s knowledge of English rather than by the subtle 
differences in meaning that word choice typically connotes. This has implications for data 
analysis in that the data must be analyzed for substance rather than for co tent or word choice. It 
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also means that the study likely lost some comments or details that translators found insignificant, 
even though they may have been significant in analysis.  
 Finally, it should also be noted that some technical difficulties prevented the researcher 
from recording all interviews as was intended in the study’s design. This presents similar issues 
as the use of translators does, in that the researcher was not able to record ev ry word and thought 
expressed by the respondent. 
 
Analysis Methods 
 A number of challenges that appeared in the process of collecting data reappeared in the 
process of analyzing it. These primarily are issues that stem from conducting interviews in 
Georgian or Russian while attempting to analyze them in English.  
 It is likely, if not certain, that a degree of meaning was lost in the process of translating 
responses to English and consequently of interpreting these translations. First, there were a 
number of responses that even with notes and a recording, were incomprehensibl in regards to 
the question asked. Without the ability to go back and clarify some of these responses, the 
analysis had to group some of these responses as “other,” effectively losing the information in 
them. Similarly, in order to be able to quote responses in this paper, the wording f some 
responses had to be adjusted to make them logical and comprehensible to an English speaking 
audience. And, as is always a problem when working in multiple languages, certain words and 
sayings lose their full meaning in translation. This is also the cas with the existence of cultural 
connotations to certain terms and phrases. While a translator can interpret the words spoken by 
respondents, they cannot translate the cultural context in which they are spoken. It should be a 
given fact that references and associations were made by interviewees which the researcher could 
not have understood and that the translator would have thought to explain.    
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 It is important as well to note why the data collected in this study did not undergo 
statistical analysis to determine, for example, the statistical significance of certain differences in 
the data. First, the purpose and intentions of the study do not lend themselves to stati tical 
analysis and significance testing. This research was conducted as an exploratory study, with the 
intention of exploring a topic about which little data has been produced and in turn identifying 
important issues in this topic and generating hypotheses and questions for further research. The 
intention of the study is not hypotheses testing, which is the purpose of using inferential statistics. 
Testing for statistical significance is done to establish whether the study’s results where due to 
chance or due to the hypothesized relationship between variables (Neuman & Kreuger, 2003). 
Furthermore, inferential statistics and significance testing rely on probability sampling. However, 
as discussed earlier, this study utilized purposive sampling, which is categorized as a non-
probability sampling method. As such, it is neither necessary nor logical to include statistical 
testing in the analysis of the data collected in this study.        
 
Conclusion 
 This section has highlighted a number of caveats that one should bear in mind when 
reading the findings and conclusions of this study. The non-random sampling method used means 
that the representativeness of this pool is limited, and its findings should are not meant to be 
generalized to the greater Georgian IDP population. Furthermore, middle age men were under-
represented in the subject pool, while IDPs that were involved with local NGOs, had participated 
in peacebuilding activities, or had received some form of conflict training were over-represented. 
This may have the effect of skewing the data to make the IDP population appearmor  
conciliatory towards Abkhazians and better prepared to handle conflict than they actually are. 
Finally, the use of translators and the challenges presented by translating interviews also means 
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that some of meaning in the responses as they were originally conveyed may have been lost in the 
translation and transcription process.  
However, the reader should also bear in mind that many of these flaws are inher nt in the 
type of study that was conducted. Qualitative interviewing, collecting data in nother language 
and culture, working with a translator, and working with what is considered to be a vulnerable 
population are all elements that complicate the execution and accurate analysis of a study. 
However, these are all factors that enrich such a study as well. The obstacles presented by 
language, culture, and logistics were all necessary in order to gather the thoughts and perspectives 
of a population about which little is known; and it would be impossible to accurately understand 
the role of this population in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict without attempting to understand 
what they perceive their role to be.      
All things being said, the existence of multiple shortcomings in this study is apparent. 
However, this should not entirely discount the results and conclusions that it has produced. While 
these challenges may have affected the representativeness of the data collected, they have not 
affected the study’s ability to identify issues and sentiments that exist within the IDP community. 
And, after all, the identification and understanding of such issues, and not hypothesis testing nor 
the establishment of statistical certainties about this population, was the stated purpose of the 













 This thesis has attempted to explain the dynamics of the phenomenon referred to as 
frozen conflict and to answer the question of why it goes unresolved for so long. In order to do 
this, this paper first attempted to provide a working definition of the term “frozen conflict” and 
what it implies about conflicts that are labeled as such. A review of literature from the subjects of 
protracted social conflict, intractability, and post-Soviet conflict provided the pieces of an 
understanding that classifies frozen conflict as a particular type of intractable or protracted 
conflict. This type of protracted conflict is distinct in that violence is almost entirely halted after 
the signing of a ceasefire, but the conflict itself and the legal status of participants in relation to 
each other remains in limbo for years or even decades.  
 In order to answer the question of why frozen conflict experiences this extended period of 
stagnation or a freezing of the peace process, the literature review turned o a number of fields 
and subjects ranging from settlement and peace agreements, power sharing, t e former-Soviet 
Union, and refugee studies. This review helped to identify a number of central fac ors in the 
freezing of certain conflicts, from which two plausible rival hypotheses were developed about the 
dynamics and causes behind the stagnant nature of frozen conflict.  
 First, however, the review uncovered a number of insights into the nature of what have 
come to be called frozen conflicts. Scholars of the Soviet successor wars such as Dov Lynch 
(2004) and Charles King (2001) have suggested that the term frozen is inappropriate for these 
conflicts, as it misconstrues them as inactive or static when, in reality, these conflicts and the 
parties they involve can be highly dynamic. The legal status of the conflict a d the parties 
remains unchanged in such conflicts, but the parties themselves change a great deal, and with that 
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the issues at stake in the conflict can change as well. As suggested in the literature review, it may 
be more fruitful to think of frozen conflict not as a static state but as being in a state of 
equilibrium. Borrowing from Lewin’s theory of force field analysis and quasi-stationary 
equilibrium (1958), this paper suggests that frozen conflicts are held in equilibrium by opposing 
forces acting against each other. There are forces that act to drive or push the intensity of the 
conflict up and there are opposing forces that push the intensity of the conflict down and keep it 
below the threshold beyond which the pain of stalemate would be great enough to motivate the 
parties to settle. The conceptualization offered here refers to this threshold as ripeness for 
resolution, borrowing the concept from Zartman (1989). This conceptualization of frozen conflict 
as being in a state of equilibrium allows for an understanding of the phenomenon as something 
that feigns the appearance of being static because little to no progress is made toward resolving 
the political and legal status of the conflict, but underneath this surface is dynamic and changing. 
This conceptualization of frozen conflict also opens avenues for further study of this phenomenon 
in identifying and analyzing the various forces acting on a given conflict. Fromthis 
understanding of frozen conflict two plausible rival hypotheses emerged.          
 The first hypothesis suggests that, in terms of intensity, frozen conflict exists in a state of 
equilibrium somewhere between peace and a threshold of intensity that might be considered as 
akin to ripeness for resolution. The conflict remains at this equilibrium d e to a number of factors 
that either dampen the conflict’s intensity, keeping it below this ripeness for resolution threshold 
or push the intensity of the conflict up, ensuring that the conflict will not simply dissolve or fade 
away. Some of the factors that post-Soviet scholars identify as those that keep the de-facto states 
afloat could also be identified as these de-escalating forces. Such factors might include the de-
facto state-building projects that take place in the separatist regions involved in these conflicts, 
and the involvement of international organizations which provide just enough aid and assistance 
to make the pain of stalemate tolerable for the parties involved. Meanwhile the escalating or 
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conflict driving forces would include factors such as IDP populations and the activities of 
paramilitary groups or militias. 
The second hypothesis suggests that a key to understanding the protraction of frozen 
conflict lies at the internal level of the IDP population, and in the opposing forces at work in this 
population. Informed by Kurt Lewin’s theory of force field analysis and quasi-sttionary 
equilibrium (Lewin, 1958), this hypothesis posits that the seeming stagnation of long term 
displacement is the result of opposing forces at work in the IDP community. These opposing 
forces act on the IDP community compelling them simultaneously both to wish to stay in the host 
community and to desire to return to their home territory, and it is this contradiction of forces that 
prevents the return of the displaced population while also preventing their integration into the 
host community.   
This study opted to isolate one of the factors in this equilibrium framework ith the 
intention of further exploring this factor and the role it plays in the conflict as a force maintaining 
this frozenness. As such, the hypotheses were explored through a study of a select IDP population 
operating within the context Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. This conflict, between the Republic of 
Georgia and the separatist region of Abkhazia, erupted into war between 1992 and 1994 and has 
since gone unresolved. This study focuses on the sizeable population of ethnic Georg ans who 
were displaced from Abkhazia as a result of this war. This study, based on interviews conducted 
with 45 Georgian IDPs during the summer of 2007, explored these hypotheses within the co text 
of this conflict. In regards to the first hypothesis, the study attempted to determine whether this 
community does indeed act as a driving factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict by identifying 
trends within the stated beliefs and perceptions of the IDP community that reflec this role as 
conflict drivers.  To address the second hypothesis, the study attempted to identify th  forces and 
motivations towards either return, integration or the status quo at work within the IDP population. 
These forces were identified by collecting information regarding IDP integration and impressions 
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of their host community, perceptions of their home territory, and thoughts on the prospect of 
return. All of this was done with the intention that the study’s results would provide greater 
understanding of the forces at work within this community, as well as point to o e hypothesis as 
more compelling than the other in describing the dynamics responsible for th  stagnation behind 
frozen conflict.   
The study conducted for this project revealed a number interesting factors and is ues at 
work within the Georgian IDP population, and raised a number of additional questions about the 
nature of frozen conflict and the role that displaced populations play in it. Both levels of the 
analysis uncovered a number of interesting and thought provoking issues that would merit further 
study. The first level of analysis was intended to identify and uncover the opposing forces acting 
on the community of Georgian IDPs involved in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. The analysis 
identified a number of strong motivations and forces at work in this population, and also found 
several interesting contradictions within this field of forces. The study found that most 
respondents reported a low expectation of conflict in the event of beingrepatriated to Abkhazia, 
and the attitude towards Abkhazians among respondents was also found to be quite conciliatory. 
Yet at the same time, in regards to the prospect of returning to Abkhazia, respondents reported 
strong fears of starting another conflict and fears of personal security.  
In another contradiction, when asked about quality of life and integration in parts of 
Georgia where they currently live, respondents cited overwhelmingly a lack of aid or state 
support that contributes to a rather poor quality of life. However, they also reported being very 
well integrated into Georgian society and demonstrated a strong motivation to be better integrated 
through steady employment and more fixed housing. Thus, while this section of the analysis did 
not point to one hypothesis as a more compelling diagnosis of the situation, it did reveal some key 
contradictions within the IDP community and its motivations to either retu n or integrate. Most 
interesting, however are the forces that were not identified. The IDP populati n h s been 
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displaced for nearly fifteen years at the time of writing this, and remarkably few have undergone 
what most would classify as integration into Georgian society. Much of this population still lives 
in collective centers that were set up as temporary housing for them over a decade ago. Most 
people in these centers are unemployed and remain largely segregated from broader Georgian 
society. As such, one would expect to find a set of forces in this analysis that draws this 
population towards this non-integrated status quo. However, the forces that were identified seem 
to push or pull this population in all directions other than that of the status quo. Therefore, in the 
force-field- analysis inspired approach to this population, it would appear that there is some force 
pulling the IDP population towards the status quo that was not identified in the first part of the 
analysis. 
 The second level of analysis was done to identify broad and emerging themes within the 
interview data, and in doing so address the role of the IDP community as a driving force in this 
conflict. According to the second hypothesis posed in this study, displaced populations, in this 
case the Georgian IDP population, are examples out of a host of factors that serve to drives the 
intensity of the conflict up. The analysis showed that while some findings from the first part of 
the analysis would negate the role of the IDP population as a driving force in the conflict, this 
second analytical approach found several broad trends that showed more subtle ways hat they 
can act as a driving force. First, the analysis identified a trend in the data towards what is termed 
here as selective aggression. When identifying the degree to which a certain population serves as 
a driving factor in a conflict, one obvious factor to look for is the level of hostility and aggression 
they display towards the enemy side. The first part of the analysis showed that when asked, 
respondents heavily (76% of respondents) stated that their feelings toward Abkhazians were 
conciliatory and friendly. However the second part of the analysis showed that aggression 
towards Abkhazians does emerge from data in more subtly stated ways, such as howing 
aggression towards select parts of the Abkhazian population like veterans of the war.  
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 Entrenchment in a polarizing position is another way in which a party to a conflict can 
serve to drive that conflict. A trend toward this kind of entrenchment also appears in the data in 
regard to the multiple references to Georgian control over Abkhazia as a precondition to return 
and the demand of the IDP community for security guarantees from the government. A number of 
these responses that reference traumatic events in the IDP community’s history belie the need for 
protection that lies behind these demands, and the fear of returning only to experience the trauma 
of displacement again that lies behind this entrenchment. The entrenchment in this position of 
course places the IDP population as a driving force between the current level of conflict 
equilibrium and the possibility of it de-escalating. If the IDP community doesn t imply fade 
into the Georgian population (which it does not appear to be doing) and if this community akes 
clear that they will not be gradually returning to Abkhazia on their own without state protection 
then it is unlikely that the conflict of which they are a part will begin to fade drastically in 
intensity. 
    Finally, the analysis also produced an interesting finding in regards to a seeming 
deference to outside control, particularly to the government, or a lack of agency among 
respondents in regards to the out come of the conflict and their ability to impact it that also 
emerged as a trend in the data. A return to the literature on refugee dynamics suggests that this 
disempowerment may have connections to the trauma of displacement that they have experienced 
and to the identity of victim that comes with such trauma. Some literature on psychological 
phenomena related to victimization and trauma, such as that of Volkan (1994) and Herman 
(1942) suggest that the identity of victim, or in this case the identity of IDP, provides certain 
means of coping to the individual. These include a sense of cohesion and community a o g the 
traumatized group, as a degree of power stemming from what Herman (1942) refers to as the 
“specialness” of victim identity. As such, the lack of agency displayed may have to do with 
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maintaining the role of IDP and with it the identity of victim and various means of coping that 
come with it.    
 Looking at the numerous insights and issues raised in both parts of the analysis it would 
appear that the most interesting and useful conclusions that can be drawn from this data are not 
those which point to one hypothesis or the other as more compelling. Rather, the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the synthesis of both levels of analysis say more about the role of IDPs in 
these conflicts. By comparing the conclusions of both levels of analysis, the tudy found results 
that suggest the existence of interesting and unexpected dynamics within the IDP population with 
regards to its role in the conflict. Namely, these findings suggest th  possibility that there may be 
certain psycho-social phenomena at work in this population whereby the IDP community draws a 
degree of meaning, identity, and even power from their role as victims in this conflict. By 
maintaining the IDP identity as something distinct within the broader Geo gian social fabric this 
community is able to safeguard a distinct role in the conflict and with it some degree of power in 
a situation in which they have otherwise been powerless. Furthermore, it is by remaining a 
distinct and segregated entity in Georgian society that the attitudes of thi population translate 
into action that drives up the intensity of the conflict. The segregation of the IDP population and 
their continued existence as a separate entity in Georgia is where the Abk az Government-in-
Exile draws its authority. This apparatus has significant influence in Georgian politics, and 
pushes for a hard-line approach to the Abkhaz conflict, actively acting as an gitating force and a 
blocking force, preventing the conflict from de-escalating through negotiated se tlement by 
rejecting the compromises that would be necessary in a peace agreement. Thus, by passively 
providing continued power and authority to the Government-in-Exile, the mainten ce of the 
status quo by the IDP, and whatever degree of intentionality there is in doing so, plays a role as a 
driving factor in the conflict.        
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These conclusions may not specifically answer the question of “why does frozen c nflict 
go unresolved for so long,” but it does lend an understanding to the role that IDP or refugee 
communities play in the conflicts that displace them and to the dynamics of prol nged 
displacement. Specifically, these findings suggest that the degree of power or powerlessness that 
a displaced community is able to maintain may be connected to their ability to n egrate into a 
host community or their perceptions of repatriation. Yet further research is equired into this 
particular finding to draw any more solid conclusions from it. 
This research leaves a large number of unanswered questions and avenues for further 
research. In order to more fully understand the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict further research is 
required, first and foremost, into the thoughts and perceptions of the Abkhazian general
population. In particular this research raises the need to understand Abkhazian views on the 
conflict, on the Georgian IDP population, and on the prospect of IDP return. Outside of the 
conflict context studied here, there are a number of questions raised in the review of theoretical 
literature that have only begun to be addressed in this exploratory study. In order to better 
understand frozen conflict and its dynamics, further research is needed in regards to other factors 
that affect the frozen nature of these conflicts, such as the role of militia or paramilitary groups as 
driving factors, or the role of international organizations in dampening the intensity of such 
conflicts. Similarly, further understanding is needed into how the various factors that hold the 
equilibrium of frozen conflict in place could be augmented or manipulated to mobilize the peace 
process. Furthermore, this research begs the question of whether these findings have any 
applicability to other conflicts: either other frozen conflicts like those in Cyprus or Nagorno-
Karabakh, or other intractable conflicts that involve sizable displaced populations. It would be 
worthwhile to know whether the findings presented here are specific to the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict, to frozen or separatist conflict, or whether these findings about the role of IDPs in 
conflict is in some way applicable to all populations displaced by conflict.  
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In addition to these possibilities for further research, there are also a number of trends and 
questions that this study was unable to explore due to its structure, limitations, and sampling 
methods. There were a number of dominant sentiments and positions among respondents that 
could be verified through a study with a more generalizable sample. For exampl , such a study 
could be done to confirm that a majority of the IDP population, as opposed to a majority of the 
participants in this study, would demand Georgian state protection before willingly returning to 
Abkhazia. Furthermore, the exploratory nature of this study also raised several new issues for 
future research. For example, it would be valuable to our understanding of the r le of displaced 
populations in conflict to pursue the relationship between victim identity and power and how this 
relationship plays out in the identity as displaced person within a ost society.  
 There are a number of areas and subjects in which the findings and the new questions 
generated in this study could be applied. The most obvious area where these findings have 
significance is in further developing the concept of frozen conflict as a particular phenomenon 
under the umbrella concept of intractability. This study and its suggestions for further 
investigation also hold significance for the various ongoing conflicts that are categorized as 
frozen. Looking at the broader implications of this study, the findings and insights discussed here 
could carry significance in the area of refugee aid and integration. In addition to societies engaged 
in frozen conflict, these conclusions also have significance for conflicts where sizable displaced 
populations are a significant factor in the conflict’s resolution, and for societies that are host to 
sizable displaced populations. This study’s findings have suggested the idea that the maintenance 
of refugee or IDP identity through segregation from the host community could be connected to a 
way of maintaining a degree of power in the conflict and its outcome. It also suggests that when 
this resistance to integration is combined with entrenchment in a polarizing position in regards to 
return, that IDP communities can indeed act as a driving force in th  equilibrium of frozen 
conflict. This suggests that power and voice may be more important to displaced communities 
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than they are typically credited as being. The important role that voice plays in peacebuilding and 
in trauma healing has been recognized by theorists and practitioners alike, and numerous fields of 
psychological study have recognized the “critical link between voice and ide tity” (d’Estree, 
2006 p.107).  Yet it is typical that when displaced populations are mentiond in relation to a 
particular conflict they are regarded one-dimensionally as a cost of conflict, or as part of the 
overall destruction caused by an armed conflict. All too rarely are displaced populations regarded 
as stakeholders in a conflict, and more importantly as key players in a conflict’s resolution.      
 There is an emerging emphasis within the fields of humanitarian nd refugee aid and 
trauma healing towards the distinction between victim and survivor. This line of thinking posits 
that in treating someone that has experienced trauma as a survivor carries with it a greater 
emphasis and recognition of that individual’s dignity and autonomy than regardin  them as a 
victim. In turn, this thinking also emphasizes that in order to truly be of aid to the traumatized or 
forcibly displaced, one must above all else treat them with dignity (Van Arsdale, 2006). In a 
similar vein, this study’s conclusions suggest that it would be worthwhile for societies, 
governments, and agencies that work with or host displaced communities to look into ways of 
approaching these populations that treat them as stakeholder in a conflict, rather than simply as 
victims. These findings raise the question of what would be the result if displaced populations 
were more actively incorporated in the peace process. What would happen if refugees and 
forcibly displaced persons were treated and regarded as the conflict stakeholders that they are? If 
the governments involved in such conflicts worked with refugee communities on this level, would 
this ease the struggle for power and control and thus facilitate temporary integration?  If indeed 
taking an alternative approach to displaced populations could facilitate integration (temporary or 
permanent) then it could conceivably also help ease the tension around the issue of di placement. 
Being that this is often one of the more irreconcilable factors in the conflict, particularly those 
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involving separatist dynamics, this alternate approach to displaced populati ns could conceivably 
help ease protraction and facilitate movement in the peace process.  
 The results of this study also carry some implications and specific recommendations for 
interventions carried out by non-governmental organizations and other groups involved in this 
conflict. There are implications here for both the types of interventions being done and how non- 
governmental organizations (NGOs) operate in this context. First, a number of NGOs that are 
engaged in grassroots peacebuilding conduct projects that attempt to improve relations laterally 
between Georgian IDPs and Abkhazians. The idea behind this would be to ease the prospect of 
return for both the IDP population and for Abkhazians by developing relations between he two 
communities on the grassroots level. However, the results of this study have suggested that in 
regards to the prospect of returning to Abkhazia, the issue of security is paramount. Their 
attitudes overwhelmingly suggest that the IDP population perceives the Georgia g vernment as 
the only entity able to provide sufficient protection from harm and from the prospect of being 
displaced again. Therefore, these findings call into question the utility of ateral Abkhaz-IDP 
peacebuilding and the ability of such projects to address the pertinent needs of the conflict and the 
parties involved.  
At the same time,  the findings that power may play a role in contributing to the status 
quo of the IDP population also carries some implications for interventions and projects by NGO.  
The results here suggest that involving the IDP population in the official peace process to a 
greater extent would be a possible way to address this disempowerment. As such, it may be 
beneficial to focus on building “up-down” relations and connections between the IDP community 
and the various bodies that are said to represent their interests at the elite level. Part of increasing 
the fluidity with which concerns and attitudes pass from the IDP community up through the ranks 
of government is obviously to mobilize key individuals that can move among these lev ls of 
society (Lederach, 1997). However, there are a number of ways in which NGOs could foster 
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greater empowerment and involvement within the IDP community. For example, advocacy 
training within the IDP community might serve to foster greater political involvement in this 
community not simply on the issue of the conflict, but on improving quality of life among the 
community and pushing for a meaningful way of addressing their situation and the issue of 
integration. Finally, on another note, this study has also suggested that the provision of aid can 
also serve to further entrench the status quo of the conflict when it is given as a sort of “life-
support” providing both the IDP community and people in the separatist regions just enough 
support to get by. This makes the status quo bearable but does not provide enough resources to 
change or improve it. This suggests that aid providers to both the IDP and Abkhaz community 
should attempt to channel resources to fund the improvement of the quality of life such as 
investing in infrastructure or food production tools and supplies, rather than continuing to provide 
subsistence-oriented aid.      
 
 Perhaps the most immediate areas of relevance for this study are for th  Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict. At the time of writing, the outcomes and status of the conflict between 
Georgia and Russia are uncertain as of yet, and little talk of negotiations or peace processes have 
been made public. However, roughly six months after the brief outburst of violence b tween these 
states dominated news headlines it has become apparent that neither side is approaching the 
issues of the separatist states and the populations displaced from them in a way th t departs 
significantly from the approach taken in 1994 when the initial ceasefire was signed. That is to 
say, the governments and international organizations involved in this conflict failed miserably in 
the mid 1990’s to confront in a fruitful and productive way the more contentious issues in this 
conflict, particularly the issue of IDP return. The consequences of this failure are obvious: the 
conflict has gone unresolved for roughly fifteen years and the population displaced by the conflict 
has remained in a state of prolonged uncertainty and limbo during that time.  
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 Six months after the “August War” of 2008 ended, the analysis and debate over this brief 
but intense conflict still tends to center on issues of Russia’s military conduct, questions of “who 
started it,” and what these events mean for the former Soviet Union and the West. Yet, it would 
be a significant loss if at some point this debate does not shift to thequestion of: “how did this 
happen?”  The unresolved status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be blamed entirely for the 
recent outburst of violence between Georgia and Russia, but it did play a role in triggering and 
allowing the most recent round of fighting there. As the international community watches events 
unfold in and around Georgia, it should eventually be asking itself why these conflicts were 
allowed to go unresolved for so long, and why the peace processes that began with ceasefire in 
1994 and 1995 (in Abkhazia then South Ossetia respectively) were able to linger and stagnate for 
so long without reaching any formal agreement on status. As these events conti ue to unfold in 
the Caucasus, one can hope that the issue of the displaced persons involved and th question of 
repatriation will be approached with the urgency, seriousness and inclusiveness that they clearly 
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Appendix B: Interview Questionnaire 
 
Section A – Displacement and Assistance Information 
General Information: 
1. In what area/region did you live before being displaced? 
2. When did you leave? 
3. Where did you initially go after being displaced? How long were you there? 
About Assistance: 
4. What kind of assistance did you receive immediately following displacement?  
5. Have there been any changes between the amount and type of support that you used to receive  
and the support that you receive now? 
6. To your knowledge, what have been the sources of this assistance: government, interna io al 
agencies, NGO’s? 
7. In your opinion, what are some ways that providers of aid and programs could be more helpful 
to IDP’s? 
 
About Return & Integration: 
8. Do you seek to return to the area from which you were displaced?  
9. If yes, is it to live permanently, to visit, to collect belongings, or for an ther reason?  
10. Why do you want to return (or why do you not want to return)?  
11. To what degree are you integrated (ie having permanent place to live, having a job, becoming 
part of host community) here? 
12. On a scale of 1 to 5, Are you treated well by people who live in the host community (5 being 
very well, 1 being very badly)? 
13. Do you see your integration here as permanent or temporary?  
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14. What do you need for you and your family to be integrated here with native dwellers, and to 
feel part of the community? 
 
Section B – Experiences With and Thoughts on Conflict Resolution 
1. If seeking return on a permanent or residential basis, do you intend to return to the specific 
town/area where you resided before you left? 
2. What are your feelings towards those who live in the region where you used live? How would 
you characterize these people? 
3. Have you had any contact with Abkhaz since being displaced? If so, how did you react to it? 
How would you describe the experience? 
4. If you were to return, what part of this would be most challenging/most difficult or you? 
5. If you were to return, what fears might you have about doing so? 
6. On a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being most challenging, 1 being the easiest), how challenging would it 
be for you to: 
 -Live in the same town as Abkhaz people? 
 -Live next door to Abkhaz people? 
 -Be friends with Abkhaz people? 
 -Share land or other important things with Abkhaz people? 
7. If you were to return, do you think that you would find it helpful to talk or meet with an 
Abkhaz person before returning? 
8. If given the chance would you be willing to participate in a dialogue or other me ting with 
Abkhaz people? 
 a. If yes, what worries or fears might you have about doing this? 
 b. If yes, what would you expect to gain by participating? 
c. If no, why not? 
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9. Have you ever participated in a project or activity (since being displaced) where you worked or 
met with Abkhaz? 
 a. If yes, please describe the experience. 
 b. If yes, please describe what was challenging and rewarding about this experence. 
10. As you know, different people tend to handle conflict and disputes in different ways, for 
example, some people try to avoid arguments or disputes, others see it as a competition that they 
can win. Could you please tell me about the kinds of disputes that you typically fae? (For 
example: small disputes or arguments with neighbors, friends, or family?) How do you usually 
deal with these conflicts?  
11. What kinds of disputes do you think you might face in your community if you were to return?  
12. How would you imagine that you would handle these types of disputes? 
a. If this first approach doesn’t work? 
 
Additional Questions if respondent wants to return to live permanently: 
13. Under what conditions would you be willing to return? 
14. What would it take for these conditions to exist? 
15. Would you be willing to return without state protection if you were able to build relationships 







   
   
 
 
 
 
